With the current attention being given to Russia's menacing military buildup there is a lot of discussion about how seriously the threat should be taken and how to respond.1/
Inevitably at times like this we get the two favourite historical analogies - rapid mobilisation in the summer of 1914 or Munich in 1938. One warns about ambitious military moves; the other too many diplomatic concessions. 2/
Trouble with both analogies is we know they each led to war, and so 'lessons' can get overdrawn and by now are cliched. And also they come from pre-nuclear age. Risks of war are different now. 3/
Better analogy is 1961 Berlin crisis. Moscow then upped the stakes and set deadlines, had something real to worry about (ppl from E using Berlin as an escape route), saw a weak US Pres, and had all the local military advantages. 4/
JFK raised the military stakes, by announcing a US buildup (which would not have helped in fighting around Berlin) and stuck to established position that there could be no change to the city's status. 5/
Although the Germans were worried that they would be forced into concessions JFK made it clear that he would stick with status quo (although in practice that meant that he was prepared to take risks for West Berlin but not East). 6/
Khrushchev didn't want war and found a way out of the immediate crisis with the construction of the wall. Stopped hemorrhage of ppl from East but was stuck with Western outpost in middle of East Germany. 7/
US and allies agreed to talks on future of Berlin. US Sec of State Dean Rusk was happy to keep talking and could be as stubborn as Soviets.8/
So if Russia now offering talks on security guarantees etc no reason not to engage. Far too much time is spent on both sides speculating on what the other is up to and clarity might help. Things might be done for mutual reassurance. 9/
If they have a draft treaty we should study and propose amendments of our own. That could keep us going for a while. 10/
We should never fear diplomacy - but must be actually clear that Ukr is an independent sovereign state and we have no intention of pressing Kyiv into concessions it does not wish to make 11/
And we must also stop talking up Russian military options as if they were in any way attractive or easy for Putin at the moment. They are fraught with danger. He might still try something on but it is as likely that at the brink his caution will return. end/

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More from @LawDavF

16 Mar
Thread on UK nuclear weapons policy. Be patient. Quite long.
The statement in the review on UK nuclear policy is the most comprehensive for some time, although it requires careful reading. It largely reaffirms existing policy. 1/
Most important announcement is the increase in the nuclear stockpile from 180 to no more than 260 warheads. The number derives from the maximum that can be deployed if two subs are on patrol. 16 missiles per boat; 8 warheads per missile; two boats on patrol. 16 x 8 x 2 = 256. 2/
Read 21 tweets
11 Jun 20
The paper I tweeted yesterday was not the one to which Channel 4 referred (apologies) but one actually discussed at SAGE (which is why i assumed one mentioned). I have done a bit more research to work out how Prof Riley’s paper fitted into pattern of decision-making. 1/
This is what Channel 4 said.
channel4.com/news/uk-govern…
Professor Riley’s paper warned that is measures were not taken then the UK faced a Covid-19 catastrophe. Channel 4 say they don’t know how it was evaluated and they don’t say why it was written. 2/
Professor Riley, one of the Imperial College team, was not the only modeller urging action. John Edmunds’ group at the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine had been warning of the scale of the coming epidemic since February.3/
Read 18 tweets
20 May 20
Lots of papers put on SAGE website - up to meeting on 12 May. haven't had a chance to review yet.
gov.uk/government/gro…
These are largely statistical analyses of cases rather than scientific advice. It is mainly updated versions of this paper - Dynamic CO-CIN report to SAGE and
NERVTAG - from later March to last week. This is the most up to date version.
assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/upl…
There is a lot of detail in these reports but headlines are unsurprising:
‘Hot spots’ of disease incidence largely reflect areas of high population density (most notably London) with a few exceptions.
Read 7 tweets
11 May 20
This article describes UK decision-making on Covid-19, covering the period up to full lockdown on 23 March. It is largely but not solely based on primary sources, including the documents on the SAGE web-site. iiss.org/blogs/survival…
1/13
It is preliminary in that while much is available on policy inputs and outputs the material is more speculative on how one influenced the other. I’m afraid its extremely long and hard to reduce to a series of bullet points. Here are a few headlines. 2/13
Two factors reduced the sense of urgency in January. One was past experience: we had avoided SARS in 2003 while ‘swine flu’ had turned out to be a ‘damp squib’.3/13
Read 13 tweets
2 Apr 20
‘Although we have had 30 years to prepare for what should be done in the event of an influenza pandemic, I think we have all been rushing around trying to improvise investigations with insufficient time to do it properly.' 1/n
This was a comment from J Corbett McDonald of Public Health Laboratory Service to Ian Watson, Director of the College of General Practitioners' Epidemic Observation Unit in the autumn of 1957, referring to that year’s Asian Flu epidemic. 2/n
First noticed in Hong Kong in April 1957. Despite WHO advice supposed unlikely to arrive before winter. Letter to BMJ from a GP in June 1957: 3/n
Read 13 tweets
27 Mar 20
Given allegations about early UK response to Covid-19 I’ve been looking at minutes of the New and Emerging Respiratory Virus Threats Advisory Group (NERVTAG). This to the main Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies (SAGE). The minutes can be found here app.box.com/s/3lkcbxepqixk…
Its chaired by Peter Horby of Oxford University. Professor Neill Ferguson of Imperial among its members. Clearly not the only advisory group meeting and not where decisions are taken but it has a lot of academic firepower and addresses some big question for the government.2/n
Before this crisis its previous meeting had been in June 2019 when it discussed a variety of influenzas. It first met on this crisis on 13 January and has since met regularly. The last published minutes are of a sub-group that met on 4 March 3/n
Read 28 tweets

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