OK. It has to be said. As someone who has spent big chunks of her voluntary + professional life in the past 20 years trying to help a federal solution of the #cyprob I would love this headline to to be true. But I am afraid the opinion polls say something else. #Cyprus. 1/n
https://twitter.com/guardian/status/1480132725285785600
Polls suggest that the historically dominant UBP of the late Rauf Denktash - the party currently all bent on a two-state solution - will come first. 2/ 
But either way, it would be a mistake to judge the 23 January election as a vote about the #cyprob, for several reasons. First, there are far more pressing issues. 3/
The big issue is that the economy is suffering. GDP contracted >16% in 2020 (latest data). Tourism did not fully recover in 2021. Inflation is >40% today thanks to lira crash. 4/
The political result of this is not that UBP loses on 23 Jan but simply the gap closes between the traditionally pro 2-state #cyprob solution UBP + the traditionally pro-federal solution CTP. This is my guesstimate, despite what people say about this particular polling agency. 5/
Got to make a call before a meeting so will continue after 11:30 EET. Sorry! 6/
(Continued): But it is just that, a closing of the gap. All polls point to UBP still getting the most votes, albeit not enough to rule alone. 7/
It’s been decades since a single party in northern Cyprus got enough votes to rule alone. So like DIKO in the south, the decision of either the Democratic Party (DP) or Kudret Ozersay’s much newer People’s Party (HP) or both will determine who governs. 8/
Also, to view this as a vote about a
#cyprob solution is mistaken. It is a parliamentary, not TC president/leader election + there are various camps, each with their own dilemmas. 9/
#cyprob solution is mistaken. It is a parliamentary, not TC president/leader election + there are various camps, each with their own dilemmas. 9/
Camp 1. Economically conservative, secular, business oriented, some of Turkish origin. (Extrapolating from 2011 census, when Turkish-origin vote was 25-30%, Turkish-origin vote is nine 35-40%. 10/
Camp 1 is suffering. The Turkish Cypriot administration (I think 2 since the pandemic) imposed really harsh Covid-19 restrictions even before the latest lira crash sent prices soaring. 11/
But Camp 1 is also in a dilemma. They are peeved with the economic situation, they sit awkwardly (quite literally when doing a show of praying) with the pious AKP in Turkey. But they don’t like “leftist” CTP. 12/
And Camp 1 is not so sure about Kudret Ozersay’s People’s Party (HP), which is a bit new + still finding its feet + has alienated some with unkept promises. 13/
Camp 2. Secular, socially liberal, economically left. But many households depend for income on the authorities (teachers, some academics, public servants). These are the middle class Turkish Cypriots whom the rest of us typically encounter. 14/
Camp 2 is also in a dilemma; “if we rail against Turkey maybe it won’t subsidise our salaries when our authorities, as they always do, run out of money” (largely because of a distortionary tax system). For history, check out credit from Turkey in 2019. 15/
Incidentally, this fear of losing salaries, as well as, ahem, a lot of carrots from Turkey, plus influential Greek Cypriots trashing pro-solution Akinci and Turkish Cypriots generally, is why Akinci lost the leadership election in Oct 2020. 16/
But Camp 2 also knows they are at existential risk from increasing Turkey (specifically AKP) political + cultural influence. So they’ll mainly go to CTP (formerly Talat, now Erhurman) or TDP (basically Harmanci-Akinci people: feel free to correct me if I got that bit wrong). 17/
(By the way Camp 2 is really peeved that the Greek Cypriot political leadership keeps pushing them away by ignoring their demonstrations + perpetually equating them with “illegally occupied puppet pseudo-state”.) 18/
(And this is before considering the big subject of all the other ways in which various parts of the Republic of Cyprus machinery prevent connections between Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots. Treatment at crossing points is just one case in point.) 19/
Camp 2’s weakness is that, like many on the left, they fight among themselves. CTP ran its own candidate against Akinci in 2020. It may split the vote by running its own candidate for north Nicosia (now TDP: Harmanci). North Nicosia is v important for intercommunal stuff. 20/
Camp 3. Small and “more Catholic (Greek Cypriot) than the Pope”: “TRNC is a by-product of invasion + occupation. Boycott the vote because voting endorses it.” Some of Camp 3 was interviewed for the piece, as were some in Camp 2. 21/
Camp 4: “Grey Wolves”. The far right, successors of TMT (go Google it).
Other camps: this includes YDP, which is mainly of Turkish origin. A small party but lately needed by UBP to make up coalition numbers. 22/
Other camps: this includes YDP, which is mainly of Turkish origin. A small party but lately needed by UBP to make up coalition numbers. 22/
All this means that whether you are the ~65% “original Cypriot” or a Turkish-origin voter (~35% including Kurds), you are not primarily voting about the Cyprob. 23/
You are voting about 1) your incoming income (will I get my salary?) + disposable income (will inflation eat it?); 2) the health of you & your family; 3) the education of you & your family. So just like any voter anywhere else. 24/
So even though opinion polls continue to show that a majority of voters in northern #Cyprus would vote yes to a #cyprob solution referendum even tomorrow, the Cyprob as such will IMHO be marginal in this election, even if the economic situation is a by-product of the Cyprob. 25/
This means that if UBP wins on 23 January + you read “Turkish Cypriots reject #cyprob solution”, you should whizz straight past the headline + go listen to the excellent analysis on Nicosia Uncut hosted by @IslandTalksCY instead. The end. 26/26
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