Thread by @usacac

THE 1941 GHQ MANEUVERS (Part II)

Early in this series we mentioned a concept known as Protective Mobilization. This was the American plan to build an initial military force capable of defending the United States if needed.

https://twitter.com/usacac/status/1374355401114853382?s=20

The Protective Mobilization effort generally coincided with events in the opening years of World War II (1939 to 1941), during which time Germany’s Panzer Divisions were spearheading their “seemingly invincible military machine.”

“These were powerful, mobile formations that exemplified the principles of speed, surprise, and shock.”

But armored vehicles were not “new” in 1939. During the First World War, General Pershing had authorized the creation of a 30-battalion Tank Corps as part of the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF), and that Tank Corps was authorized 15,000 men.

However, only four of those Tank Corps battalions ever saw action in WWI. But the @USArmy had contracts with manufacturers and so even after the Armistice, these companies were still delivering on their wartime contracts.

As a result, we ended up with more than 1000 British and French tanks only to then deactivate the Tank Corps and place all tanks under the Infantry Branch, as we discussed in recent weeks.

The Infantry kept tanks in a support role. They were to “facilitate the uninterrupted advance of the riflemen in the attack” and @USArmyDoctrine called for medium tanks to advance immediately behind a rolling barrage with the objective to “attack enemy anti-tank positions.”

Light tanks were to help subdue machinegun positions and other strongpoints, always accompanied by Infantry.

For many, this was the “logical” doctrinal approach to the use of tanks – but it did not help in the advancement of armor theory or explore the potential of using tanks as weapons systems. Having mostly obsolete equipment also hindered creativity in their application.

As a result, by 1940 the Infantry Branch had only eight tank battalions. Looking at the progress Germany was making in Europe, we would definitely need more.

We have also discussed the Cavalry Branch, which was not authorized tanks (under the National Defense Act of 1920) but did exercise some creativity and ended up with its own mechanized force, complete with “combat cars” which are definitely not tanks 👀

The Cavalry Branch’s attitude toward mechanization was inarguably more innovative than that within the Infantry Branch at the time. But this was largely because, for the most part, they operate differently and are assigned different missions.

Under then-Colonel Adna Chaffee, the 7th Cavalry Brigade (which only existed in this form until 1940) established an impressive record of accomplishments in the 1930s through field tests and maneuvers (exercises).

Through this effort, COL Chaffee decided that it was possible for a properly organized mechanized unit, like 7th Cavalry Brigade, to “strike the decisive blow in battle.” This is not really what Cavalry was designed for, but it shows significant forward thinking.

The progress made by 7th Cavalry Brigade in the 1930s led to the unit becoming a prototype for combined arms in a mechanized force – with two Cavalry regiments, an Artillery battalion, observation aircraft, and an Infantry regiment in 1940.

Leading up to the 1940 GHQ Maneuvers, multiple field armies contended for COL Chaffee’s brigade. The winner ended up being Lieutenant General Stanley Embick, who got use of the 7th Cavalry Brigade for Third Army’s Maneuvers in Louisiana that year.

LTG Embick also got the Provisional Tank Brigade under Brigadier General Bruce Magruder (pictured), which the Infantry Branch had created by pooling seven of its eight tank battalions. We talked a bit about this in the Armor Branch threads too.

At the end of the 1940 Maneuvers, the 7th Cavalry Brigade and the Provisional Tank Brigade were joined together to form the @USArmy’s first provisional mechanized division.

Despite these successful tests of the employment and application of these units and vehicles / weapons, Army Officers remained somewhat divided when it came to things like mechanization.

More than a few Army Officers believed that Germany’s successful use of Blitzkrieg in Poland in 1939 could not be duplicated against a first-rate opponent. In other words, some believed that Blitzkrieg was effective because Poland was not up to the task of defending against it.

Keep in mind that in the late 1930s, the United States Army ranked 17th in the world in size and efficacy – so this type of thinking was more than a little arrogant. Plus, the US has two natural defensive barriers that influenced the way many thought about national defense.

While our 1940 GHQ Maneuvers were underway, Germany launched mechanized forces against our Western Allies. In just 10 days, 9 Panzer divisions led the German Army to essentially “punch a clean hole” through the French defenses along the Meuse River and raced toward the Channel.

“This campaign made clear to all that mechanization had established a new era in warfare.”

On the last day of the 1940 Maneuvers, in the basement of a nearby high school, a special meeting took place.

Chaffee and Magruder, along with other interested Officers including COL George S. Patton and Brigadier General Frank Andrews (Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations), met to discuss the creation of an American mechanized branch.

These men all agreed that it was essential to give independence to a mechanized branch because the “Cavalry and Infantry had procrastinated too long already.”

Interesting enough, the Chief of Cavalry and the Chief of Infantry were both present in Louisiana at the time in order to observe the 1940 GHQ Maneuvers – and neither of them received invitations to the secret basement meeting.

The men in that high school basement compiled their recommendations and sent them to Washington with BG Andrews. About 10 days later, GEN Marshall informed the Branch Chiefs that a decision was made to create an autonomous armored force.

The War Department officially activated the Armored Force on 10 July 1940, naming Chaffee as its first Branch Chief. Within a week, 7th Cavalry Brigade became 1st Armored Brigade and the Provisional Tank Brigade became 2nd Armored Brigade in the new Armor Branch.

Incidentally, the word “Armored” was chosen intentionally since the Infantry had used the word “Tank” to label its tank units and the Cavalry had used “Mechanized” to label its mechanized units. What we needed was something different.

Chaffee was tasked with establishing the first of our Armored Divisions and determining how we would use them. “The natural decision would have been for Chaffee to copy the organization and doctrine of the German Panzer divisions.” Chaffee took a different approach.

While the @USArmy Armored Divisions had the same basic characteristics as Panzer divisions in 1940, with all elements being motorized, our divisions would not be subdivided to form battlegroups like the German units could.

Chaffee did agree with the philosophy of Heinz Guderian, the “father of the German Panzer Force”, in that Armored units should be all-purpose, not merely arms of exploitation, and when grouped en masse, “they were capable of striking the decisive blow in a battle.”

By 1941, in explaining the role of Armor to Congress, Chaffee said: “The role of an armored division is the conduct of highly mobile ground warfare, particularly offensive in character, by a self-sustained unit of great power and mobility…”

“… composed of specially equipped troops… on missions either strategical or tactical, whose accomplishment will effect to the maximum the total destruction of the enemy.”

This Armor Branch that Chaffee was authorized to set up and lead in the middle of 1940, was to organize, grow, train, and develop doctrine which would all be tested a year later in the 1941 GHQ Maneuvers 😬

Chaffee did not want to waste time. He set a date of 1 October 1940 when the new Armored Divisions would be ready for their first field training exercises.

Chaffee chose General Magruder (an Infantry Officer) to lead the @1stArmoredDiv , made from the 7th Cavalry Brigade, and General Scott (a Cavalry Officer) to lead the 2nd Armored Division, made from the Infantry’s Provisional Tank Brigade.

Patton was a Brigadier General at the time, also a Cavalry guy. He would eventually replace Scott as commander of the 2nd Armored Division in December of 1940.

This mix-match of leadership across the new Armored Force “was successful in loosening old affiliations” as seen in the esprit de corps that very quickly filled the Branch. This enthusiasm is credited with significantly helping them overcome obstacles they were about to face.

Remember that Anti-Mechanized Defense memo that we talked about a couple of weeks ago? Well, General McNair had managed a study and he brought results from his study of these anti-tank concepts to GHQ in 1940.

Among the findings were the inaccurate notion that 'armored forces' meant 'massed tanks' as opposed to combined arms task forces, and the idea that anti-tank guns should be pooled in order to defeat armored forces.

“With enemy armor neutralized by its anti-tank elements, the division would be otherwise free to get on with offensive operations.”

A new Anti-Mechanized Defense manual was released late in 1940.

“Field units were advised to post a minimum of their anti-tank guns in frontline positions and to retain as many as possible in reserve.”

“The field armies and corps, however, failed to take the initiative in developing their own anti-tank capabilities. Very few gun crews had ever seen a real tank in action; even fewer had fired a real anti-tank gun at a moving target.”

“The VI Corps and the Armored Force were the only headquarters to issue comprehensive anti-tank instructions to their troops.”

This approach, when combined with news of victory upon victory of German tanks in Europe, actually started to reinforce “unreasonable fear of the tank” within the US Army. GEN Marshall told his G-3 to study the possibility of highly mobile anti-tank units.

But no one could reach an agreement on this so Marshall solved the problem by assigning anti-tank defense to the G-3.

In less than two weeks, the G-3 produced “a recommendation for establishing divisional anti-tank battalions to reinforce regimental anti-tank companies.”

These were activated on 24 June 1941. Mere months before the 1941 Maneuvers would kick off in which the Armored Force and the Anti-Tank Forces would be put to the test.

If you're just tuning in or you've missed any of the previous threads, you can find them all saved on this account under ⚡️Moments or with this direct link twitter.com/i/events/13642…