1. I dont think I have seen a report this confused for some time. Well possibly not since UNODC’s “is poverty driving the opium boom in Afghanistan” in 2008 (a report that argues the polar opposite of what @UNODC is claiming here).
2. It is not just the word soup (p7) “In view of the volatile security situation, protracted economic crisis & health emergency, the international community must urgently provide basic needs & services to the people of Afghanistan” (breath)…
3. …..” to promote sustainable reductions in illicit drug cultivation, production & demand” (& I suspect here is the rub) “as part of overall UN assistance”.
4. It is the mental gymnastics the authors go through to not mention the Taliban by name. It is surreal, especially given UNODC were at the heart of reporting on the Taliban’s earnings from the drugs trade & the ubiquitous (& inaccurate) 10% ushr claim. unodc.org/unodc/en/press… Image
5. The report mentions “taxes on opiates representing a lucrative potential source of financing for non-state actors in country” & the now downgraded to 6% tax charged by “non state actors” (even though no one is running a VAT system in Afghanistan). areu.org.af/wp-content/upl…
6. There is even what might be a leftover reference to “insurgents” (Fig. 8) but there is not a single mention of the Taliban even though they are the defacto government or (as we had to refer to them in the UN in the 90s) the “presumptive authority”.
7. Even with the temporary price hike in August, in part a function of the Taliban’s announcement they would ban opium if development assistance was forthcoming, the report refers to the Taliban takeover as a “reaction to the changed political situation” & “continued uncertainty”
8. There is no mention of the Taliban statement or past efforts to ban. Its as if there is no history (or history of UN narrative on drugs & Taliban).
In fact, the report misses the mark in so many places. Far too many to mention in a social media thread-even one of my long ones. ImageImageImage
9. Perhaps most of all on meth where speculation is exacerbated by error.
The claim that the ephedra “plant is bulky and it has been speculated that they may not be sustainable for large production” is odd when we consider the realities. ImageImageImageImage
10. After all which is bulkier 45 kg of ephedra from the central mountains of Afghanistan required to make 1kg of meth or the 2,500 bottles of cough mixture, or perhaps the 30,000 cold relief tablets – both of which have to be imported. ImageImageImage
11. Is bulk really the issue in Afghanistan, surely cost and availability (particularly when borders are disrupted) are more important?
The speculation on whether meth will displace opium lacks substance claiming “there is little overlap with opium cultivation” in W Afghanistan.
12. While ephedra comes from the high mountains where poppy doesn’t grow, once dried it is transported to SW where is milled & processed into ephedrine, then meth in the same areas where poppy grows (often using solar technology). Labs nearby process opium into morphine & heroin. ImageImageImageImage
13. These economies operate in parallel & in the same physical place. How is it that UNODC do not know this? There are plenty of reports documenting it. l4p.odi.org/resources/war-…
14. The failure to understand the relationship between poppy cultivation & food self sufficiency (p9), implying that a reduction in poppy would offer food security, is tantamount to neglect in the current environment when so many Afghans face such deep food insecurity.
15. We have long understood that one of the reasons farmers grow poppy is because they have insufficient agricultural land to grow enough food crops for their families; by growing and selling opium they can purchase what they need. This is development 101. openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/hand…
16. The part on cannabis is another oddity, drawing on a 2012 survey (dropped cos it was unreliable) it states gross incomes were higher than for poppy in 2012, only to suggest cannabis remains “more profitable” than opium in 2021
17. (although the abandonment of cannabis in parts of Afghanistan due to low returns in 2020 & 2021 would suggest the contrary). afghanistan-analysts.org/en/reports/eco…
18. To not see that profit & gross income are not the same is worrying. But UNODC’s failure to account for costs & assess how income from the drugs economy are distributed among the Afghan population has been an issue for many years. areu.org.af/wp-content/upl…
19. One that has led to their distorted assessment of the “profitability” (or gross income as they actually mean) of the drugs economy & therefore the amounts that could be raised as tax by “insurgents”. ImageImage
20. Why does any of this matter? Well the UN & others call for evidence based policies. Only recently I sat a meeting on Afghanistan with various donors & international organizations where seniors argued “now was not the time for speculation, we needed evidence more than ever”.
21. Yet at a time when the population of Afghanistan is in a severe crisis & needs carefully considered & tailored responses we need the best assessment possible not the worst in over a decade full of old repackaged data, misunderstandings, speculation & error.
22. It fails to draws on any of the ongoing primary research in Afghanistan by organisations like @AANafgh @ODI_Global @L4P_Afghanistan @AREUafghanistan @CrisisGroup & so many others. It does not seem to have been reviewed for even the most basic of errors before publication.
23. This latest report is also far from “key for planning, implementing, & monitoring global counter-narcotic efforts”that is claimed. Rather it is the last thing planners & policy makers should reach for. We should demand better particularly at this time. @GhadaFathiWaly @UNODC

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More from @mansfieldintinc

21 Oct
1. The latest report exposes a number of myths about Afghanistan, drugs, taxes & the Taliban based on indepth fieldwork over the last 25 years and high resolution imagery analysis @AlcisGeo areu.org.af/wp-content/upl…
2. It suggests we all need to be more discerning consumers of data: media, scholars, officials. It’s a prerequisite that we look at method, even if it’s in an esteemed journal, from a celebrated journalist or scholar, or an official UN report. For example (in no particular order)
3. Myth 1. The Taliban banned opium cultivation in 2000/01 to increase the value of the stockpiles they had accumulated. The reality is the opium bazaars were already empty in May 2001 and no stockpiles were ever found in Afghanistan despite considerable efforts to locate them.
Read 25 tweets
11 Oct
1. The numbers of migrants departing Zaranj in Nimroz for Pakistan en route to Iran has increased exponentially. Reports indicate most are ex employees of the former Republic, some leaving along with their families, highlighting the desperate situation for many in Afghanistan.
2. We have been documenting these departures for some time. As early as June 2021 -some 2 months before the govt collapsed- we pointed to the dramatic rise in the number of migrants & the growing proportion of ANA/ANP amongst them.
3. Since capturing Zaranj the the people smuggling business has been “regulated” by Taliban. Akin to other businesses, regulation has been minimal & often taken the form of restating pre-existing practices. Further evidence of the Taliban’s “small govt” approach to the economy.
Read 15 tweets
31 Aug
1. I was trying to avoid any more threads for a while but this story needs much more context and a look beyond the headlines. It represents only a snapshot in time and perhaps a local event: it certainly not the whole picture.
wsj.com/articles/talib…
2. 12 days ago the price of fresh opium increased to around $135 per kilogram in the south, a function of market uncertainty due to the Taliban announcement of the intention to ban opium poppy cultivation, but also border closures following their capture of Kabul.
3. However, this was only temporary and markets have now corrected: prices have fallen to between $55 & $80 per kilogram in Helmand depending on quality. On the Iranian border prices are slightly higher, at up to $100/kg for good quality opium.
Read 8 tweets
28 Aug
1. During this really difficult time for Afghanistan & its population, while the west decides how it will engage, it would be helpful if people would be more discerning about what they write, it could draw on misinformation & result in illconceived & counterproductive policies
2. Just cos something has been written don’t make it true. And if it has been written check out what the actual sources say and whether they are credible - just cos it’s a “reputable” org it may have just lifted the figures from somewhere else without checking the veracity.
3. This for example, like so many articles on drugs is littered with facts that ain’t so. It makes claims that if you think about them make no sense at all. For one, the idea that the Taliban collects 10% of the value of the drugs trade (others like USFOR-A claimed 20%).
Read 25 tweets
6 Aug
1. The fall of Ziranj is significant, perhaps less because it is a provincial centre & more it marks the final official border crossing with Iran to fall to Taliban & a major source of revenue to the govt & it’s allies.
washingtonpost.com/world/2021/08/…
2. Official revenue from Ziranj $43.2 million p.a. in duties plus another $50 million in direct taxes. We estimate $176 million p.a. when undeclared goods included. That is as much as $83 mill p.a to share amongst “friends” - part of the glue that held the Republic together?
3. Official trade stats indicate Taliban have control over border crossings with trade worth $3.4 billion p.a, incl. $2 billion p.a. with Iran. Undeclared trade worth significantly more with 1.5 million MT of fuel entering Afghanistan from Iran undeclared. dec.usaid.gov/dec/GetDoc.axd…
Read 8 tweets
5 Aug
1. Our forthcoming work for @L4P_Afghanistan shows that the loss of Kang in Nimroz would deny government affiliated actors just short of $7 million per annum in informal taxes levied on the smuggling of fuel and drugs ariananews.af/kang-district-…
2. There is approx 37 MT of fuel worth $19.2 million p.a. smuggled across the border from Iran at Kang. Transported by tractors, with payments made to private actors & ABP both at the border & as it’s moved by pickups en route to the city of Ziranj, it raises $826,000 in bribes. ImageImageImageImage
3. By far the bigger source of revenue to govt affiliated actors in Kang is the drugs trade. An important entrepôt for smuggling opiates, methamphetamine & cannabis into Iran we estimate govt affiliated actors earn as much as $6.1 million p.a. from the various taxes levied. ImageImageImage
Read 11 tweets

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