Thread by @AndrewPRLevi

My suggestion that two foreign secretaries were extraordinarily bad at the job has led to a discussion of civil service impartiality, revealing deep misunderstandings about government in general & the civil service in particular.

I hope the following (long)🧵helps./1.

https://twitter.com/AndrewPRLevi/status/1468224638530510863

Impartiality & objectivity are two core civil service (& diplomatic service) values. Integrity & honesty are others. I’ll focus here on the first two. But, of course, they’re all interlinked. /2.

Within the law, ministers, accountable to parliament, set policy. Officials advise on policy & on operational issues. They then execute ministerial decisions. /3.

If a civil servant thinks a ministerial decision flawed, but legal, they can (should) advise against. If ministers nonetheless want to proceed they can (& do) direct that. Civil servants must loyally & to the best of their ability then do what ministers have directed. /4.

If a civil servant believes the decision morally wrong, they must be given an opportunity to make their case (usually to a very senior official) &, if at all feasible, be redeployed to a different task which they’re well qualified to carry out. /5.

If a decision is illegal, a civil servant must refuse to implement it.

Of course, it’s open to civil servants to resign on principle. Some have. Over Suez, & the Iraq War, for instance. More recently, over the approach the Johnson government has taken to Brexit. /6.

That doesn’t mean they were failing impartially & objectively to carry out their duties up to that point. But it does mean they had the integrity - & courage, some might say - to take a very difficult decision to leave an often successful & long-term career. /7.

Impartiality is a meaningless concept if there are no differences of opinion on important matters. It’s precisely when such differences arise that impartiality is crucial. At least, under the constitutional arrangements we’ve been used to in the UK since 1854. /8.

Civil servants impartially & objectively (& with integrity & honesty) serve the Crown. A more modern way of putting it, informally, could be, they serve the public interest. /9.

Under Mrs Thatcher, this loyalty to the Crown/ public interest, was interpreted to be equivalent to & essentially indistinguishable from serving the duly elected government of the day. That’s the way it’s stayed since. /10.

Which is fine (just about) provided the government of the day is beyond reproach on issues such as legality & the rule of law, honesty, & fundamental political & human rights. /11.

Let’s just agree that, whatever your view of what’s happened in recent years, were a government to, say, trash international law, lie to The Queen, lie to Parliament (& not correct the record) … that would fall outside the definition of “beyond reproach”. /12.

And, were that to be a persistent feature, it would lead to the breakdown of Mrs Thatcher’s doctrine. Civil servants would be placed in an impossible position, between loyalty to Crown & country, on the one hand, & a rogue government, on the other. /13.

When Carne Ross & Elizabeth Wilmshurst resigned from the Foreign Office over the Iraq War, illegality was a key issue. So was ministerial lying. These cases are well-documented. I’m not taking sides between Tony Blair & the two officials. /14.

They had reason to think the government had gone rogue. (My words, not theirs. They can speak for themselves, & have done so). More recently, Alexandra Hall Hall explained her reasons for resigning over the Johnson government’s handling of Brexit. Similar comments apply. /15.

What is a civil (or diplomatic) servant supposed to do in such a position? Stay & participate in wrongdoing (as they see it)? Or resign? Might their staying make things better, or at least less bad? If they resign, are they breaching the requirement of impartiality? /16.

Much of this is rendered largely theoretical if civil servants who’ve resigned stay silent. And, on the whole, officials - resigned or retired - have kept quiet in the past, about their policy differences with past or present governments. /17.

But that was because, on the whole, in the past they’ve generally had reason to accept that the relevant governments were acting properly, even if implementing potentially bad policies. /18.

65 years ago the Suez Crisis shook that assumption for many. 18 years ago, so did the Iraq War, for a later generation. What’s happened in the last couple of years, in particular, is unprecedented in its scale & nature. /19.

For many officials, having loyally served each government, accepting Mrs Thatcher’s constitutional doctrine, even as it arguably became ever more threadbare, impartially, objectively, (honestly, with integrity), to the best of their abilities, their position became untenable./20.

They could no longer reconcile serving the government of the day *&* being loyal to the Crown/ public interest.

Staying silent, after having resigned, is always an option. Of course. But this isn’t business as usual. /21.

When you’re so dedicated to your country, when you’ve resigned precisely because you are, when the security, prosperity & well-being of the country is, as you see it, being assaulted & dismantled by the government & its political & other collaborators, you speak up. /22.

That isn’t impartiality.

Sure. You’re no longer a government official.

You’re taking sides. Absolutely.

On matters you consider vital to the future of the country. /23.

It is integrity, though. And honesty. And, if you stick (as you must) to applying expertise to the analysis of external, factual reality, it’s most certainly objectivity.

There’s no duty on an ex-official to be impartial. /24.

Several former senior officials have revealed powerfully anti-EU views since leaving the service. Yet, for their entire careers they impartially served governments committed to EU membership. Good for them. Or don’t we believe they were impartial? Let’s leave that hanging. /25.

As ex-officials they’re allowed to express their anti-EU sentiments.

And, my goodness, they do. /26.

Let’s have less of the Brexiter self-pity & (not infrequently) bad-faith attacks on those who equally strongly express their views, after equally honourable & dedicated public service, on the other side of the argument. /27.

Yes, I do have a view. As anyone who reads my tweets will know.

It isn’t party political.

I object primarily to two things:

▪️unfitness for office of ministers (or officials: but ministers are in charge, so I focus mainly on them); /28.

▪️abuse of power, in particular taking a wrecking ball to the rule of law & the constitution, & pursuing policies fundamentally incompatible with the security, prosperity & well-being of the country & the people in it. The Johnson-Frost Brexit is guilty of both. /29.

Also, as those who’ve read my tweets will know, I don’t just object. I propose change.

You don’t have to like it. And I don’t have to stop doing it.

As an official I always observed the Thatcher doctrine. And always worked to the best of my abilities within that framework. /30.

If you want party hacks as civil servants, by all means tear up the system we’ve used for over 160 years. See where it gets you.

If not, get your head around what impartiality really means. /31.

And stop pretending the civil service or the diplomatic service - for all they need constant improvement, sometimes significant - are the problem.

Any UK prime minister & cabinet with a large parliamentary majority wields huge, quasi-monarchical power. /32.

If the Johnson-Frost Brexit is a car crash (it is), that’s down to them. Not officials.

If the UK’s Afghanistan involvement became a mess (it did), that’s down to them. Not officials. /33.

If the rule of law & constitution are being shattered (they are), that’s down to them. Not officials.

If there’s a fundamental failure of national leadership (there is), that’s down to them. Not officials. /34.

If officials fail in their duties & that isn’t rapidly corrected, that’s ultimately down to the prime minister & cabinet.

And, of course, any officials who’ve failed - or caused others to fail - through their own incompetence. /35.

But bear in mind, to take a current example, that the insane decision to merge the FCO & DfID at a time of predictably mounting international crisis was the PM’s. /36.

As often as not, whether in business or officialdom, teams fail, when they do, because they’ve been put in an impossible position by hopeless strategic leaders.

In government, that’s the prime minister & the cabinet.

The buck stops. We know where. Do this team understand? /37.

I don’t think so. I don’t think you think so.

No one should be impartial about unfitness for office or abuse of power.

I’m not. /38. End

What should ex civil servants be allowed to say? (See tweets 17-24, above).

The norm, reflected in the Civil Service Code, has been that they not talk or write about their work, except perhaps in an educational way; not attack the govt or take party-political positions; /1.

… & (of course) not endanger national security etc by breaching the Official Secrets Act. Setting aside the question of official secrets, that norm has been eroded over the years.

Memoirs have been published. /2.

Some, like the self-aggrandising account of a former UK ambassador to the US, in more innocent, pre-Brexit days, with what has looked to many like arrogant contempt for the expected proprieties. Although with little apparent moral justification - eg whistle-blowing. /3.

More recently, some of the UK’s few most senior (ex) officials have published highly critical, if usually soberly phrased, books, articles & social media posts, setting out serious deficiencies of UK govt policies, competence & process. /4.

Usually they’ve let a couple of years or more pass, after their departure from the service, before speaking out. This raises a question which has never properly been resolved, probably because it couldn’t be: /5.

… how long should ex officials stay silent, about precisely what, & under what circumstances? Forever? If not, for how long? And does that vary, if so based on what criteria? /6.

The purpose of the norm described above has been to help ensure trust between the elected government & unelected officials is maintained. “Kiss & tell” official memoirs & articles would damage that trust. Which is fair enough. Under normal circumstances. /7.

Of course, if an official stands down & becomes an elected politician (it has happened: a notable example was George Walden, Lord Carrington’s private secretary) they’re as political as the next MP. Still, they shouldn’t abuse the trust they held as an official. /8.

Or, if they’re a whistle-blower, like Raphael Marshall the other day (sending evidence to MPs of what he observed to be Foreign Office dysfunction), they’re protected by the law. /9.

But the biggest, most troubling issue has been when the elected government abuses its power, public trust, the law & the constitution on a grand scale. Earlier norms no longer hold. /10.

The Civil Service Code, certainly in relation to ex officials’ free speech, no longer carries much credibility. It would be bizarre if it did, if the Ministerial Code were being routinely abused by serving ministers, & worse. /11.

Yet there is no new, established norm for what such ex officials are to be allowed to say, or not, under the altered circumstances.

A dangerous area for all involved. /12.

Far less dangerous, though, than the trashing of the security, prosperity & well-being of the country & the people in it, by those charged with protecting them. /13. End