Thread by @LentonAC

Happy to share my new publication!📚

In 2010, 13 of Russia's ethnic republics had presidents, before a law required them to change the title. As of 2021, only Tatarstan's remains. What can this tell us about identity and center-region relations in #Russia? 🧵
#polisci #Eurasia

https://twitter.com/ponarseurasia/status/1456697503089369092

Quite a lot, I suggest! For one thing, a common perception of post-Yeltsin Russia is of a dominant centralizing government and compliant regions. In reality, there's more bargaining and contestation than this suggests.

Both Moscow and Kazan have treated the issue of Tatarstan's presidency quite delicately, even when the title contradicted federal law.

As I argued in a recent article in Russian Politics, part of the reason has to do with symbolic politics and legitimacy (feel free to message me for a copy): doi.org/10.30965/24518…

In short: the presidency is a powerful symbol of Tatarstan's special status and of Tatars' historical claims of statehood. Even more so now: whilst the government could boast of ambitious Tatar-language education and treaty-based relations with Moscow, these both ended in 2017.

This has raised the stakes now that a bill was sent to the 🇷🇺parliament on September 27 that elaborates upon the “unified system of public power” that appeared in the 2020 🇷🇺 Constitutional Amendments: amongst other things, regional leaders' titles cannot contain "president."

Tatarstan's State Council unanimously declared its objection to the proposed bill on October 25, displaying an unusual degree of official contestation.

One of the takeaways? Centralization has required leaders in Russia's regions to be smart political operators, balancing strong electoral (and other) support to the center with policies to cultivate grassroots legitimacy. But this is an increasingly difficult balance.