Thread by @usacac

THE 1941 GHQ MANEUVERS (Part VI)

Let’s talk about the Umpire Manual today. The Umpire Manual was a @USArmy Field Manual that provided the guidance for assessing units in maneuvers. The one used in the 1941 GHQ Maneuvers was updated in February of that year.

While the manual is only about 30 pages long, it provides an interesting look at how these maneuvers in 1941 were scored and assessed by the officers who observed the entire thing.

It was written specifically for these large-scale, two-sided maneuvers – with free-thinking OPFOR to really challenge the Blue Force.

But the grading and guidance provided within the Umpire Manual could be applied to smaller, one-sided field exercises, command post exercises, and other forms of training, as appropriate.

(Paraphrasing from the Manual)

Maneuvers should be FREE, with each force able to act as it chooses, subject only to received field orders, terrain restrictions, and actions of the OPFOR.

Any prohibited areas and terrain restrictions should be published to both the BLUE and RED Forces beforehand, preferably with these areas printed on a map or overlay.

Maneuvers should be CONTINUOUS – if there was an armistice or rest period during maneuvers, at night for example, it lessens the realism and therefore undermines the training value.

But maneuvers should be BRIEF since fatigue limits the useful and profitable period of this type of exercise to about 48 hours. For longer periods, it is best to divide up the training into a series of maneuvers – which they did, and we still kind of do.

Maneuvers should be DIRECTED – a Director plans and conducts the maneuver.

A Director does NOT participate in the operations of either side, but rather acts as a supreme commander of both for the purpose of presenting the situation, initiating and terminating the maneuver, and giving instructions as necessary.

The Director also leads the critique or AAR processes.

Maneuvers should be UMPIRED – actual combat involves movement, fire, and physical contact with OPFOR (“shock action”).

For Maneuvers, movement can and should be real, approaching actual service conditions as closely as possible for the purpose of realism and training value.

Naturally, fire must be simulated, with or without the use of blank ammunition. And the effects of fire must be determined and indicated by the Umpires.

Hand-to-hand combat should not be real in the Maneuvers. (The fact that this had to be stipulated is a little amusing.) OPFOR will be stopped short of actual physical contact with BLUE Forces.

So, with the exception of movement, tactical progress was to be determined and indicated by the Umpires based on the strength, position, and firepower of the forces involved.

Umpires were assigned to units on both sides, but they were in no sense part of those units. Much like modern OC/Ts (Observer, Coach, Trainers) are present but not part of the Training Audience or Rotational Training Units at our Combat Training Centers. @OPSGRP_NTC @OpsGp_Jrtc

“Umpires are neutral in attitude and actions.”

The entire group of Umpires working one of these exercises was more or less superimposed on the exercise (maneuver) as a whole. They were to promote realism in every possible procedure and their decisions were to express and interpret tactical facts.

Regarding the troops involved in the Maneuvers – the soldiers must understand and conform to procedure established for maneuvers and accept the decisions of the Umpires. BUT they can call on Umpires for decisions when needed and for clarification of decisions that have been made.

It was essential that the Umpires avoid interfering and take care not to reveal the locations of units to which they were assigned by exposing themselves unnecessarily.

In other words, once an Umpire was assigned to a training unit, they were to respect and adhere to any restrictions on that unit, be it by location or for any other established reason.

The Umpires would fall under the Director of the Maneuvers. For large maneuvers such as these, the Director could designate a Chief Umpire and one or more Assistant Chief Umpires for handling admin, assignment/supervision/transportation/equipping of Umpires and so forth.

There were two types of Umpires in these large-scale maneuvers. Unit Umpires, which were those assigned to units with duties as described in the Umpire Manual. And Fire Umpires, which were responsible for marking artillery fires on the ground, also described in the manual.

Now, one thing these exercises did not have in 1941 was Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System or MILES gear. So they needed a method of assessing damage caused by engagements in the exercise, and a means of indicating that damage.

A decision was made to use flags, streamers, stickers, and placards. All of the BLUE Force soldiers would wear a blue hat band or brassard (armband); all of the RED Force would wear a red hat band or brassard.

The Red and Blue vehicles would be indicated by either a placard or sticker on the front and rear vehicles in the associated color. Armored vehicles would be marked by a red or blue cloth, and aircraft would have either a red or blue streamer.

The Director, Higher Command and Staffs, and all Umpires would wear white hat bands or white brassards and their vehicles marked with white flags. Umpire aircraft would have no streamers or indicators.

Umpires would use flags to indicate messages to the training units. If the unit Umpire had a white flag, all troops in that unit were to halt in place while that flag was on display.

If the unit Umpire displayed a blue flag, OPFOR Infantry or Horse Cavalry could advance toward the training unit up to where the flag was displayed because they were assessed to have fire superiority. The “weaker” troops were to withdraw. This did not apply to armored elements.

If the unit Umpire displayed a red flag, the OPFOR Infantry or Horse Cav was NOT to advance toward the training unit as they were assessed to NOT have fire superiority. Again, not applicable for armored units.

If a Fires Umpire displayed a red flag with a white center, it indicated that Artillery fire was falling within 100 yards of the flag.

And an orange flag was used by an Umpire to indicate that a crew had effective anti-tank gunfire from the location of the orange flag.

The Umpire Manual provided specifications for the flags. For example, White, Red, and Blue flags for foot troops were to be 4’ x 4’ and mounted on an 8’ staff. For mounted troops and armored vehicles, the flags were 2’ x 2’ on a 5’ staff.

There was a whole system for scoring damage during exercises.

“The outcome of combat is essentially the sum of the outcomes of many encounters between small units of opposing forces. It follows that realism in maneuvers can be obtained only by painstaking umpiring of the actions at all points of contact.”

The decisions would come from the Umpires placed with the training and OPFOR units. “Umpires at the headquarters of the Director or of large units can exercise no proper influence on the progress of a maneuver and should be kept at a minimum.”

Whenever BLUE and RED Forces would approach contact, or under certain other specified conditions, the Umpires would make a decision on how things would proceed and what the results of the contact would be.

There had to be a set means of doing this to ensure consistency throughout the exercises, and the decision factors had to produce realistic decisions to support the greatest degree of realism possible.

Since the units could not effectively fight it out, the processes here (in training) were largely focused on leadership, decision making, tactics and maneuvers at all echelons, and the application of learned Army Doctrine.

As units approached contact, the Umpires in each unit would display white flags signaling the troops to stay in place. Typically what followed would be one unit permitted to advance, the other told to withdraw; or neither would be allowed to advance – all indicated with flags.

If the Umpires disagreed, they threw out the flags and engaged in a fight to the death.

Kidding 😂

If they disagreed, then the majority ruled. In case of a tie vote, the decision would be against the stronger force.

In general, once Umpires made a decision, there would be some change in disposition of one or both forces present.

So, the “combat” part of these maneuvers was more or less “intermittent actions marked by blue and red flags, separated by the display of white flags and the ensuing decisions.”

Naturally, some could argue that this process of interrupting action and delaying maneuvers while Umpires discuss and decide what will happen next would counteract the natural tendency for rapid progress with such things in actual combat.

“… it is only by frequent and considered decisions, based on facts at points of contact, that a maneuver can afford correct and useful training commensurate with the effort and expense involved.”

In other words, units shouldn’t complain about the delays for these decision processes because it’s all part of the training value to their units and this type of training requires a return on investment to justify the time and cost associated with maneuvers of this scale.

Combat generally progresses with Infantry and the Infantry progresses according to its firepower. An Infantry element should only be allowed to advance when it has “decisive superiority of firepower compared to the elements opposing it in contact.”

“The superiority should never be less than 2:1 and generally should be 3:1 or 4:1.”

Just as an example of the complexity here, let’s consider firepower:

It would be impossible for Umpires to evaluate every single weapon in a unit, so they developed a way to sort units with firepower “points” not unlike the point system used in tabletop wargames.

If the unit had either a 1903 or M1 rifle, that rifle was 1 point.

An automatic rifle was worth 3 pts.

Light machinegun – 6 pts. Heavy machinegun – 10 pts; and this included the .50 cal, if used against personnel.

The 60mm Mortar was given 6 pts, 81mm Mortar was given 15 pts.

The distance between units was calculated as well. Fire at short-range is obviously going to prove more effective, and firepower could be reduced at longer ranges if some weapons couldn’t reach that far.

As an example, the rifle and automatic rifle were considered to be 100% at 500 yards; but 50% at 500-1000 yards, and 0% at anything over 1000 yards.

All machineguns were determined to have 100% firepower at distances up to 1000 yards, but 50% firepower from 1000-1500 yards, and nothing if more than 1500 yards.

And the Mortars were determined to have 100% firepower at 1000 yards for the 60mm, 2000 yards for the 81mm. But 0% for ranges greater than those.

So… an Infantry unit might have four rifle squads, with 12 rifles each (48 pts); two automatic rifle squads with 2 automatic rifles each (12 pts); two light machineguns (12 pts);

Three 60mm Mortars (18 pts); four heavy machineguns, two at 800 yards and two at 1200 yards (30 pts); and two 81mm Mortars (30 pts) for a total of 150 points.

If the unit was Horse Cavalry, they were assessed the same as Infantry units but only when dismounted.

“Tanks in action will be taken as neutralizing Infantry within 100 yards of any tank. The firepower of such Infantry against opposing Infantry is reduced to zero while the tanks are present.”

This is basically how the fighting strength and firepower of every training unit was determined. There would be points for the equipment and those points could be reduced depending on distance and whether or not the equipment was “in action” and if other equipment was present.

What about losses?

“Losses would be assessed by the Umpire attached to the company, NOT by Umpires with opposing units.”

(This probably had to be explicitly stated in the manual 😂)

The unit Umpire would keep track of that unit’s losses and inform the Company Commander of the losses from time to time throughout the maneuvers. And the loss of personnel would be calculated to a percentage which would then impact the unit’s firepower.

Data from real war experiences was provided for calculating losses and weighing determination factors. “It is to be emphasized that the usual tendency of Umpires is to assess losses which are grossly excessive in the light of [real] war experience.”

The position, formation, available cover, and speed of the units also had to be taken into consideration.

When fighting tank on tank, the Umpire Manual determined that losses would be assessed at an inverse ratio of the strengths of the two opposing forces. If there are 30 Blue Tanks vs 20 Red Tanks, the losses would be assessed at 2 Blue to 3 Red.

There were rules set for obstacles based on the type, location, and with predetermined lengths of time for the delays each would create.

While there was no actual combat, the units did have some blank ammunition.

“The use of blank ammunition at maneuvers promotes realism and facilitates decisions. Also, it is helpful in accustoming young soldiers to the sounds of battle.”

When available, .30 cal blanks were to be used freely for ground fire, especially with machineguns. The manual does say “blank ammunition will not be fired toward personnel at less than 20 yards” which seems like something that probably needed to be said.

They were also not permitted to fire blanks at the participating aircraft. And all Artillery fire was to be simulated since there were no blanks available for these weapons.

The units were explicitly told not to come into contact with the OPFOR, so assuming the Umpires were effective there should have been no need for guidance regarding prisoners.

However, units or individuals may be cut off by maneuver and the action may be such that in reality they would either be captured or killed. In that case, Umpires would permit taking them prisoner and handled as prisoners for up to the duration of the maneuver.

Those who became prisoners had to remove their identifying hat or arm band to prevent confusion with active participants. GHQ could arrange for the transfer of prisoners back to the original unit.

News correspondents could also be captured. Reporters were assigned to either the Red or Blue Force units and if captured by the opposing side during the maneuvers, that reporter was held for 24 hours and prohibited from filing any articles until exchanged.

Covering the entire manual would take a handful of threads, each at least as long as this one, so for those that are curious about it, the 1941 Umpire Manual can be found here: apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fullte…

Next week we will talk about the Maneuvers themselves.

If you're just tuning in or you've missed any of the previous threads, you can find them all saved on this account under ⚡️Moments or with this direct link twitter.com/i/events/13642…