I have been waiting for months for this incredibly impressive demonstration of OSINT to come out - ever since I saw it presented at a @ChinaMaritime conference earlier this year.
The author (Mike Dahm) used AIS, commercial imagery, and other sources to weave an incredibly detailed picture of key amphibious assault exercises in 2020 and 2021 where the PLA experimented with the use of numerous civilian ships to supplement its organic sealift capacity.
Key takeaways IMO: the PLA and its reserve civilian fleet probably can't yet support a large-scale invasion of Taiwan, and the ships used so far to practice are a select cadre. But this capacity could expand rapidly after capabilities are formalized & expanded to other ships.
Another key takeaway: the PLA's ingenious floating pier systems could be used to cross Taiwanese coastal mud flats previously assessed as unsuitable for landings. If you've read many previous assessments of where/when the PLA could invade, you'll recognize this as a big deal. 👀
IMO the conclusions are spot-on: China probably can't do this now, but we shouldn't "underestimate the ingenuity and tenacity of the PLA", and efficiency may not be needed when a whole-of-society mobilization is behind the effort. And the PLA probably just getting started here.
And of course, the title, "Chinese Ferry Tales" is just...
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Ok, here we go: a few thoughts on the 2021 China Military Power report, which was released today (finally!).
I'll focus on updates that I thought were interesting/consequential - areas that were new or differed from last year's report. defense.gov/News/Releases/…
First, a topic that many folks know is near/dear to my heart: the PLA Navy's growing force structure. In the key takeaways: an overall force of 355 ships/subs (+5 from 2020) & 145 major surface combatants (+15!). The estimated in-service date for the Type 003 is now 2024 (+1 yr).
There's an added takeaway statement, discussed elsewhere later in more detail, that the PRC is enhancing its ASW forces to protect its aircraft carriers and SSBNs.
Bottom line: the PLAN has not traditionally been very good at ASW, but they've recognized this & are working on it.
There's been plenty of discussion in the news recently about the dozens of merchant ships stuck waiting off of Long Beach/LA waiting to unload due to delays caused by various factors such as COVID, port capacity, container ship demand and size, etc. businessinsider.com/shipping-delay…
To gain some perspective on just how much shipping this is, I thought it might be useful to figure out how much tonnage we're talking about, as ships come in various shapes and sizes and the raw number of hulls may not mean much to folks.
So I went onto marinetraffic.com and did a quick snapshot survey, looking at all the ships near Long Beach that looked like they were either at anchor or adrift, and took note of their dimensions and tonnages. I counted 71 at that time (this AM). marinetraffic.com/en/ais/home/ce…
And apparently Naval Base Guam isn't one naval base, it's 12!
And the Naval Hospital is a "base", too!
Even by the source document's absurd standards, the number of "bases" is 439, with 300+ yet smaller facilities called "lily pads", or even "unconfirmed".
For folks reading about French shock and surprise at cancellation of the Attack-class diesel submarine program, here's a taste of what those of us who follow this stuff have been reading for quite a while before things came to a head: thedrive.com/the-war-zone/3…
For a break from Afghanistan news, my latest in @WarOnTheRocks on the PLA's apparent use of civilian RoRo ferries & vehicle carriers to augment its amphibious assault capacity - a lack thereof having been an area of comfort re the PRC threat to Taiwan.
In summary:
For years now China appears to have been building its "civilian" shipping, and especially its RoRo ferries to dual-use civilian-military standards...
Significant portions (I'm guessing most) of China's RoRo ferry and vehicle carrier fleets are already formally organized into auxiliary units of the Chinese military...
@Ian_M_Easton: "Over the past two decades, the CCP has established representative offices in Taiwan’s major ports, invested in Taiwanese port building projects, and gained direct access to at least some of Taiwan’s basic port infrastructure."
Me:
"Other Taiwanese ports, including the Port of Taipei, use a significant number of cranes from ZPMC, which is a subsidiary of China Communications Construction Corp. (CCCC). In August 2020, CCCC was blacklisted by the U.S. Department of Defense for its ties to the PLA."