“What happens if you invest depositor’s money in a debt platform which suffers a $100M+ operational loss of which you own 50%+ in traditional finance, Patrick?”
We’ll start with the notion of “depositor.” Speaking broadly, if you accept retail money, by regulation you are almost certainly prohibited from investing in anything which has any reasonable probability of having a $100M operational loss.
But Ops losses do happen in the world.
So you have an agreement with your contra operating the platform that gave rise to the ops loss. That contract, which was negotiated by competent professionals on both sides, is extremely explicit as to which of the two of you owns the loss.
It’s probably your contra?
But what if your contra can’t pay? Well, since Ops losses are a thing that exist in the world, and sudden failure of a contra is a risk that finance intrinsically faces, you did two things prior to signing:
One, you underwrote your contra, to assess the probable risks involved.
This includes likelihood of loss, magnitude of loss, probability of contra being able to make good on loss, expected difficulty / timeline of that, etc etc.
Based on this, you likely required your contra to post some collateral with you, insure you against the loss, etc.
“But it all blew up. Play along.”
OK, so now it is between you and your depositors. You have an agreement with them, too, and there is a provision in it for who held the risk here.
Since you call them depositors, it is almost certainly you.
But everyone knew there were risks.
Since there were risks, you were well-capitalized; you had raised funding *that you had not invested in the blown-up platform but rather kept in something very safe with easy liquidity*, likely by selling equity.
Your equity holders have just taken a hit, in line w/ size of loss
You still have a war room. You still expect to be involved in litigation. You still expect to be called in by regulators to explain what in blazes happened. You still accumulate a reserve (accounting entry) against likely future losses, a bit in excess likely of the headline #
You may even need to recapitalize, and if you do, your existing equity holders will be further diluted because this is the worst possible timing and among worst possible reasons to attempt recapitalization.
But you soldier on, because none of this was particularly novel.
"Hey Patrick why do all this work if you say that this never happens?"
Oh ops losses absolutely happen. $100 million ops losses are rare. The thing that is almost impossible to imagine is all of the following in combination:
* $100 million ops loss
* You represent 50% of that loss because you somehow didn't underwrite your contra enough to detect that degree of concentration risk.
* Your loss is also material to you. (~20 bps of "your" AUM by my brief calculation, which is an alarming number in ops.)
I don't think I have an overly rose-tinted view of the traditional financial industry. But many geeks seem to have the opposite of that, and think this sort of thing happens all the time.
The brute fact that society continues to function should be strong evidence against that.
"Patrick you keep using this word 'ops loss' and that seems jargon-y."
You are right, voice in my head.
This is a so-called operational loss, which is a catch-all category for "Things that in theory should never happen but in practice sometimes do."
It is distinct from e.g. a credit loss (you loaned money to someone, there was some risk of non-payment or not-as-agreed-payment because that is the nature of lending), a fraud loss (malfeasance by counterparty), etc.
Here the proximate cause of the ops loss, from the perspective of the firm with $50 million on the line, is "Both we and our contra failed to secure systems with security tokens that were the only thing granting access to ~$100M+ in bearer assets."
A mistake! Not fraud (by you).
Note that I'm very, very not saying "X is not a fraud", but I will say "This is not a fraud being undertaken by X. Of that one thing, they are probably innocent."
Oh, another thing traditional finance typically has going for it is that the CFO called into the war room isn't in an Israeli prison.
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Is that a cheap shot?
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No, actually, that feels extremely relevant.
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People sometimes wonder when fraud is such a thing when it is “so obvious” to spot.
I have a transaction to report. Place your bets on whether it sounds legitimate.
A high school student opens an Amazon account in 1996 from Illinois. They use it to purchase books through 2000.
After 2000 the account goes almost entirely dormant, except sometimes buys Christmas gifts. It never purchases anything over $200.
In 2007, the account uses a new credit card with a billing address in Chicago associated with the account holder to buy a $2k laptop.
The transaction is initiated from Nagoya, Japan, on a machine that has never accessed this account before. The account has never been accessed from Nagoya at all.
The shipping address is entirely new. The name shipped to is, going by e.g. apparent ethnicity, not related.
No lie, sometimes I hear about the vibe people get from DAOs and think “This really rhymes with the first few weeks of that charity that started out of a bunch of geeks piling into Discord.”
I love people getting enthusiastic about collaborating on things over the Internet, and honestly the whole Constitution thing kind of pushed my buttons in a way Number Go Up projects generally do not, but broadly unclear to me that DAOs the form benefit the communities they serve
The job to be done here is much more interesting than the job currently being done, IMHO.
This week on Bits about Money: geeks running Internet-enabled small businesses using a combination of software development, marketing savvy, online platforms, and boutique investment firms... except they're evil.
This is a follow-up on my tweetstorm from Giving Tuesday about how charities get preferentially targeted by card testers, one link in this supply chain.
Talented geeks exist everywhere; market structures that support them do not.
I was struck by how similar some of their challenges were to the ecosystems I've been directly physically in in Ogaki and Tokyo.
Lack of mentors, social scripts for success which only allowed young people to aspire to BigCo jobs, little opportunity for skill building early.
Mark, the CEO, sent me an interesting email earlier today, about the cost structure for employing geeks in Africa while they skill them up. The subject was 509.
$509 (US) per month per employee in average fully-loaded cost of employment.
Love this interaction with a restaurant, which I will not name to avoid bringing them to disrepute for being really good at handling this case:
I ordered a thing that I have ordered from 40 times. It contains an ingredient. This time, that ingredient was hard as a rock.
So I gave them a call, with the goal of politely apprising them that they had a bad batch.
They took my feedback, apologized, issued a refund, and then the clerk said “Wait, you’ve ordered this 30+ times. Would you characterize this as ‘not what I enjoy’ or… something else?”
“Would you permit me to perhaps say something in a fashion which might come across as brusque?”
“Please do.”
“I do not believe this batch is edible.”
“Sir please hold while I shut down the line.”