Let's look at the EU gas situation (ex Serbia, Ukraine, Norway, CH). Overall, the seasonal %-fill for EU members (below) is lowest in a decade (yellow line). That will not change as we show below. Train left the station.
Meanwhile, the withdrawals of natural gas are coming in seasonally the earliest in a decade! Again, yellow line. If that trajetory (in GWh/d) remains, EU gas prices will hit record soon again. IMHO, a likely. We will see.
So is the gas coming overproportionally in? Answer: no, overall injection rate (in GWh/d) is in fact seasonally low. Only 2011 & 2012 were lower. However, ...
back in 2011 & 2012 etc., EU used a lot less natural gas (i.e. working gas volume).
Were is the gas seasonally missing? Answer: Austria, Germany (both due to Gazprom), the Netherlands but also Italy. France? Fine, after all they are mainly using nuclear energy :-). Below the Netherlands!
Here is Austria: 56% is the lowest. Only Ukraine (which is gas starved geopolitically by Russia) has less. Austria matters a lot. With Baumgarten, it is gas hub for Central & Eastern Europe (CEE) or 80 million people. Poland looks fine (96%), but rest is low, between 75-86%.
Denmark is also low. Not dramatic at 81% but worth mentioning because it was one of the reasons why the EU runs low on gas. Danish offshore wind farms did not deliver this summer as expected. It just had a below wind season. Period.
Germany is EU's largest gas consumer. It's fill % (below) is seasonally lowest in 10 years. Gazprom has not filled its German "Gazprom storage". I am not competent to speculate why. Is it geopolitics or simply a gas production issue at Gazprom? More insight welcome!
Since the spike in EU gas prices, VVP mentioned he will inject come 9 Nov. One measure is the injection point. Data goes back to 2014. Never been so low! Why? The NS2 pipeline approval in Germany? Not sure it is that easy.
I just don't see the fix in the coming weeks looking at seasonal injection patterns (in GWh/d). Does not make sense to suddenly have gas that is seasonally needed (Russian winter). But maybe I am wrong. Maybe Gazprom can inject 40TWh at will. Certainly no Russian gas expert.
If they can, they should start asap because the weather forecast is for a cold December in Germany. That will not help restrain withdrawal rates. In sum, I don't see the fix for EU gas prices. We will see.
In this episode, we discuss China's 2nd of 5 economic paths it can follow.
This episode will also focus on Xi the leader. To understand Xi means to better understand China's economic path forward.
1/n #China
Can China replace malinvestment with more consumption?
Answer: Maybe a little bit & over a long time frame, but President Xi does not want to focus on this path. Instead, he wants to implement his socialist utopia.
2/n
Yes, China’s rising entrepreneurs were welcomed by the Communist Party for at least two decades. But all of that is in reverse.
Under Xi Jinping, China has moved full circle: from low growth & low freedom in the pre-reform era back towards something similar today.
In this episode, we discuss China's investment-led growth model & the first of 5 economic paths China can follow.
As you would expect, also this episode is full of Chinese characteristics!
1/n #China
Starting in 1990s, China’s economic engine has been fueled by capital investments.
Its central planning bureau defined GDP targets, picked winners and drove growth from debt-driven capital formations (green line).
2/n
Has any other nation tried this before, ever? Not to our knowledge.
We checked at ALL G20 economies and their respective growth models for past 70 years. 45% capital formation share is a unique experiment in economic history.
Over the past 3 years, we made some controversial calls in commodities. We decided to exit our oil holding in Aug 2022, we went short natgas in early 2023 or called for copper to go lower in May.
Why? Because we have an egde on China.
1/n #China
Yes, mainstream media picked up pace on important issues facing China today.
Most came to understand that the property bubble burst, that the economy is slowing, that geopolitical frictions are emerging, that there is too much debt.
But do they understand the underlying forces that drive these issues?
2/n
While the majority of these facts are known, most Western observers, investors & industrialists do not fully appreciate their interdependence & the structural changes that are unfolding in China today.
Pre-2020, Gold had one marginal buyer, that being gold-backed ETFs.
Today, gold has at least 3 marginal buyers that can overlap or alternate each other. They are:
- Gold backed Western ETFs (which buy, sell or hold based on US real rates);
- Central Banks seeking higher gold reserves (China; India; Thailand; Vietnam; Qatar, KSA or even Poland) for geopolitical & other reasons;
- Chinese & other Asian wholesale or retail market participants and professional speculators;
Who bought most last? India!
Why? The government cut import duties on gold by 9% at end of July, triggering a renewed surge in demand. “The impact of the duty cut was unprecedented, it was incredible,” said Philip Newman, managing director of Metals Focus in London. “It really brought consumers in.”
At least for now, there seems to be always somebody.
1/n
Note however that Chinese retail buying has slowed down recently, as best illustrated by the Shanghai gold premium over international prices.
I will elaborate on the Chinese retail clients more soon.
2/n
However, professional Chinese speculators have increased their futures positions somewhat again. Who is the better indicator of what comes next, retail or the pros? IDK
In 2023, I said I will tweet less about oil and I will stick to this promise but today I make an exception and will break the promise as we enter a period of more volatility for oil...
So let's talk about OPEC and Saudi market share. It's decision making time.
The Saudis decided to keep oil from falling <$75 for 2y by cutting overproportionally in their OPEC+ quota context.
They have cap for 12mbpd but produce 9mbpd. It was 10.5mbpd in 2022. Pick a number but they are 15-20% below their fair share.
2/n
Why did they do so?
Likely because of bad advisers. There is a whole crew of supply gloomers out there charging clients money to claim the Permian or US shale is about to roll over.
Let me share some real time data on the EU natgas market that are hard to get.
European gas consumption for 28 countries matches last's years to the cubic meter (Oct 2022 - Oct 2023 = Year 2022).
However, consumption remains 17% below 2019/20 season.
Is there a supply issue? Rubbish. The global LNG market is oversupplied from every corner; EU storages will be filled by end of Aug where we sit. We have too much gas.
#TTF 1/4 (in mcm/day and YTD)
Three factors matter why there is less consumption vs 2019/20 season:
1) Milder weather: 70% of total consumption is temperature related. Temperatures are milder, thus Europe consumes 14% less vs 2019/20.
Is that permenant? It sure looks like a trend where I sit. But climate scientists can answer that best.
Households Consumption; 2/4
2) Less power generation: Europe replaces more and more natgas in the grid with solar & wind and in the case of France with better capacity utilisation of its nuclear fleet. That adds up...!