From ISED (pm.gc.ca/en/mandate-let…): plans for more natsec/surveillance around university research; right to repair stuff; update the Investment Cnd Act to support natsec assessments, more on Digital Charter, DARPA-like program
From PSC (pm.gc.ca/en/mandate-let…): CBSA review body promised, focus on financial crimes, legislation planned for 5G/critical infrastructure, more intel sharing with Cnd partners targeting research/investment; more natsec-related resources to RCMP and other security agencies [½]
More from PSC: involved in cybersecurity plan/strategy, focus on ideologically-inspired extremism + attention to cybercriminals/terroists; implement Clare’s Law; more digital surveillance at the borders, and improve security to ministers/MPs
From Justice (pm.gc.ca/en/mandate-let…): work with Heritage on online harms, do stuff to counter extremists+cybercriminals and terrorists; develop specialized sexual violence courts. Also good focus on issues of systemic racism/need to improve indigenous relations (and more!)
From Defence (pm.gc.ca/en/mandate-let…): mostly quiet except for role of overseeing @cse_cst “to ensure that they are in a position to lead Canada’s response to rapidly evolving cyber risks and threats, including through adequate resources and close cooperation with our allies.”
Lots of Ministers involved in National Cyber Security Strategy (PSC, GAC, ISED) and the National Cyber Security Action Plan (PSC, Justice, ISED, GAC). Those’ll be fun to see tease out over time, too.
Health (pm.gc.ca/en/mandate-let…): work with ISED to improve health surveillance etc (NOT defence/PSC); work with ISED on DARPA-like funding system; work to make Parliament more family-inclusive place of employment (this is a Health priority?)
GAC (pm.gc.ca/en/mandate-let…): work with partners on issues of arbitrary detention, economic coercion, cyber threats, foreign interference in democratic processes and egregious violations of human rights; work with DND + NATO on climate-related threat/emergencies
Heritage (pm.gc.ca/en/mandate-let…): adopt the Australian model to online companies re: paying news outlets operating in Canada and introduce in early 2022; work with Justice to develop/intro online harms legislation; lots of attention to French-language/Quebec issues
Immigration (pm.gc.ca/en/mandate-let…): expand resettlement program for human rights defenders; assist those needing resettlement from Afghanistan; modernize the SafeThird Country Agreement, expand permanent residence pathways available to international students.
(It should go without saying, but just in case: there’s LOTS more in those mandate letters + the other Ministers’. I’m cherry picking/highlighting things that are of interest to me personally/professionally. All letters at: pm.gc.ca/en/mandate-let…)
(I should note that DND is included in this, too. Thanks for the catch, @PJ47596176)
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This is a really great story from @business and congrats to the reporters for getting the story. A few comments:
1) At its core, this is a story of a Chinese government HUMINT operation that saw intel agencies push compromised software updates to operator networks
2) Subsequently, tipped off by this, US agencies saw similar activities targeting Huawei equipment in the USA. This is part of what has led to the drumbeat of ‘we can’t trust Huawei equipment in our networks’. (Me: I’m curious about Canadian, UK, and New Zealand networks!)
In this thread I’ll be highlighting some items of note, and general thoughts, on what we learned about our national security agencies as well as their review body. I’ll be structuring using the top-line headings in the report in case you want to follow along.
Section: Message to Members
The first thing to note is NSIRA recognizes the lack of access to offices and/or information have delayed reviews. Practically, staff have lacked access to classified materials which they regularly depend on to conduct reviews.
🚨🚨NEW REPORT from @citizenlab: Pandemic Privacy: A preliminary analysis of collection technologies, data collection laws, and legislative reform during COVID-19 citizenlab.ca/2021/09/pandem… 🚨🚨
1) performs a comparative analysis of pandemic data collection technologies 2) finds privacy laws didn’t inhibit Canada’s COVID-19 response, and 3) identifies how proposed privacy law reforms would harm Canadians’ privacy
Core findings:
1) how data was collected to combat the COVID-19 pandemic was unprecedented in terms of the sheer volume of data collected, and retasking of commercial services and systems to facilitate health surveillance
Earlier this year, Canada's National Security Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA) announced it experienced a 'cyber incident. @NSIRACanada is responsible for, amongst other things, reviewing the operations which have been undertaken by Canada's intelligence community. #cndnatsec
At the time there was very little public information, which led me to raise a serious of questions of what unclassified or Protected (as opposed to Secret, Top Secret, or Top Secret SI) information might have been accessed by a third party. See: christopher-parsons.com/questions-surr…
Encrypted Phone Firm Ciphr, Used by Criminals, Moves to Cut-off Australia vice.com/en/article/k78…
It's really interesting that Ciphr is expanding to include a 'Lite' version that may significantly expand their user base. Why might an organization that ostensibly markets its services criminals do this?
1) The more people using the service who are not potential criminals may increase costs to LEAs who want to insert a backdoor into the application somehow. If they can scale then there may be a public interest argument to *not* backdoor this Ciphr, unlike An0n.
Stanford professors urge U.S. to end program looking for Chinese spies in academia reuters.com/world/us/stanf…
The FBI has a track record of laying charges against American faculty for inappropriately working with Chinese institutions. But it’s critical that observers recognize that a large number of these investigations are subsequently dismissed.
Canada is adopting American methods of scrutinizing academics, with an expected focus on Asian (and specifically Chinese) collaborators. We will likely see similar charging behaviour, harassment, and bias against scholars based on ‘national security’ concerns and investigations.