City's 4-3-3 was designed to create central overloads, with false 9 Silva dropping deep and Sterling and Mahrez maintaining their width. Walker and Cancelo could then go forward to create 2v1s out wide in the knowledge that PSG’s wide forwards, were unlikely to track back... 🧐🧵
City implemented a high and aggressive press. The idea to show PSG inside was most likely to reduce the chances of them getting Mbappé or Neymar into one-on-one races in the channels in behind the City defence... 🧐🧵
City were able to dominate the game through exploiting the wide areas. They did this through diagonal switches of play after drawing PSG out to one side. Once again, this was made possible due to the low-intensity out-of-possession work from PSG’s front three... 🧐🧵
City were able to exploit the wide areas through simple overloads. Due to the lack of recovery runs from PSG's front three, any overlapping runs from the City full-backs had to be tracked by Gueye or Herrera. This would then free up a City midfielder to recycle the play... 🧐🧵
PSG's 4-3-3 structure was designed to stretch City through Mbappé’s high position and create space for Messi and Neymar to drop into midfield and receive on the half-turn... 🧐🧵
Paredes frequently dropped in between Kimpembe and Marquinhos so that PSG could build with a back three. This was useful when City used their resting shape of 4-4-2 – when they weren’t pressing high – because of the 3v2 first-line overload that it created... 🧐🧵
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Manchester City’s 4-3-3 started on the front foot as Arsenal initially attempted to press into the host’s half, in a 4-4-2 shape. Arsenal went player-oriented in the wide areas, with Declan Rice and Thomas Partey tracking Bernardo Silva and Ilkay Gündogan’s forward runs. However, Silva’s wide runs to City’s right-side created space for Savinho to drive inside, penetrating against the aggressive jumping of Arsenal’s left-back, Calafiori. This helped disrupt and stretch Arsenal’s back line in the early stages, including when Haaland was slid in-behind to calmly open the scoring... 🧐🧵
It wasn’t long before Arsenal formed a low block, while City responded with a 3-1-5-1 shape. Josko Gvardiol moved into a left-side number eight role from full-back, with Gündogan as the central option underneath Haaland. Rodri – soon to be replaced by Kovacic – acted as the single pivot. Still, it was City’s right side that proved most potent, with Silva’s wider positioning supporting Savinho’s direct movements and dribbles against Calafiori... 🧐🧵
Stemming from tweaks to the 4-4-2 formation, and initially most popular in Spain, the 4-2-3-1 grew in popularity from the 2000s onwards. It has since been used with success by many prominent coaches, including Pep Guardiola, Arne Slot and Erik ten Hag... 4️⃣2️⃣3️⃣1️⃣🧵
Central protection...
The 4-2-3-1 requires defensive midfielders who can duel, tackle and intercept in individual battles. These midfielders must be alert enough to land on any second balls. They must have good acceleration and deceleration to help with this... 4️⃣2️⃣3️⃣1️⃣🧵
Spain used a 4-3-3 structure and built play patiently from the back, despite Germany pressing aggressively from their 4-2-3-1. They moved the ball around the back line to isolate Thomas Müller, before a centre-back stepped out with the ball into midfield... 🧐🧵
Olmo continued to move inside and Asensio dropped deep, in the process pulling Süle out of his position in Germany’s back line. This helped Spain to build out from the back and get around Germany’s increasingly effective high press... 🧐🧵
Traditionally, full-backs are the widest players in a back four, and as a result they attack and defend mostly in the wide areas. However, full-backs who move inside into central spaces are known as ‘inverted full-backs’. This movement adds an extra presence centrally... ↩️🧐
Although Pep Guardiola is the coach most associated with the inverted full-back, Johan Cruyff used them with Barcelona many years before. Then, he often converted the 4-3-3 into a 3-4-3 diamond, with one full-back inverting into central midfield... ↩️🧐
Manchester United were set up in a 4-2-3-1 shape, but Fred pushed forward from the double pivot to become a number 8 and give them a stronger attacking presence in central midfield. Bruno Fernandes then adapted his positioning, moving into the left inside channel... 🧐🧵
The hosts eventually pushed both full-backs higher, primarily working around the outside of Tottenham’s wing-backs. United’s wingers then came inside, with the freedom to rotate with Fred and Fernandes, as long as both inside channels were always occupied... 🧐🧵