Many governments realize they’ve “lost” their chance to ban end-to-end encrypted messaging, but they also realize it doesn’t matter because unencrypted backups are much more useful.
https://twitter.com/tobie/status/1456602494445002756
So predictably the vanguard of the conversation has shifted away from E2EE (which is in many places a done deal) to device backups — which are still not widely E2EE encrypted.
I personally think that governments want to preserve unencrypted backups because it provides investigative capability. (Ie. they can subpoena Apple to get your texts.) And CSAM fear is just a tool that politicians are using to preserve this capability. But 🤷♂️.
Something to keep in mind is that, as useful as phone backups are, they’re not some ancient investigative capability that law enforcement has always depended on. If iCloud Backup was a child, it would be in 5th grade.
Hell, if the era of widely-used smartphones was a child, it would only be in 8th grade. Which, based on personal experience, means it would be impossible to wake up in the morning.
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
