Had a chance to review this "Tractatus" by @judge_jowday this morning. . . very interesting.

It appears to be a sort of gnomic, Wittegenstein-style philosophy of cryptolaw, intended to reconcile the two paradigms of "law is law" and "code is law".
There is no 'color commentary' provided on what the 'Tractatus' is supposed to mean or do, who would use it, whether it's meant to be descriptive or prescriptive, etc.

@judge_jowday 's intentions are open to interpretation.
The first few sections (1-3) are pretty boring, and appear to just be setting the stage for how to talk about law. They define law as an enforceable and enforced governance system consisting of rules, rights, duties and canons. (Debatable definitions).
Section 4 is where it gets interesting--defining "autonomy" as the state of "independence from laws".
It defines two flavors of "autonomy". The interesting flavor--"absolute autonomy"--arises when law is "unenforceable" against certain persons or in certain circumstances--arguably (I think?), like in robustly decentralized blockchain/DeFi systems.
I guess the idea here is that if a law is, for practical purposes, unenforcable re: certain users of certain technologies (due to decentralization + anonymity + mutation-resistance), it's not really "law" in those circumstances.
"Autonomous law" (Section 5) is defined (a bit mysteriously) as "the law-of-the-absence-of-law". I don't fully understand this, but I guess the idea is to deduce a sort of "law" from the outcomes that consistently arise in autonomous circumstances.
Sections 6-7 are about "cryptolaw"--a type of autonomous law governing "autonomous cryptosystems"--and "metalaw"--a type of "treaty" between cryptolaw and ordinary law.
"Cryptolaw" seems to me like an attempt to explain the intuitions behind "code is law" more precisely, and as trying to show the ways normal legal assumptions break down within "autonomous cryptosystems".
"Cryptolaw replaces rules with code, rights with powers, duties with incentives and canons with consensus."

This strikes me as a really concise way of explaining the paradigm clash.
In legacy finance, transactions do not occur without agreements, rights and duties. If two parties want to transact, they make mutual promises which are enforceable in law if breached.
By contrast, if someone fails to "pay back" their tokens borrowed from Compound or RAI borrowed from Reflexer, no one thinks they've "breached a contract" or "violated a promise"--instead, they just take a haircut on their deposit.
Smart contract enforcement mechanisms can always be *analogized* to traditional contracts, but there is no real need for this. It would be silly to say that someone has *promised* to pay their RAI back--they merely have a strong mechanically enforced incentive to do so.
So, I think this is sort of the point of this definition of "cryptolaw". There's a lot more there & I don't fully understand all of it, but I feel like I get the gist and that it (mostly) makes sense up to a point.
Finally, we get to "Metalaw" (Section 7), which is probably the densest and most interesting part. This basically sets forth a set of presumptions that traditional law is supposed to apply when dealing with autonomous cryptosystems / cryptolaw.
I suppose the idea behind this is that, although traditional law is practically unenforceable "on-chain," it can still try to impose "off-chain" remedies relating to on-chain events.

But it should do so with greater deference to the cryptolaw paradigm.
More pointedly, this could be seen as a proposal for a sort of 'crypto bill of rights' that the "laws of states and nations" should respect.
This 'metalaw' has too much for me to summarize, but the core proposal seems to be that people have a basic right to write create, deploy and use autonomous cryptosystems.
When people use autonomous cryptosystems to achieve essentially normal ends--e.g., centralized control of an asset--they can have the normal liabilities associated with ownership, etc.
But the truly autonomous uses of these systems--e.g., use of an immutable smart contract--should not carry the ownership/causation prejudices from traditional law. Such smart contracts would be independent "legal persons"--like corporations--and users would have limited liability
The Tractatus proposes that these autonomy-favoring presumptions could only be overcome using the standard of criminal liability--i.e., with evidence beyond all reasonable doubt, as decided by a jury of 12 independent experts.
All in all, while I am not sure what exactly could be done with the Tractatus practically--obviously, it would be tough to get governments to adopt the 'metalaw'--it does a good job of capturing some of the deep 'paradigm clash' legal issues & provides some good conceptual tools.

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More from @lex_node

26 Oct
If you talk to lawyers in the space who are working on SEC defenses for DeFi projects, one of the biggest issues is that internal chats/communications (discoverable by SEC) lapse into talking about the project as if it were any tech start-up instead of a FOSS project
if you talk like you're running a business, there is a high risk that you will be regulated like you're running a business
people like to poke holes in how XRP has been treated vs. how ETH has been treated, but one of the biggest distinctions between them is that Vitalik and others are very disciplined--communicating that they basically research & develop network clients & designs for network clients
Read 8 tweets
24 Oct
I simultaneously agree that algo stablecoins like UST are very risky and experimental and disagree that USDC and DAI (which is also USDC) are categorically safer. Just different kinds of risks they expose you to.

A better comparison would be between UST and RAI.
USDC (and now by proxy DAI) expose you to counterparty risk, censorship risk, classic info asymmetries, classic agency problems and certain regulatory risk (I think both are securities or securities swaps).
UST and RAI present different kinds of risks around game theory, the adequacy of the incentives people are expected to respond to, etc.
Read 7 tweets
12 Oct
Well, today we got two very different statements on crypto/DeFi/tokens from two SEC commissioners, Hester Pierce and Caroline Crenshaw.
I will probably write something longer about this soon, but for moment what really strikes me--and that I hope everyone in crypto will understand--is that regardless of where they land on the issues, their respective takes are *extremely* well informed.
These two commissioners have, directly as well as through very informed advisors, taken a keen interest in studying DeFi & grappling with the issues it presents.
Read 11 tweets
11 Oct
Neurosis Token ($NEUR) is an insecurity.

Simply collateralize or wrap your existing tokens with $NEUR and they will be converted from non-compliant overconfident securities into fully compliant self-hating insecurities.
$NEUR will be airdropped only to U.S. persons.
Some people are asking about other $NEUR features:
--> stagflationary
--> aleatory (1M $NEUR randomly re-distributed every block)
-->negative 100,000% APY (drains all other tokens in your wallet--even your other wallets (thanks to our amazing partnership with @chain_analysis))
Read 4 tweets
11 Oct
good points from @stephendpalley

a smart gov't wouldn't "regulate devs" but would offer devs who do agree to be regulated certain safe harbors--e.g., 'get this license and we'll keep SEC away from you; otherwise, go take your chances with them'
@stephendpalley his key point is this & one I fully agree with--DeFi lacks both the traditional separation between ownership and control and 'counterparty' risk that most regulatory regimes are premised on

it has other sources of risk, but they are not addressed by those regulations:
@stephendpalley -->game theory risk (the risk that incentives designed into the system are inadequate to produce the desired outcomes)
-->tech implementation risk (the game theory is sound but implemented incorrectly)
Read 5 tweets
7 Oct
super simple fix to token securities laws:

*adapt section 13 and section 16, and call it a day--they would give all and only the needed disclosure

*don't regulate the tokens themselves as securities (unless that comes with a special version of secondary rules that works)
*a business developing software a deployed instance of which has native tokens valued at $1B+ must have its "insiders" (execs and token whales) file section 16 insider trading reports regarding that token (like insiders of public companies)
*a 10% plus holder of the token must also file section 16 reports

*any 5%+ holder (even if not in the biz of developing the software) must file section 13 reports

no financials, no CD&A, no executive comp disclosures, etc.--none of these things matter
Read 10 tweets

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