Really important point by @PJTheEconomist. Many discussions of devolution focus on the *legal* powers of devolved bodies (in 🏴, 🏴 or English mayors). But their *fiscal* powers are equally critical: without the ability to raise their own taxes they are constantly supplicants.
Moreover, without their own fiscal autonomy, accountability for decisions is confused and poor.
Central government uses its purse strings as a whip, but hopes to evade responsibility for the consequences (see the current TfL drama) - and devolved government evades responsibility for its decisions by blaming Westminster parsimony.
We need (a) a much better and fairer system of business and residential property tax (a good tax to devolve, as property can’t move between areas) and (b) a debate about other devolved taxes.
There are also constitutional problems. 1. How do you entrench fiscal autonomy against centralising pressure (central government will always claim that it needs to limit fiscal autonomy for macroeconomic reasons or to “protect taxpayers”)?
2. Given the differences in the tax base (property values/income) across the U.K., how do you redistribute resources between richer and poorer areas? If central government has that function, how do you prevent abuse?
(The problem of central government fiddling funding formulae to favour regions run by its supporters is not new to the current government: see how Thatcher bent the formulae to throw funding at Westminster and Wandsworth in the 1980s.)
So any discussion about devolution to English local government/mayors, and reforming and entrenching the UK devolution settlement, needs to address fiscal autonomy as well as legal autonomy: but discussion of fiscal autonomy also raises deep legal issues.
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“Binning it” isn’t actually a bad idea - and that is so even if you believe that it’s likely that substantial improvement in regulation is possible be replacing carried-over EU law with new U.K. drafted rules.
The review had two strands. One was to go through all areas of retained EU law to suggest replacements.
Worth noting Frost’s express admission that the current government’s chosen relationship with the EU places “burdensome”arrangements on GB businesses and has a “chilling effect” on trade and investment.
And that “regulatory burdens” on GB/EU trade will “get worse” as the current government succeeds in promoting divergence.
Absolutely. And read @jillongovt’s piece below. If Case was asked to take on this role, he should have refused (he may well have been bounced into it, of course).
At the very least, he should have insisted on getting someone from outside to do the digging and ask the awkward questions - a sort of Counsel to the Inquiry (eg a retired senior police officer or criminal law QC.)
To use the traditional phrase, no one is going to - or should - believe that the Cabinet Secretary could investigate the matter “without fear or favour”.
Worth noting, when claims are made about UK capacity to take swifter regulatory decisions outside the EU. NB, for those fascinated by the Protocol’s impact in medicines, that this means that the position is that in NI 5-11 year olds can have the vaccine while in GB they can’t.
(Of course, dangerous to generalise about regulatory capacity on the basis of one or a few cases, which may have various complexities. But that knife cuts both ways: and there are grounds for concern about MHRA resourcing after it lost a lot of income and work after Brexit.)
In the longer term - a point I and others have made - there is a real dilemma here post-TCA with no good options. Rough sketch of those options: -
A couple of thoughts about this proposal, floated in today’s Times, for an annual “‘Interpretation Bill’ to strike out findings from judicial reviews with which the government does not agree”. thetimes.co.uk/article/boris-…
As written, that sentence raises more questions than it answers. What is meant by a “strike out a finding”?
If “finding” means “a ruling about what the law is” and “strike out” means “change the law” than that is not exactly revolutionary. If judges rule that legislation means “X” but Parliament doesn’t like X, then Parliament can change the law. (This happens all the time in tax law.)
Thinking about this in terms of pleading a case, what the current government is essentially doing is “non admission”: refusing to make a positive or negative case on the core factual issue (“was there a party in No 10 on 19/12/20?”).
However, non-admission isn’t sustainable in litigation if the person taking that line holds all the relevant evidence and is in a position to know whether the allegation is true or false.
As is the case here: the minister’s complaint about “rumour” doesn’t (and can’t) land because the government knows the facts and is able to confirm or refute the rumour.