Last week, one of our papers was mentioned by none other than Nobel Laureate @DAcemogluMIT. I want to take the opportunity to engage critically with the points he raised in his recent "Remaking the Tech Sector" thread. I write here as an econ-friendly antitrust lawyer🧵 1/N To begin, I take issue with the introduction's critique of the common description of the digital economy as "made up of competitive small companies rushing to innovate." This characterization is more accurate than not. 2/N

The great @StiglerCenter conference yesterday showcased what @ZephyrTeachout called a series of ‘history panels” on antitrust #StiglerAntitrust24. A thread on why so much focus on history in US antitrust debates 1/n That intense emphasis on history is a fascinating intellectual phenomenon. In contrast, European discussions about antitrust reform are more focused on present-day issues such as concrete policy impacts, legal administrability, and economic soundness 2/n

The arrival of a new kid on the block in social media holds three lessons for competition in digital markets. A thread on @Threads 1/n 1⃣ A theory of 'broad-spectrum' competition amongst monopoly platforms has strong descriptive power. As I wrote in my book, each dominant tech firms exerts a degree of competitive pressure on the other 2/n https://t.co/jNNP9VhMYaamazon.it/Big-Tech-Digit…

What happened yesterday in @EUCourtPress Intel v Commission, T-286/09 RENV? Hot Takes. For antitrust geeks only 1/n
bloomberg.com/news/articles/… The General Court (GC) was asked for 2nd time to review legality of an EUCommission setting a > €1 Bi fined against chip maker Intel for abuse of dominance. 2/n

V simple. The ‘win’ / ‘loss’ framing is polarising. It’s not useful 1/n

https://twitter.com/lewis_crofts/status/1486308367366860805

Now the law. Annulment proceedings can be understood as a « procès fait à un acte ». EU law does not follow the adversarial model of litigation of anglo-american legal systems. « We » is inappropriate 2/n

Sharing my prelim analysis of the main points of law raised by last week's Google Shopping judgment of @EUCourtPress Not my final word. The General Court approached the case as in Intel v EC, trying to clarify the law

Presenting this morning #7thBiennial on Growing Market Power and Concentration #CCIER #GlobalConference #Economy #Law #PolicyMakers Slides 👇

I mean every hyperbolic word here => latest convo of @LeConcurrential w/ Bill Kovacic is gold mine of antitrust wisdom leconcurrentialiste.com/a-conversation… 1/n The requirements of practice makes antitrust laws converge toward rebuttable presumptions, quasi rules, and structured standards 2/n

Long thread w/ color commentary of IMCO amendments to draft #DMA. I focus on what struck eye, leaving aside the small stuff 1/n Tightening of clause allowing presumptive gatekeeper to escape designation => “exceptional circumstances” and “compelling” evidence 2/n

Short thread w/ provisional thoughts on draft EU #AI regulation following gr8 Roma Tre/@EUI_EU/@PoliTOnews seminar yest 1/N 2/N

Quick thread on the Opinion of the AG in Deutsche Telekom and Slovak Telekom (DT & ST) v Commission (C-152 and 165/19 P) curia.europa.eu/juris/document… For antitrust geeks only 1/n The Opinion asks whether a firm w/o an indispensable infrastructure can nonetheless abuse a dominant position by way of margin squeeze. 2/n

@randypicker discussion of static monopolization in #Fortnite v Apple displays substantial parallels with the problems faced by antitrust towards tacit collusion 1/n

https://twitter.com/randypicker/status/1295007314727120897

That is: should antitrust law deem unlawful business coordination without an explicit act of collusion? 2/n

Long & geeky thread on yesterday @EUCourtPress judgment that annuls the @EUCommission decision that blocked the merger between Telefónica UK & Hutchison 3G merger (T-399/16) 1/n.

https://twitter.com/lewis_crofts/status/1265936485540380673

In a nutshell, this is a judgment on the *substantiality* of the market power effects required to enjoin a merger 2/n.