Not sure what "major change" means, but there is evidence Russia is continuing to send units and equipment near Ukraine, which I assume will continue. The "red line" from the US is a Russian invasion, but not a Russian enhanced military posture with more reinforcements.
Unless Biden announced major concessions during his conversation (which was never likely), the Russian buildup was always going to continue. Putin said he thinks there is value in keeping up tensions. We should expect to see an enhanced Russian mil force near Ukraine for months.
Russia has deployed much if not most of a Central Military District combined arms army near Ukraine. Until it leaves, Russia will have an enlarged military presence, and it would be costly to move it back and return it to Ukraine if the situation worsens. Easier to leave it.
Maintaining an enhanced military posture near Ukraine should be considered the default option until the summer or later. It isn't that costly, serves a purpose, and keeps Putin's options open. Reducing it would limit Moscow's options, which would only happen if something changes.
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This talk was never going to solve the current situation. Russia will almost certainly keep an enhanced presence near Ukraine's borders for the foreseeable future (i.e. until the summer or longer) and can invade quickly. Much depends on how substantive these discussions are.
The current tensions was a final warning about Russia's red lines wrt/ Ukraine (the spring buildup was the 1st warning, which wasn't heeded). I'm sure those lines were communicated to Biden. I doubt we'll get another warning if Russia chooses to escalate (to achieve surprise). 2/
So the risk of a Russian invasion will be high for the foreseeable future. Another Ukrainian TB2 strike in the Donbas could be enough to start a Russian invasion, as well as a newly announced arms deal for Ukraine. We shouldn't be surprised if Russia escalates on short notice. 3/
There are more units from the Central Military District near Ukraine now than in the spring. Russia can reinforce this area quickly with western and southern district units, which means Russia will have the forces necessary to start a large-scale invasion on short notice.
I don't see many tents and medical facilities at Yelnya, but you can set those up quickly and transport troops there much faster than heavy equipment, which is being prepositioned. If Moscow decides to invade, they can move the other stuff quickly (and use transport aircraft).
We should keep an eye out for army-level C2 equipment if it arrives in Yelnya since I would assume the 41st CAA's HQ would lead its subordinate units if they do anything.
A quick word about the possible scheme of maneuver in these maps. Militaries typically assess the enemy's possible COAs with the enemy's most likely/probable course of action (EMLCOA) and the enemy's most dangerous course of action (EMDCOA). These look more like the EMDCOA.
When you develop a scheme of maneuver, you try to form a plan that achieves your objectives while minimizing risk. Amphibious and airborne operations are inherently dangerous, so is conducting an offensive from only one direction. Where would Russia choose to assume risk? 2/
Re: an amphibious assault, Russia would need to suppress/destroy Ukraine's anti-ship systems (e.g. Neptun) before launching one with large landing ships. If they conducted a landing with only landing craft, they would need to build up that force so it could defend itself. 3/
"U.S. intelligence has found the Kremlin is planning a multi-front offensive as soon as early next year involving up to 175,000 troops"
"The plans involve extensive movement of 100 battalion tactical groups with an estimated 175,000 personnel" washingtonpost.com/national-secur…
The Ukrainian MoD graphic from late November showed 40 Russian BTGs near Ukraine's borders, but the US IC assesses there are now 50 (maybe they used different distances). 100 BTGs would be 2/3rds of Russia's total BTGs. There are also more units nearby not in the red areas. 2/
This part is a little odd. I thought the previous references to concerns about reservists was the BARS program. The 100k figure seems really high and strange. The BARS program is new, so a force of 100k stood up this quickly would likely not be an effective force. 3/
Short thread: I see a number of people arguing that the ultimate goal of Russia's buildup is to occupy more Ukrainian territory. When you look at what Russia is actually doing, that explanation makes little sense.
1st, Russia's current activities are related to its buildup in the spring. Many of the units/equipment moved near Ukraine in March-April never left. Russia did not conduct a large-scale invasion then to occupy more territory. If that is their ultimate goal, why didn't they? 2/
The current buildup is less public than in the spring, but it isn't hidden and US/Ukr intel can see what they're doing. Russia isn't being that secretive (Putin said they were deliberately increasing tensions) and there is alot of strong rhetoric coming from Russian officials. 3/
None of the weapons NATO is providing to Kyiv is a game-changer, but I think Russia wants to stop this support before it includes things like long-range missiles or missile defense. If Russia decides to escalate, they'll destroy Ukraine's TB2 on the ground in the first 30 minutes
People have a false perception of how effective TB2 and other UCAVs would be against the best militaries because they've only been used against insurgent groups or relatively weak militaries with limited fires capabilities/air defenses. 2/
TB2 UCAVs played a key role in the 2nd Karabakh War last year, and Armenia sustained very heavy equipment losses in the first 30 minutes. But much of these losses came from Azerbaijani MLRS and ground-based fires that had GPS locations for Armenian artillery and air defenses. 3/