A serious problem with Kant’s First formulation of the Categorical Imperative, the Universality formulation, is that while it is often a crucial test, it isn’t a perfect one — some ethical matters ought not to be universalized: this destroys their very substance.
A good example of a place where Kant’s test breaks down is in our ethical obligations to our own family, which are always particular: no one but her children have *these* duties to my/our mother.
Kant’s test of universalizability does do an excellent job testing whether something CAN BE universalized — and all moral principles that apply to us just qua human beings, or rather, persons, are such.
Don’t mistake me: Kant’s universalizability criterion is not SUFFICIENT to fully and correctly delineate moral duties. That isn’t a license to IGNORE it.
Evil, being a στέρησις (privation), has no essence, but it has characteristic marks — and one of these (which all men know) is in the attempt exempt oneself from the moral duties one recognizes as common to all.
“The rules don’t apply to me.”
“The rules don’t apply to me.”
Kant’s universalizability criterion does very well at ferreting out this kind of wickedness, e.g. the thief steals for his own gain, but wills that no one steals from him; the murderer who kills for his selfish interest does not will that he be expendable for another's interest.
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