Some stream-of-consciousness: the more I think about China's growing precision strike capabilities (e.g., 300 IRBMs and 600(!) MRBMs, ALBMs, etc.) and read the PLA's strategic documents, the more unsuitable I think the A2/AD concept (which is ours, not theirs) really is.
Our thinkers project a bubble thrown up by China (who then sits inside it) which we (as the active participants) then try to get through to save Taiwan or the SCS, etc. So we work to figure out how we're going to penetrate it and operate inside it.
But that's not what their thinkers have in mind - rather, imagine wrecked bases and airfields, paralyzed C2, destroyed HQs, ships sunk at the pier, ports mined shut, etc. And a PLA with the freedom of action to then carry out its plans with little opposition or interference.
They are going to go first & big - just read their works. The PLA's 2006 Science of Campaigns uses variations of "preempt" 15 times, "surprise" 110 times, "sudden" 246, "paralyze" 93, "seize" 231, and "strike" 942 times.
They don't just mention this stuff, it's their core idea.
The more recent 2013 Science of Military Strategy, at half the length, mentions preemption 30 times.
We should remember that the PLA force we're seeing take shape today may well be built on views like these, worked out by the PLA's thinkers 15 years ago (or more).
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A few thoughts about Michael Anton's recent @FDRLST article, in which he essentially recommends standing aside in the case that China decides to act militarily against Taiwan.
I won't address the geopolitical - or domestic political - angles to what he has to say. Reasonable people can and do disagree on these topics, and there are plenty of folks out there with opinions on all sides of the arguments about restraint, wokeism, etc.
What I DO want to address are some of the specific military- and naval-related facts he presents to underpin his arguments, as a number of them are misleading, show a lack of familiarity with key military questions that underpin his larger argument, or are factually incorrect.
Ok, here we go: a few thoughts on the 2021 China Military Power report, which was released today (finally!).
I'll focus on updates that I thought were interesting/consequential - areas that were new or differed from last year's report. defense.gov/News/Releases/…
First, a topic that many folks know is near/dear to my heart: the PLA Navy's growing force structure. In the key takeaways: an overall force of 355 ships/subs (+5 from 2020) & 145 major surface combatants (+15!). The estimated in-service date for the Type 003 is now 2024 (+1 yr).
There's an added takeaway statement, discussed elsewhere later in more detail, that the PRC is enhancing its ASW forces to protect its aircraft carriers and SSBNs.
Bottom line: the PLAN has not traditionally been very good at ASW, but they've recognized this & are working on it.
I have been waiting for months for this incredibly impressive demonstration of OSINT to come out - ever since I saw it presented at a @ChinaMaritime conference earlier this year.
The author (Mike Dahm) used AIS, commercial imagery, and other sources to weave an incredibly detailed picture of key amphibious assault exercises in 2020 and 2021 where the PLA experimented with the use of numerous civilian ships to supplement its organic sealift capacity.
Key takeaways IMO: the PLA and its reserve civilian fleet probably can't yet support a large-scale invasion of Taiwan, and the ships used so far to practice are a select cadre. But this capacity could expand rapidly after capabilities are formalized & expanded to other ships.
There's been plenty of discussion in the news recently about the dozens of merchant ships stuck waiting off of Long Beach/LA waiting to unload due to delays caused by various factors such as COVID, port capacity, container ship demand and size, etc. businessinsider.com/shipping-delay…
To gain some perspective on just how much shipping this is, I thought it might be useful to figure out how much tonnage we're talking about, as ships come in various shapes and sizes and the raw number of hulls may not mean much to folks.
So I went onto marinetraffic.com and did a quick snapshot survey, looking at all the ships near Long Beach that looked like they were either at anchor or adrift, and took note of their dimensions and tonnages. I counted 71 at that time (this AM). marinetraffic.com/en/ais/home/ce…
And apparently Naval Base Guam isn't one naval base, it's 12!
And the Naval Hospital is a "base", too!
Even by the source document's absurd standards, the number of "bases" is 439, with 300+ yet smaller facilities called "lily pads", or even "unconfirmed".
For folks reading about French shock and surprise at cancellation of the Attack-class diesel submarine program, here's a taste of what those of us who follow this stuff have been reading for quite a while before things came to a head: thedrive.com/the-war-zone/3…