In the biggest picture, it's pretty ridiculous that US college credentialism increased exponentially in the 20th century ... but the US higher education system stopped making elite physical universities in the 19th century.
An important/interesting exception is the unfurling of the UC system, which got its start in 1868. UCLA was founded in 1919 and UCSD in 1960.
Still means the youngest of the v good physical universities are near Social Security eligibility in age.
what i should have said:
the significance of college attainment in the US economy has grown by a lot during a period in which there's been very scarce expansion, experimentation, or invention in higher ed. no matter what you make of today's news, that's bad!
In the 30 years between 1865 and 1895, we built a lot of great universities. In the last 30 years, some state colleges did great things, but student debt blew up, for-profit scams proliferated, the Ivies barely grew, and we built ... what did we build?
One big-picture lesson of the cascade of failures from the CDC, FDA, and the great COVID test debacle is that American science badly needs a scientific revolution of its own.
Our 20th-century institutions aren't enough to guide 21st-century progress.
This is a piece about Fast Grants—an Operation Warp Speed for scientific funding, from @tylercowen and @patrickc—but it's also about how Fast Grant's success is an important indictment of a big, broken scientific funding system.
I've spent a lot of time the last few months thinking about the problems in the way we fund scientific discovery.
And I think one summary of that reporting is that American science suffers from 3 big paradoxes—of trust, expertise, and experimentation.
The gap between the "real" vs "observed" economy is an interesting recent theme
2017: Democratic econ confidence dips (but things are fine!)
Late 2020: GOP confidence dips (but things are getting better!)
Today: Consumer sentiment in the dumps (but the economy's kinda booming!)
I don't want to overplay the boominess of the economy. Gas prices are up, the supply chain's a mess, buying a car is a nightmare, etc.
What's interesting, however, is that personal finances are in good shape, while consumers expectations are at *decade lows*
"... a complete rout of net favorable views of buying conditions: household durables fell to the lowest level since 1980, vehicles fell to the lowest level since 1974, and homes to the lowest level since 1982 ... all due to complaints about high prices"
The 1990s happened to be when cable TV neared its financial apex, drew in big-time showrunners whose hits had a flywheel effect that, over time, sucked original stories to the smaller screen
Recently there's been a movement to fight workism with, eg, UBI, 4-day workweeks, anti-burnout policies
What if it's the ideology of the anti-workists that's the actually elite ideology?
What if the working class + MC immigrants are way more workist than we (or, I) assumed? And their resistance to universal programs stems from a deep belief that policy SHOULD revolve around work?