Thread by @supbrow

1/ This report from 1988 is a really interesting read, esp thru lens of the geopolitical situation in 2021, regarding China-US competition.

@cgberube @cdrsalamander @lawofsea @JerryHendrixII @graham_euan @ElbridgeColby @Rory_Medcalf @BDHerzinger @mercoglianos @man_integrated

2/ This report is also interesting after listening to @Ng_Eng_Hen speech at #AspenSecurity, with his sweeping historical view, and quotes from Singapore's LKY on the nature of US and China.

mindef.gov.sg/web/portal/min…

3/ Seems that 1998 and 2021 have a lot in common.

4/ This seems to be an enduring observation, almost always ignored, the higher up the chain of command one gets.

5/ Good to see that the thought on Unmanned vehicles has not really changed much...

6/ Wonder if Chinese PLA Strategists think the same about "Time & Surprise" regarding Taiwan, as the Soviets did?

7/ This is probabaly the most accurate statement in the whole report, when applied ot China.

8/ Here is a bullseye statement reagrding how China will treat its neighbours regarding border disputes:

9/ Here is the understatment of the year, well, actually last four decades.

10/ It's almost impossible to think that thhese kinds of disruptions won't happen between US & China in proxie battles in among other countries.

11/ Nailed it again. Remember SCUDs?

Well, they also explained the challenge, later called A2/AD, from Chinese missiles.

12/ What's more accurate than a Bullseye?

Describing our outsourcing of industrial capability and risk to supply chain for key materials and defense supplies in 1988.

Well, at least we have a Task Force in 2021.

13/ Section III on Shocks is worth reading in full.

How many Shocks & Dsconinutities have we seen since 1988?

14/ This one really makes you think hard.
11 SEP
GFC
COVID19
6 JAN

Hello, 1988? This is 2021. We'd like to have your Cold War clarity back.

15/ OMG. Nailed it.
Could you not have warned us more specifically about Trump?

16/ Two timeless questions for strategic planners:

17/ An important paragraph regarding Alliances & Partnerships:

18/ Section on Loss of US Bases is interesting.
Identifies the "streamlining" drive, for "sake of efficiency"
Also, written 2 years before getting kicked out of 🇵🇭
Role of USMC for amphibuous campaigns to seize bases.

20/ And nailed it again:
Impact of a US Setback or Defeat.
Read this whole section.
Then re-read SIGAR AFG Lesson Learned Report.
sigar.mil/interactive-re…

21/ 1988 thinking about the coming multipolar world:

22/ Looking at Asia, they are asking the same questisn that many are asking today.

23/ And the call for more analysts that understand the workings of rising powers.

This always seems to be pointed out as a critical requirement, but do we ever invest in this enough?

24/ An important section on the challenges of mobilization of the US Industrial Base.

More relevant today, than I think 1988 could even have predicted.

25/ And finally, important questisn about assumptions regarding US Basing Structure, or as we not call it, Force Posture. With the impending DoD Force Posture Study, I hope we aren't making any predictable mistakes in analysis, that 1988 warned about.

26/ Here is a link to "The Future Security Environment" reort of 1988:

books.google.com.sg/books?id=__YuA…

27/ As usual, sorry for all the typos.