Thread by @OlyaOliker

Why escalated war in Ukraine is very possible. A thread. For more, read our briefing 1/16 crisisgroup.org/europe-central…

Russia is deeply unhappy with the current security/political order in Europe. Call it insecurity, call it status, call it sour grapes. Result is the same (I call it insecurity and status, which are related, and view sour grapes as part of status) 2/16

Russia sees the escalation spiral since 2014 as part and parcel of a process ongoing since 1991, if not before—one of intentional weakening of Russia. They’re wrong (there’s not that much intent there), but we’re not going to convince them otherwise. 3/16

They have thought this for a very long time. None of this is new. It’s not even Putin. It’s Russia. 4/16

Moscow is not interested in accommodating Euro-Atlantic interests until and unless its own are accommodated. Sees two possibilities: more escalation (more sanctions, worse relations, more military buildup) or accommodation. 5/16

Moscow would go to (more) war in Ukraine to prove Western states wrong (they won’t save Ukraine) and force Ukraine back into its orbit. In their view, this could also then force the accommodation they’re looking for. 6/16

It views the costs of war with Ukraine as bearable in Ukraine itself. I think Moscow's underestimating the Ukrainians, but again, me thinking they're wrong doesn't change their minds. 7/16

The costs vis-à-vis the US and its allies, well, that’s simply accelerating what’s already happening, and it won’t get past a certain point, in Russia’s view, because no one wants to go to war over Ukraine. Totally worth the price of getting Ukraine “back”. 8/16

I can argue endlessly that Russia won’t get Ukraine back, and that the risks of escalation are higher than they think, and that the result will be far less security for Russia, but the Kremlin simply does not see it that way (sense a pattern?) 9/16

Where does that leave us? With reality that Russia doesn’t want off-ramps, it wants deals. Moscow knows it may need to compromise to get deals, but it also needs to get things it wants. It is willing to negotiate, but also to go to war if it doesn’t get a deal it likes. 10/16

So, US and NATO should negotiate & seek to deter, as they're doing. On negotiations, could aim to do what’s feasible fast—e.g., agreed limits and constraints on deployments and exercises (say in Black Sea), & on non-aligned territory, null and void in face of aggression. 11/16

But it might not work, because Russia wants more than Western states can/will deliver. 12/16

The deterrence piece needs to credibly threaten escalation unacceptable to Russia, and that needs to align with Western plans for what happens if negotiations fail. Because this also might not work. 13/16

Fundamentally, the Western threat is that much worsened security order in Europe, more buildups, etc. Russia may think it can live with that, but it really will be a nastier situation, and more prone to broader conflict in the next crisis (which will happen). 14/16

If they get to a deal, it will be fragile, because negotiations will have to continue, and there’s a lot of room for them to derail. 15/16

I really hope I am wrong, & there's a feasible (i.e., doesn’t require anyone to magically transform into something other than what they are) path that gets us to a far more peaceful 2022. But I think we're in for scary muddling through at best. At worst... 16/16