One big-picture lesson of the cascade of failures from the CDC, FDA, and the great COVID test debacle is that American science badly needs a scientific revolution of its own.
Our 20th-century institutions aren't enough to guide 21st-century progress.
This is a piece about Fast Grants—an Operation Warp Speed for scientific funding, from @tylercowen and @patrickc—but it's also about how Fast Grant's success is an important indictment of a big, broken scientific funding system.
I've spent a lot of time the last few months thinking about the problems in the way we fund scientific discovery.
And I think one summary of that reporting is that American science suffers from 3 big paradoxes—of trust, expertise, and experimentation.
1. The trust paradox
People in professional circles like saying that we “believe the science." But the current grant funding apparatus doesn't really actually the best scientists in the world to pursue the research agendas that they themselves think are best.
2. The specialization paradox I
The U.S. education system takes great pains to train scientists to be monkish specialists—but professional scientists are typically forced to spent 25-40% of their time not doing science, but rather begging for money.
2 (cont). The specialization paradox II
This era of specialization has very likely coincided with a measured slowdown in scientific productivity.
3. The experimentation paradox
The first scientific revolution was, in large part, a revolution of experimentation. But the current scientific funding system is the opposite of experimental. It is the bureaucratic extension of a post-WWII hypothesis about how science should work
The pandemic was a reminder that much of human welfare is downstream of scientific progress.
We shouldn’t have to depend on 20th-century institutions to guide 21st-century progress. The lesson of Fast Grants is that we don’t have to.
The gap between the "real" vs "observed" economy is an interesting recent theme
2017: Democratic econ confidence dips (but things are fine!)
Late 2020: GOP confidence dips (but things are getting better!)
Today: Consumer sentiment in the dumps (but the economy's kinda booming!)
I don't want to overplay the boominess of the economy. Gas prices are up, the supply chain's a mess, buying a car is a nightmare, etc.
What's interesting, however, is that personal finances are in good shape, while consumers expectations are at *decade lows*
"... a complete rout of net favorable views of buying conditions: household durables fell to the lowest level since 1980, vehicles fell to the lowest level since 1974, and homes to the lowest level since 1982 ... all due to complaints about high prices"
The 1990s happened to be when cable TV neared its financial apex, drew in big-time showrunners whose hits had a flywheel effect that, over time, sucked original stories to the smaller screen
Recently there's been a movement to fight workism with, eg, UBI, 4-day workweeks, anti-burnout policies
What if it's the ideology of the anti-workists that's the actually elite ideology?
What if the working class + MC immigrants are way more workist than we (or, I) assumed? And their resistance to universal programs stems from a deep belief that policy SHOULD revolve around work?
There is a fandom faction within both parties that says a lot about their forking paths
Republicans idolize conspiratorial, institution-smashing outsiders, while many Democrats make bobbleheads from bureaucratic heroes, or within-the-system saviors
My point isn't that these distinct tastes for political heroes are equivalent, or equally rational.
But there is a difference here that clearly exists, which says something important, I think, about education polarization, trust in institutions, and baseline paranoia re: elites.
I don't think everything is downstream of education polarization, but the GOP Outsider Savior vs. Democratic Insider Hero dynamic definitely is.
If, at a gut level, you just trust advanced-degree leaders of traditional institutions, you're gonna fish in that pond for heroes.