As @ChrisGiles_ pointed out in our podcast, the rise coming in April may amount to 4% of disposable incomes -the sort of hit you only normally see in a recession
2. Voters can't help seeing energy prices as government business
3. The price cap has shielded households from the immediate impact of soaring gas prices. And these have soared FAR past the levels that DECC forecast they might reach in 2013-5 when planning energy policy. Forecasts of high and variable prices were jeered at back then by many 3/
4. The cap led to corporate failures. But the level of company entry into the market was excessive up to 2018, and didn't lead to much real innovation - just price tariff innovation/confusion.
5. The amount to be competed over once unavoidable costs removed isn't much... 4/
6. The insolvency system, SOLR, worked in normal times, but the costs that are spread across the system were low then. Now they're very high (billions) and the system buckles.
7. Prudential regulation and equity requirements were too low. Too many fly by night businesses 5/...
...that didn't hedge responsibly and left all the surviving companies/their customers carrying the can. Ofgem tightened the system in 2019 but could have done more.
But 8. The price cap isn't why we now face higher bills. And 9. Nor is net zero 6/
As @ab4scambs says, the answer to a gas crisis isn't more gas. More storage wouldn't have stopped prices shooting up - and costs £££
And while more cheap wind would be nice, we installed LOADS. The loudest critics today were berating us for doing too MUCH wind in 2013! /ends
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I too like the idea that "security" is a key policy value that parties should be promoting (see Don Paskini tweet). But the problem is that the evidence is not all that good for insecurity to have risen as much as it feels 1/
There is a debate to be had: should we want higher growth but with more unsettling dynamism, or better security-for-all? I tend to favour growth, because it gives you the resources to handle the collateral damage of volatility. But ...2/
... there are strong rebuttals. One is to refute the premise. People can have security and flexibility/dynamism - likee Danish flexicurity system. Another: the stability of fewer jobs moves as @resfoundation explore is not the point. Other forms of insecurity *are* worse 3/
Challenge yourself by reading Oliver Lewis' praise for his now-departed boss Lord Frost conservativehome.com/platform/2021/… and you find a link to Frost's lecture from February. Frost makes a particular claim about trade 1/
Attacking the (multiple, almost unanimous) studies saying Brexit makes us poorer, Frost says this, and in particular questions whether the decline in trade will really hurt productivity so badly. 2/
(He calls it "unproven" decline in trade, but the OBR can pretty much refute him - see charts).
Anyway, I have long read that lower trade lowers productivity, and it stands to reason. Trade and comparative advantage, the essence of what the market does - who questions that ? 3/
Now suppose it is, in terms of hospitalisations, about as dangerous as Delta. That is - about 10 days after a case number, the daily hospitalisation number is 2% of that. You would expect two curves like this 2/
Now, just take out the lag and look at the ratio of day X's hospitalistions over that *same* day's cases, you get this (which is what we are appearing to see right now - 900 hospitalisations, 90,000 cases, a drop to 1%) 3/
Rereading Josh Lerner's 2009 book on failed attempts to help Entrepreneurship. On Venture Capital he notes that support is often subject to distortions, such as "pressure to 'spread the wealth': to ensure each region gets its fair share of venture subsidies..."
Just imagine 1/
Evaluating SBIR, he observes how congressmen successfully lobby for it to be in every state. The effectiveness drops drastically when the funds go to the places judged deserving rather than on merit ... 2/
Yes, the contrary force is the (wicked) "Matthew Effect" = "to every one who has will more be given" = or agglomeration.
Sometimes, it is successfully leaned against. Taiwan. Always Taiwan ...
3/
Kate Bingham's speech (link found here ox.ac.uk/news/2021-11-2…) is much more interesting than some of the more OTT, civil-service-hating coverage would have you believe. Some points 1/
First, for everything that follows, the monumental scale of what Covid has wrought needs this dramatic reiteration. Note: this is a conservative estimate of global deaths. Very few policy situations occur against such an extraordinary backdrop ...2/
and it could have been worse: SARS' slow-mutating nature allowed the prospect of a vaccine-exit from the nightmare 3/
The way I see it: VL were like your drunken mate who promised one bunch of people they could break a 5 minute mile, and another that they could throw a javelin 80m.
When confronted, the punchy answer is, "why can't there by sprinters with huge arms": 1/
So there are three claims. 1: we can deregulate significantly in a growth-boosting way. 2: we can seize state levers, direct resources around brilliantly and 3: you can do both.
Where Cummings is right: laughing at 3 is the least interesting attack (though still well founded) 2/
Take the first. Obviously, deregulate to grow is a looooongstanding agenda, pushed by DC's admittedly lower-calibre predecessors ft.com/content/94ba1a…
The fruits are always harder to pluck, the returns less impressive and the trade-offs more real than its advocates expect 3/