➡️ Hardrock type is known to be Granite of unknown strength (140-230 Mpa), with an reported overburden of 90m
➡️ Heavy backpacked concrete steel tunnel liner is used
Graphic below shows an attack by 250kt nuclear warhead delivered by Jericho/Trident
With known heavy Iranian liner types interpolated at 2,5 kbar:
➡️ Probability of damage is just 10% with an avarage value of granite compressive strenght
➡️ It is estimated to decrease to 2-5% with very hard granite, which is most likely and the reason for site selection Fordow
Appears that the design point of Fordow is also the most likely scenario of the 3:
➡️ Ballistic missile attack by non-MaRV'ed Jericho-2 (or Trident-II)
Against which it would most likely remain intact (vibration sensitive centrifuges excluded)
Multiple hits to some extend too
Scenario:
1: MOP is non-feasible in terms of penetration, except temporarily blocking entrances
2: Aircraft delivered nuclear earth penetrator would work, but given:
➡️ Depth of Fordow in 🇮🇷 heartland
➡️ Improvement of 🇮🇷 air-defense
Would require a long, total war campaign
This shows why Fordow is of such a key importance for Irans nuclear leverage and latent capability
➡️ It also shows why 🇮🇱 threats on a strike against 🇮🇷 uranium enrichment capability, even with its most potent weapon; nuclear Jericho-2 BMs is simply infeasible
➡️ JCPOA Psyops
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- by hitting high-end sensor elements like the X-band AN/TPY-2 radars
➡️ Which in turn disables 🇮🇱 capability to identify and discriminate between real targets and decoys, but most importantly; avoid wasting interceptors on empty spent 1st stage boosters which come behind them
If Iran manages to deplete 🇮🇱's interceptor inventory, it will not only cause a 2-digit billion $$$ financial loss
➡️ An Israel which can't defend against ballistic-missiles can't continue a war for long and will have a very bad negotiation position at a future table
- Israeli missile interceptors stocks & sensor performance will degrade over time
- Iranian missile bases & launchers safety protocols will get more loose once the in-situ sabotage assets like OWA- & FPV-drones/ATGMs are found or depleted
1/4
Since Israel hit civilian targets at the start of the attack, Iran will use heavy missiles like Emad to hit targets, even in urban regions.
Once Arrow-3 and THAAD are exhausted by trying to catch hypersonics like Kheybar-Shekan-2/Fattah-1 via multiple launches against single missiles
➡️ The gates are open for heavy Emad hits
And up until here, there is no talk about higher end even heavier warhead missiles like the Khorramshahr family
In comparison, Israel relies primarily on OWA-type drones to hit soft targets.
The psychological effects of seeing a burning oil depot are very different to experiencing a blast of a 1-ton warhead at mach 6
➡️ Combining Tabas and Raad ambush SAM systems in the yet unknown SAM system (left photo)
Lets take a look at the features of Raad-3/Tabas-2 (whatever its called), some of which are unique 1/2
Main feature is passive engagement capability of the Raad system, which combines infrared volume search with a long-range laser-range-finder
➡️ It allows passive engagement up until the last seconds before SAM impact, when it switches to terminal SARH mode and radar is turned on
In the new system, infrared search cameras are likely mounted on the mast, putting it at higher position
On the photo, the mast only mounts the long-range directional data-link antenna, which is a very important capability of the system.
It relies on upper-echelon early warning