I’m a firm believer in the (cliche) adage, “Outcomes, not output.” It’s not about the number of lines of code you wrote in 2021, but the impact those lines of code had - the outcomes they created. Here’s 5 small things you can do in 2022 to create big AD security outcomes:
#1: Audit the owners of your domain controller computer objects. Update the owner of each object to the Domain Admins group for that domain.
Time required: up to 1 hour
Potential attack path impact: extremely high.
Risk of breaking something: very low
#2: Use BloodHound to find where Domain Users/Everyone/Auth Users has privileged access, and remove all such instances.
Time required: up to 1 week
Potential attack path impact: extremely high.
Risk of breaking something: low
#3: Add every Domain Admin to the Protected Users group.
Time required: up to 1 hour
Potential attack path impact: high.
Risk of breaking something: medium, but easily resolved with using daily driver accounts for services that require delegation or NTLM auth
#4: Use BloodHound to audit who has control of your Azure sync account, and remove anyone not in tier zero.
Time required: up to 1 hour
Potential attack path impact: extremely high.
Risk of breaking something: very low
#5: Audit who has control of GPOs that apply to your DCs and DAs. Remove anyone not in tier zero.
Time required: up to 1 hour
Potential attack path impact: extremely high.
Risk of breaking something: very low
Do these 5 things and you can eliminate millions or billions of possible attack paths in your AD environment.
Enough time has passed now that we are starting to see the outcomes of this methodology, which I'd like to talk to you about:
Strip away the brands, the tools, the people, and everything else, and you are left with the only thing that REALLY matters:
The problem.
The problem that APM seeks to solve is the persistent availability and reliability of attack paths.
Pentesters, red teamers, and real attackers have been abusing attack paths, specifically in Active Directory, for over 20 years. AD attack paths are INSANELY reliable. They can be abused with reliable tools, including legitimate admin tools like Powershell and PsExec.
This service is accessible to every VM in Azure. As far as I know, there's no reason to ever disable this service for a VM, so it should always be accessible to every Azure VM.
IMDS's REST API is available to each VM at the non-routable, local IP of 169.254.169.254.
Lina is writing the technical content our industry needs: deeply technical, clearly explained, and appropriate for both offense and defense audiences. See her writings here: inversecos.com
“Attackers think in graphs. Defenders think in lists. As long as this is true, attackers win.”
If you’ve seen more than one of my talks, you might think I’m contractually obligated to include this quote in every talk I do.
This quote means a lot to me. A LOT. Graph theory, to me, almost seems like it was invented solely for the information security field. Its purpose and reach is obviously waaaaaaay further than our field, but…
… we have BARELY scratched the surface of what’s possible with applied graph theory in information security. The core feature of #BloodHound is finding the shortest path between two nodes. The algorithm this is based on was first published in 1959.