[Thread] 1/ What follows is an examination and identification of a MENA sockpuppet network I've been following for some time. Unlike crude bot networks for hire, this one has a clear anti-Erdogan, anti-Muslim Brotherhood and pro-authoritarian agenda. #disinformation
2/ The first notable thing about this network is that it's almost exclusively run by accounts with photos of attractive young Arab women. Very catfish-esque. It was probably bigger at one point, but in October 2020 there were around 64 of these accounts. The photos are
3/ presumably to drive engagement. But there is also the danger that the images were designed to facilitate phishing through honey traps. The accounts largely follow the same modus operandi. They have a scenic image of an Arab country as their banner image. They post touristic
4/ content when they are not posting political tweets. However, in between this banal content they will post pointed political tweets directed usually at supporting their respective autocratic leader, or criticising the muslim brotherhood (MB) or Turkey. For example, @tiaashrraf_
5/ who claims to be from Sidi Bou Said in Tunisia, criticizes on a number of occasions the Ennahdha party, and criticizes former parliamentary speaker Rached Ghannouchi. She will also praise figures like Abeer Moussa for fighting the MB, and clearly associate the MB with terror
6/ As you can see from below, the accounts often target Turkey, accusing it of being the source of terror in the region, and singling out Erdogan for abuse. They also revel in Turkey's economic misfortunes. #disinformation
7/ An analysis of the networks activity, that included around 5000 interactions (tweets, retweets etc) across the past 3 months shows that the most common terms (excluding stop words and Allah) used by the network are "brotherhood" (Ikhwan) and Turkey. This indicates the focus
8/ of the network recently is on Turkey and the brotherhood. They are also sensitive about the Turkish news channel @TRTArabi , with the accounts often responding to tweets by them. Clearly they see themselves as protecting against Turkish influence in the Arab world
9/ Overall the network seems very aligned with UAE foreign policy. The accounts, despite being from across the Arab world, praise the UAE frequently. The only time they don't criticize Turkey when mentioning it is when it appeared there was some UAE/Turkey rapprochement
10/ Other indicators that the network reflects UAE foreign policy is the fact the network praises Tunisian President Qais Saied and Egyptian Pres Sisi. They also criticise Qatar, with many of them jumping on the #WhereisNoof hashtag (won't explain that now).
11/ in addition to the photos and touristic images, the network is identifiable by the common posting patterns, the fact that all of the accounts use Twitter Web Client, and the fact that all of them block me without me having interacted with them. 😅 Another interesting element
12/ is the evolution of the network. The account consist of appropriated (hacked/stolen/bought) Twitter accounts from real users that have gradually taken on new identities. Look at the image below, you will see how at around Nov 21, the accounts all changed their handles to
13/ sound more Arabic. So for example, 'bozkcute_28' became LamaFathy and prettysmile010 became sara_saraahmedd. They all changed at the same time, possibly being one of the reasons that prompted Twitter to suspend many of the accounts. #disinformation
14/ On that note. Twitter have suspended most of the network gradually. I say gradually as they do it in stages. It is not clear if these accounts will appear in Twitter's state-backed information operations archives. As yet, the following accounts are still live >
15/ Some of you may remember that Twitter suspended a few of the accounts back in October after I did a thread about how the network were targeting the human rights organisation @ALQST_Contact . Despite this, most of the account remained active for months
16/ So to sum up, Twitter are in the process of suspending a large MENA sockpuppet network that is
1) Pro UAE 2) Anti Muslim Brotherhood 3) Anti Turkey 4) Anti Qatar 5) Pro Qais Saied 6) Pro Sisi 7) Anti Iran 8) Anti human rights orgs focused on UAE/Saudi
🧵1/ I analysed the headline and lead paragraph of 536 English news articles including the terms "Maccabi" + "Amsterdam" and classified them using Claude 3.5 Sonnet to determine how many framed Israelis as victims or non-Israelis as primary victims (as well as both).
2/ The results are fairly striking. 65% of articles frame Israelis as the victim, while only 5% frame Non-Israelis as victims. 24% are neutral while 9% framed both groups as victims. Quite clear the media emphasised violence as anti-Israeli and antisemitic, especially early on
3/ There isn't much evidence too of corrective framing at this point, although a small increase in neutral framing a week after the incident. Israeli victimhood was categorised as emphasis of violence initiated by non-Israelis, and focus on anti-Israeli or antisemitic violence
🧵 1/ Part of understanding what is going on in Amsterdam is also to understand the coordinated anti-Arab, anti-Muslim and anti-immigrant campaigns run with huge amounts of money targeting Europe. Here's a short private Eye article about an investigation I did with @SohanDsouza
2/ Here's a write-up by @karamballes on the campaign in @BylineTimes "Disinformation Campaign on Social Media Reached More Than 40 Million People – but Meta ‘Alarmingly’ Hasn't Revealed the Culprits' bylinetimes.com/2024/08/30/qat…
@karamballes @BylineTimes 3/ ...How a covert influence campaign helped Europe’s far right
Our findings about the shadowy multi-platform operation attacking Qatar and stoking Islamophobia to further its far-right agenda in Europe and beyond call for immediate action. aljazeera.com/opinions/2024/…
🧵🚨1/ This is nuts. After mysteriously deleting a package covering the Amsterdam protests, Sky News have put up a new version. The new version completely changes the thrust to emphasise that the violence was antisemitic. See the opening screenshot change below
2/Even the tweet accompanying the video has changed. It has explicitly shifted from mentioning anti-Arab slogans to removing the phrase "anti-Arab" and using antisemitism. It also removes mention of vandalism by Israeli fans. An extremely clear editorial shift!
3/ They have also inserted into the video, right after the opening footage of Dutch Prime Minister condemning antisemitsm. This was not in the original video.
1/ If you break down the BBC's live reporting of what happened in Amsterdam, you can see the disproportionate attention it pays to Maccabi fans and Israelis as victims, with far less attention paid to the actions of Maccabi fans. Here are the sources interviewed.
2/ In terms of mentions of Arab, Dutch or other Ajax fans, there is very little emphasis on Arab safety, with the majority of coverage focused on Maccabi fans as victims. There are vox pops with fans, but very little interaction with non-Maccabi people.
3/ The language used to describe the attacks on the Maccabi fans is also much stronger, ranging from pogroms to brutal and shocking. Similar terms aren't use for the anti-Arab racism.
🚨1/ This New York Times piece is wild. Let's go through it.
Firstly, the lede is an emphasis that attacks in Amsterdam were based on antisemitism, yet it cites no evidence of this, but DOES cite evidence of anti-Arab chants.
2/ The claims of antisemitism are based primarily on the Prime Minister of the Netherlands, who tweeted that the attacks were antisemitic. Note - the Dutch Prime Minister didn't call out anti-Arab or anti-Palestinian racism from Maccabi fans.
3/ The piece links to an Amsterdam police statement to talk about the violence - although the police statement doesn't mention anything about antisemitism.
🧵 'At least 1,800 bots on the social media site X are promoting the controversial choice of Azerbaijan, a major oil and gas producer, to host next month’s ...#COP29, according to a new analysis shared exclusively with The Washington Post".
2/ The analysis by Marc Owen Jones, an expert on disinformation at @NUQatar, focused on roughly 2,800 X accounts that collectively sent around 10,800 tweets, retweets and replies about the conference between Oct. 17 and Oct. 24.
3/ Detection
73% of all accounts active in sample created in the space of 3 quarters in 2024.
Conservative estimates suggest 66% (1876) accounts in the sample are fake (bots) based on activity over the past week