1/8
Thanks, Gerardo, but if domestic Argentine politics really are as hopeless as you say, then the only intelligent response would have been for investors to stop lending money. Instead, when the century bond was launched just four years ago, it was more than three times...
2/8
oversubscribed, even though much of the world found it astonishing (the WSJ called it "preposterous"). What is more, we know from history that the severe economic contraction associated with difficult debt restructurings tends to radicalize the population and...
3/8
worsen political outcomes, and current events in Argentina do not seem to be an exception. That is why I'd argue that there is no reason to assume that another decade of debt restructuring and economic pain will result in anything useful.
4/8
What history seems clearly to suggest instead is that Argentina will experience great economic suffering and disinvestment during the restructuring period, followed ultimately by significant debt forgiveness, only after which will the economy start to grow again.
5/8
But even if Buenos Aires is as hopeless as you say, my main point is that Washington should stop subordinating the interests of American producers, workers and farmers to the interests of international creditors.
6/8
When a country cannot access international capital, its debt repayments ultimately represent transfers from foreign producers to international creditors (including on this case many rich Argentines). The country itself is just collateral damage.
7/8
That's because an Argentina that spends the next decade with net debt-repayment outflows (almost certainly exacerbated by capital flight) is an Argentina that must by definition run large trade surpluses.
8/8
It can only do so by squeezing imports and increasing exports, which means that ultimately foreign manufacturers and farmers must fund the transfers. But it should be international investors who bear the cost of their high-yield lending, not American and global producers.

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More from @michaelxpettis

31 Oct
1/6
Rather than simply extending debt that is never going to be repaid anyway, Washington should be working with Buenos Aires to complete a final restructuring of Argentine debt with considerable debt forgiveness.
ft.com/content/814e08…
2/6
Other countries besides Argentina are facing similar problems, and allowing this mess to drag on for another decade helps no one. More importantly, and contrary to what many assume, how this is resolved isn't something that matters only to Argentina's international creditors.
3/6
It matter just as much to American farmers who compete with Argentine agricultural exports. That's because countries struggling with external debt and B-o-P difficulties usually see their imports collapse, and are forced to export a larger share of what they produce.
Read 6 tweets
30 Oct
1/7
One of the things I teach my PKU students is that much of what we learn in economics is applicable to the US or the UK, where most economic thinking has developed, far more than to countries, like China, with very different institutions.

scmp.com/news/article/3… via @SCMPNews
2/7
This seems to be a typical example: "China’s central bank has ordered the country’s lenders to meet new asset and leverage standards to make them more resistant to risk." China wants to adopt FSB standards domestically, but these are unlikely to have the same domestic impact.
3/7
In a market-based economy, it is possible that stricter financial regulations may reduce financial risk by constraining the ability of the financial sector to support non-productive spending and excessively risky behavior (although even here, a strict Minskyite might demur).
Read 7 tweets
29 Oct
1/9
Very interesting article about what after many years is starting to become a consensus – i.e. the similarities between China today and Japan in the late 1980s. I agree with Harding that China can learn a lot from Japan’s mistakes.
ft.com/content/af51a7…
2/9
I am skeptical however about what he believes to be the most important difference between the two. He notes that Japanese output per capita in the late 1980s was four-fifths the American level, whereas Chinese output per capita today is only one-fifth American levels.
3/9
This means, he says, that “Japan in 1990 had run out of room to catch up, whereas China still has a way to go.” I think economists overstate the tendency of developing countries to converge with advanced economies. There certainly is little evidence that this indeed happens.
Read 9 tweets
28 Oct
1/6
More evidence that Beijing is trying to enforce Xi Jinping's demand for less of the "fictional" growth that has characterized much Chinese growth in the past several years: "With local government debt rising, the central government ordered...
caixinglobal.com/2021-10-28/fou…
2/6
local governments with high debt levels to vigorously reduce operating expenses of government offices and outlays for construction." Among other things local governments are being told to stop constructing unnecessary government buildings, hotels and convention centers.
3/6
The problem isn't the debt per se so much as the huge amount of non-productive expenditure which, because it was capitalized when it should have been expensed, has overstated real growth and has created trillions of dollars of fictitious wealth.
carnegieendowment.org/chinafinancial…
Read 6 tweets
27 Oct
1/4
According to People's Daily, in the first nine months of 2021 industrial profits for businesses with revenues of over RMB 20 million amounted to RMB 6.34 trillion, or roughly 7.6% of GDP.
en.people.cn/n3/2021/1027/c…
2/4
In the past two years industrial profits have grown at nearly four times the pace of GDP (41.2% versus 10.5%), driving the industrial-profit share of GDP up substantially from what I calculate to be roughly 6.1% in 2019 (and 5.8% in 2020).
3/4
Given that all GDP is distributed to households, businesses and government, soaring industrial profits on China seem to have been balanced mainly by lagging household income growth. Lower relative wages obviously can drive both.
Read 4 tweets
26 Oct
1/7
For years I’ve been arguing (against most analysts focusing on China, I should add) that much of the GDP “growth” generated by Chinese investment in property and infrastructure should not be considered part of China’s GDP on a basis comparable to...

caixinglobal.com/2021-10-25/edi…
2/7
that of other countries. It was not real economic growth so much as residual activity designed to bridge the gap between real economic growth and the politically optimal GDP growth target. On a comparable basis, I argued, China's GDP growth was probably closer to 3%.
3/7
It now seems, at least within China, that this is becoming a consensus view. According to yesterday's Caixin editorial, “at present, China is facing inadequate investment, weak consumption, a complicated external environment and substantial downward pressure on its economy."
Read 7 tweets

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