Let us look at US crude & product inventories. It remains the largest refining system globally & by far & away the most transparent market which is why US inventory data matter for crude oil prices globally (although less so now than in times pre-global satellite data).
All-in, US crude & product inventories incl. SPR are 35Mb below their 10-year average at 1,825mb (blue line). They are 100Mb, give or take, away from hitting a decade low. With 50Mb SPR release, we may get their in Q1 2022 and subject to Omicron effects.
2/..
The same data in a 5-year average scenario? We're already 125mb below its 5-average. Kind of interesting. Mind you - commodities price at the margin. So this is an interesting combo with WTI at $68/bbl (ex Macro Set-up).
3/..
Why is this interesting? Bc the current refinery run rate (=demand for crude oil) of 15.6mbpd (million barrels per day) remains "Covid-19 constrained" and will go back to >17mbpd (or higher) long bf runs go lower, say by 2028, to due the global energy transition.
4/..
Here is a seasonal perspective for refinery runs which illustrates the massive Covid variant effects in 2021 alone as well as a massive reduction of its 5-year averages - starting in March to December - due to the run collapse in the range of 12.5 to 14.2Mbpd back in 2020.
5/..
The Covid 2020 effect is best illustrated below. So expect the US refinery system to be back in a 17mbpd range in 2023 by the latest, but more likely post H2 2022 - and subject to not more Greek alphabet words spooking politicans each and every time.
6/...
Back to 5-y inventories. US crude inventory incl. SPR (which under Biden is new marginal supply barrel) is at 1,036Mb. So at a normalised 17mbpd run-rate and ex product stock & indigenous production, the US can theoretically supply its market for 61 days; ex SPR for 25.
7/...
For good order sake, pre-Covid the US was a 20.5mbpd crude products consumption market. The difference bw 17mbpd US refinery runs and demand is imports and change in product inventories.
8/..
So why is 25 days commercial inventory of Tweet 7 interesting? Because if we look at "US Commercial Crude Inventory in Days" for the past 11 years, we were in that 20-25 days range between 2010-2014.
9/...
Source: Burggraben analysis; Bloomberg
So what? Well, that was the period when WTI traded bw $69-114/bbl. WTI only dropped into the "lower for longer range" of $55-65 with the STRUCTURAL outlook of sustained US shale oversupply, starting in September 2014. Rightly so, as inv days of subsequent years illustrated.
10/.
Back in 2018, we published our bullish oil thesis - 3 years early - including our "Oil Price Framework" in which we argued that price goes >$100 when, among others, d/s is faced with a structural deficit (the reverse of 2014 outlook). That remains our guiding principle.
11/...
We also included our "Drivers of Price Formation". In a market full of noise, see the forest for the trees. Comparing back then with today, our "barrel counting outlook" for a STRUCTURAL DEFICIT strengthened due to the permanent capital stravation of US shale (green shift).
12/.
What changed is the role of China. It added tank capacity to strategically make use of price vola & remain at "baseline purchases" if prices raise. Looking at China's commercial inv days, they are back 50 now after substantial inv draws.
13/... Source: Burggraben; Kayrros
Comparing the US and China's crude reserves incl SPRs (China classifies much less SPRs vs US), but have around 62 days of reserves. This tells us that China is a likely buyer above baseline here, although its property crisis may mean it will hold back for another quarter.
14/..
Put differently: The CCP wants total control. So China's Majors will be allocated buying quotas on the basis of their inventory data first. Those inventories are, despite substantial capacity addition, back at their 2016/2017 levels. But we are sure you knew all that :-)..
15/..
What also changed? The macro set-up. Barrel counting or - god forbit - refinery margins/diffs etc, as we often explained, is not enough to understand oil prices. In fact, it is often a distraction as seen last week. Where are we on macro?
In all, US & China inv. are low from a 10-y avg perspective once runs are normalised due to return of interconti travel. By then, oil markets will have used up OPEC+ spare, face a structural deficit but also a "walking on ice" macro regime. Vola both up & down.
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On this platform, certain perma bulls keep pushing a bullish crude narrative based on relative U.S. inventories—day after day, for three years now.
Their logic: Total U.S. crude inventories (including the SPR) are at 838 million barrels (orange line), 200 million barrels below the 10-year average → bullish!
Yet, inventories keep falling, and prices remain stuck in a range. Clearly, they are wrong.
1/9 @UrbanKaoboy @Iris62655179 @BrentRuditLeo
The problem with their logic?
a) The U.S. is no longer the marginal importer of crude oil—Asia is (or was).
b) U.S. inventories are artificially high on a 10-year average due to the shale boom, which took off in 2014. Shale growth and Covid distort the data, keeping inventories (ex SPR) elevated. So any 5- or 10-year comparison is meaningless—period.
2/n US Crude Oil Inventory ex SPR
Including SPRs, the picture looks more normalised - but not tight. But does the US really need 700mb of strategic reserves in 2025? I don't think so.
Yesterday, I shared a few thoughts that I’d like to expand on, especially given how volatile the current tariff landscape under this admin has become.
Navigating it isn’t just difficult—it’s nearly impossible to avoid missteps. Hopefully some traders will expand on my thoughts...
1/n
What do we know?
As at 23 March 2025, Comex copper price in New York is trading at 14% premium to LME in London. Buying a tonne of copper in NY costs $11,213 versus 9,842 in London, $1,371 per tonne more than in London.
2/n
Why is that? Because of tariff FEARS, not tariffs.
Traders are hedging future risk of potential tariffs on all forms of the raw material, such as cathodes, concentrates, ores, and even scrap. But there aren't such tariffs in place for copper yet (unlike alumnium).
The current Comex price action in the U.S. is basically a Trump tariff trade mirage and is otherwise as misleading of fundaments as the May 2024 price action of which I warned on multiple occasions.
1/n $/pound
In May 2024 however, U.S. price action was more in synch with London. But it didn't reflect weak Chinese housing & construction fundamentals which has been 15-30% of GLOBAL copper use for the past two decades. Today, U.S. prices trade as if borders close tomorrow.
2/n Comex - LME arb in $/t
Unlike May 2024, copper blue chips like $FCX, however, do not buy the rally. So at least it seems that the equity market understands the tariff aspect of the copper price mirage.
In this episode, we discuss China's 2nd of 5 economic paths it can follow.
This episode will also focus on Xi the leader. To understand Xi means to better understand China's economic path forward.
1/n #China
Can China replace malinvestment with more consumption?
Answer: Maybe a little bit & over a long time frame, but President Xi does not want to focus on this path. Instead, he wants to implement his socialist utopia.
2/n
Yes, China’s rising entrepreneurs were welcomed by the Communist Party for at least two decades. But all of that is in reverse.
Under Xi Jinping, China has moved full circle: from low growth & low freedom in the pre-reform era back towards something similar today.
In this episode, we discuss China's investment-led growth model & the first of 5 economic paths China can follow.
As you would expect, also this episode is full of Chinese characteristics!
1/n #China
Starting in 1990s, China’s economic engine has been fueled by capital investments.
Its central planning bureau defined GDP targets, picked winners and drove growth from debt-driven capital formations (green line).
2/n
Has any other nation tried this before, ever? Not to our knowledge.
We checked at ALL G20 economies and their respective growth models for past 70 years. 45% capital formation share is a unique experiment in economic history.
Over the past 3 years, we made some controversial calls in commodities. We decided to exit our oil holding in Aug 2022, we went short natgas in early 2023 or called for copper to go lower in May.
Why? Because we have an egde on China.
1/n #China
Yes, mainstream media picked up pace on important issues facing China today.
Most came to understand that the property bubble burst, that the economy is slowing, that geopolitical frictions are emerging, that there is too much debt.
But do they understand the underlying forces that drive these issues?
2/n
While the majority of these facts are known, most Western observers, investors & industrialists do not fully appreciate their interdependence & the structural changes that are unfolding in China today.