The great @StiglerCenter conference yesterday showcased what @ZephyrTeachout called a series of ‘history panels” on antitrust #StiglerAntitrust24. A thread on why so much focus on history in US antitrust debates 1/n
That intense emphasis on history is a fascinating intellectual phenomenon. In contrast, European discussions about antitrust reform are more focused on present-day issues such as concrete policy impacts, legal administrability, and economic soundness 2/n
So why the focus on history in the US antitrust convo? I see three possible reasons. One, the neobrandeisian movement needs history to rescue itself from a legitimacy trap it 3/n
The arrival of a new kid on the block in social media holds three lessons for competition in digital markets. A thread on @Threads 1/n
1⃣ A theory of 'broad-spectrum' competition amongst monopoly platforms has strong descriptive power. As I wrote in my book, each dominant tech firms exerts a degree of competitive pressure on the other 2/n https://t.co/jNNP9VhMYaamazon.it/Big-Tech-Digit…
My theory doesn't predict where moligopoly competition hits, but it correctly shows the existence of new channels of competition across markets that current laws incorrectly treat as fraught with monopoly illnesses @Cernaksj reviewed the argument there 3/n https://t.co/SztcRde8Aramericanbar.org/content/dam/ab…
The General Court (GC) was asked for 2nd time to review legality of an EUCommission setting a > €1 Bi fined against chip maker Intel for abuse of dominance. 2/n
When GC looked the 1st time, it gave the EC a satisfecit. The case was appealed to the upper EU Court (CJEU), which appeared more uncertain 3/n
Now the law. Annulment proceedings can be understood as a « procès fait à un acte ». EU law does not follow the adversarial model of litigation of anglo-american legal systems. « We » is inappropriate 2/n
And the law again. In continental law systems, judicial control of administrative decisions is a safeguard against excessive encroachment of executive power on the will of the people, as expressed in congressional legislation or constitutional principles and texts 3/n
The requirements of practice makes antitrust laws converge toward rebuttable presumptions, quasi rules, and structured standards 2/n
Use of per se rules moves away discussion from economic analytics => legal classification issues, as seen in early Sherman Act cases. Equally facts intensive, and costly for plaintiffs 3/n