Page 79 of the White Coat Waste Project FOAI doc is very interesting.

I'll just put it here with my notes in red. Read these first.
@MaraHvistendah @fastlerner
@AndrewKerrNC @anthonybellotti
The bat sampling is for markets AND surrounding caves & forest:
So it definitively includes wild-caught bats too:
Additionally this sampling was to involve Chinese samplers, the usual collaborators of EHA, and all the samples were to be processed at the WIV.
Now we have a very plausible direct route from Laos to Wuhan, a route with two options:

#1 Wuhan bat sampler infected on field sampling trip.
Interestingly this is an hypothesis that Callahan himself has on the top of his list.

politico.com/news/magazine/…
siliconicarus.org/2020/07/31/dar…
#2 Research accident in Wuhan when manipulating a Laos BANAL-like BatCoV (possibly used as a backbone where a Yunnan-type spike was introduced).

Basically the exact recipe given in DEFUSE:
.. a recipe which according to the sudden urge to sequence that boring RaTG13 in 2018, seems to have been much more than just theoretical:
Anyway - what a mess!

Now if you still think that it is more plausible that a wildlife infection or market animal with a BANAL like BatCoV made its way of all places to Wuhan (and nowhere else), without the help of such a research project, then good luck to you.
There is also something that baffles me here.

How come that the USAID / State Dep agreed to have these samples from Laos and other countries all sent to the WIV?

Come on! This is DURC and you use the WIV to process them all.
Is anybody watching?
And it fully breaks Callahan's basic rule for this kind of Cooperative Threat Reduction game:

>> One should always try to involve local labs and not just ship to a foreign lab (and certainly not China!) <<

What is going on?nap.edu/catalog/23484/…
This should force a serious downgrade of the market zoonotic origin.

=> The most direct - and correctly **exclusive** - link between a BANAL type specimen from a market or cave in Laos and Wuhan now goes via the WIV and EHA.
And it also allows for the presence of a BANAL type sample in Wuhan just at the right time, if one considers a lab accident, potentially as backbone for a chimera with a nasty spike.

Last, this proposal breaks the DURC CTR game rules - EHA is basically running wild.
EHA is not reducing the DURC risk but actually increasing it, by using Chinese and local teams to send market and wild caught bats samples directly to the WIV.

A grave mistake in the CTR game. That this could be allowed shows a total dereliction of duty from the supervisors.
Samples from Laos were sent to the WIV from June-17 to May-19 (years 4 and 5).

That email on page 60 basically says 'as we did with year-4, we would like again to collect samples in South East Asia (markets, caves, etc) and send them to the WIV for year 5 (to May 19)'.
It cannot have started before year 3, since EHA first asked to be able to send samples from Laos and other neighbours to China in that email below dated May 2016, at the time of the end of year-2 reporting (p.75-76).
The question is: Did they also ship South East Asian samples to the WIV in year 3 (June 16- May 17)?

The answer is very likely no based on p.70, p.80. p.101 and also based on the specific demand for Burma (p.84) [and despite B.6 aim on page 175]:
Also based on the answer for Burma (a more complex process due to USG sanctions), we can see that they would have likely targeted at least 4 samplings over the 2 years in Laos (p. 89).
Now if you want to understand why EHA decided to sample neighbouring countries in the middle of the grant, it all goes to the their observation of a reduction in the purchase of wildlife at wet markets in South-China and a shift to trade with other countries.

See page 181, 187:
Page 178 is interesting because is give the basic approach 'sample / check spike / create mutant' for both SARS and MERS:
I have not seen any paper under that R01 grant about the BatCoV samples from Laos and other neighboring countries sent to Wuhan.

- Why no paper?
- Can we see the sequences of the Laos BatCoVs sent to Wuhan?
In Sep 19, EHA published their findings about high-risk people in Southern China (including low seropositivity of 0.6%) covering work for years 2 to 4 (to Jul 17).

Nothing since about these BatCoVs, especially the ones from Laos. ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/labs/pmc/artic…

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More from @gdemaneuf

4 Nov
People are starting to talk about the likely real death toll for Covid-19, centered around 12 mln.

Detailed estimates have been available for months.

But, by and large, the media tend to stick to the 5 mln number which is way below actual.

fb.watch/935ITt8kS-/
Why stick to the 5 mln when it is very clear that there is dramatic underreporting in many countries, especially developing ones?

Is it because people prefer to report a very wrong number that is supposedly precise, instead of fairly spread estimate that is way more correct?
Thus effectively gaining an illusory precision at the cost of a massive bias..

Or because it comes from country officials. Effectively trading critical thought for some official backing.

The role of media is to question numbers, no to go for the blatantly wrong & easy solution.
Read 6 tweets
3 Nov
That recent letter from the Committee on Energy and Commerce to Collins is really worth reading

Some very interesting revelations about four highly relevant letters between NIH and EcoHealth discussing EcoHealth’s research proposal.

republicans-energycommerce.house.gov/wp-content/upl…
Letters which have not been made public (why?) but for which HHS arranged an 'in camera' review of printed copies by a bipartisan Committee, at HHS headquarters on Oct 5 and monitored by HHS staff.

See particularly pages 6 and 7:
What they show is how easily EHA argued that their research objectives did not constitute GoF, against the initial concerns of the NIH.
Read 9 tweets
31 Oct
Some interesting differences on the WIV portal, showing how web.archive.org can be harnessed:

Removal of many international links on the 22 Mar 2021:
web.archive.org/web/diff/20210…
'Projects' and 'Achievements' entries removed on 2 Sep 2020.
web.archive.org/web/diff/20200…
Easy to do from the 'Changes' page on web.archive.org:
web.archive.org/web/changes/ht…
Read 5 tweets
30 Oct
Let's get a few things clear about this declassified ODNI assessment (ODNI: Office of the Director of National Intelligence) :
washingtonpost.com/national-secur…
First as is written on page 2:
"This assessment is based on information through August 2021."

In other words it does NOT include any information that has come up since the summary assessment of 26th Aug 21.
dni.gov/index.php/news…
In particular it does not include the DEFUSE revelations (especially about the FCS).

Or the latest revelations that show that GoF on BatCoVs was indeed happening within the WIV.

It is based on data frozen in time - nothing new since the summary report: dni.gov/index.php/news…
Read 16 tweets
29 Oct
@BiophysicsFL @stuartjdneil @Ayjchan @TheSeeker268 @R_H_Ebright @breakfast_dogs The BSL-4 was not studying BatCoVs, this was instead done in various institutions at BSL-2 and BSL-3, so the location argument - while being essentially correct - is a bit misleading.
@BiophysicsFL @stuartjdneil @Ayjchan @TheSeeker268 @R_H_Ebright @breakfast_dogs Also the historical argument which considers a zoonosis 1000x more probable (a priori) than a lab leak is incorrect.

It’s only over the last 15 years that BatCoVs have been extensively studied, and there were 6 primary cases of LAIs including one with community outbreak.
@BiophysicsFL @stuartjdneil @Ayjchan @TheSeeker268 @R_H_Ebright @breakfast_dogs Not counting that outbreak because it was not a pandemic is based on another wrong generalisation: it’s only during the last few years that China was looking at enhanced pathogenicity of BatCoVs at scale using passaging or by building chimeras (you can date that to 2017).
Read 9 tweets
29 Oct
There is quite a bit of confusion as to what was by EHA reported and when.

So let me try to clarify this.
wsj.com/articles/coron…
Issue #1: the WIV1-SHC014 experiment.

The NIH tries to call it 'limited' and 'unexpected'.
[I won't go trough the details but it is not much unexepected as far as I can tell - it's a fully possible result that was being tested for here.]
That was part of year 5 reporting - officially submitted on the 3rd August 2021 according to the records.
Read 11 tweets

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