Sharing my prelim analysis of the main points of law raised by last week's Google Shopping judgment of @EUCourtPress Not my final word.
The General Court approached the case as in Intel v EC, trying to clarify the law
The Court buried to the ground the theory of a transversal Bronner threshold in abuse cases.
A legal rule against self preferencing can be effective in cases where full integration makes no economic sense.The Court he court falls short of explaining why a. My take, it makes sense
Evidence of leveraging alone is not sufficient to affirm antitrust liability against a dominant firm. A 'plus conduct' element is required. Like unequal treatment. Special tests apply.
What the test of illegality for unequal treatment remains unclear => 1/ abnormality; 2/ discrimination?
Platform specificity of the Google ruling?
And the constitutional law controversy!
Less prominent gems.
The Court implicitly treated Google as a public utility, common carrier, natural monopoly, you name it. /END
Sorry abt typos. Pls disregard 2 last sentences, that I thought I had deleted.
A legal rule against self preferencing makes sense in cases where full integration makes no economic sense.
« Abnormal to display w/ favoring » not « w/o »
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The great @StiglerCenter conference yesterday showcased what @ZephyrTeachout called a series of ‘history panels” on antitrust #StiglerAntitrust24. A thread on why so much focus on history in US antitrust debates 1/n
That intense emphasis on history is a fascinating intellectual phenomenon. In contrast, European discussions about antitrust reform are more focused on present-day issues such as concrete policy impacts, legal administrability, and economic soundness 2/n
So why the focus on history in the US antitrust convo? I see three possible reasons. One, the neobrandeisian movement needs history to rescue itself from a legitimacy trap it 3/n
The arrival of a new kid on the block in social media holds three lessons for competition in digital markets. A thread on @Threads 1/n
1⃣ A theory of 'broad-spectrum' competition amongst monopoly platforms has strong descriptive power. As I wrote in my book, each dominant tech firms exerts a degree of competitive pressure on the other 2/n https://t.co/jNNP9VhMYaamazon.it/Big-Tech-Digit…
My theory doesn't predict where moligopoly competition hits, but it correctly shows the existence of new channels of competition across markets that current laws incorrectly treat as fraught with monopoly illnesses @Cernaksj reviewed the argument there 3/n https://t.co/SztcRde8Aramericanbar.org/content/dam/ab…
The General Court (GC) was asked for 2nd time to review legality of an EUCommission setting a > €1 Bi fined against chip maker Intel for abuse of dominance. 2/n
When GC looked the 1st time, it gave the EC a satisfecit. The case was appealed to the upper EU Court (CJEU), which appeared more uncertain 3/n
Now the law. Annulment proceedings can be understood as a « procès fait à un acte ». EU law does not follow the adversarial model of litigation of anglo-american legal systems. « We » is inappropriate 2/n
And the law again. In continental law systems, judicial control of administrative decisions is a safeguard against excessive encroachment of executive power on the will of the people, as expressed in congressional legislation or constitutional principles and texts 3/n
The requirements of practice makes antitrust laws converge toward rebuttable presumptions, quasi rules, and structured standards 2/n
Use of per se rules moves away discussion from economic analytics => legal classification issues, as seen in early Sherman Act cases. Equally facts intensive, and costly for plaintiffs 3/n