Good question!

Mongolia's demography is absolutely fascinating and it's worth taking a closer look in regional comparison!
To start with, this is not my first foray into Mongolia commentary. It's an amazing country I've tweeted about a lot because I'm lowkey obsessed with it. It's basically the Kentucky of Asia.
You can read some of my takes on the plight of Mongols in China here as well. The cultural commonality and difference between ethnic-Mongols in China and Mongolians is a fascinating divide without clear parallel anywhere in the world!
But okay, on to fertility!

What's going on with Mongolia's fertility rates?

On face value, they're way up. Here I use Mongolia's official vital stats instead of World Bank, because their vital registry system is generally regarded as being complete.
The first huge elephant in the room with Mongolian demography then is understanding the *pre-1990* fertility norm. Before the fall of Communism, Mongolian women were having like 4.5 children each.

Because the fall of communism created massive chaos everywhere....
.... my view is that the "correct" baseline for assessing post-Soviet fertility is something like "fertility in 1988." I've done some extensive analysis along this, specifically in reference to Russia's remarkable fertility rebound, here:
So by that standard, even at a TFR of 3, Mongolia has still experienced a massive decline in TFR.

You might think this is because Mongolia has had extremely rapid economic growth leading to "modernization," but that's not actually a super likely explanation.
Why?

Well, we can look at another post-Soviet Central Asian resource-rich country which managed to avoid civil war after Communism and had massive growth and high pre-1990s TFR: Kazakhstan.
Mongolia's real PPP per capita has risen about 127% since 1988. Kazakhstan's has risen about 88%. But Mongolia's fertility remains 40% below pre-1989 levels, while Kazakhstan's has returned to those levels.
MAYBE the difference between 88% real income growth and 127% real income growth explains that difference.... but I'm pretty skeptical, especially since Kazakhstan's total income level is a lot higher.
So what gives?

Well, without getting too much into the sociology of sedentarization, nomadism, and the fertility transition, I think we can just say that Mongolia underwent social transformations far beyond what is measured in PPP per capita.
Those transformations mean that Mongolia's TFR is actually one of the *lowest* in the post-Soviet world, as compared to its pre-1989 fertility rates, even though it is one of the highest absolute TFRs in the former Communist countries, or even in Asia!
Okay, so that's all interesting. But we can compare Mongolia across a lot more countries at once. Here, I compare Mongolia to every other Buddhist-majority country in the world + Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, showing TFR vs. real PPP per capita.
What you will notice is that even controlling for real income levels, Mongolia had MUCH higher TFR than these comparable countries early in the data. And shockingly, Mongolia transitioned from 6 children per woman to 2 children with ZERO ECONOMIC GROWTH.
Folks this is nuts!

Mongolia experienced its entire fertility transition without *any* increase in standards of living measured in "consumption capacity" terms! It's an incredible example and really calls into question purely-economic theories of transition.
The "standard" economic-transition experience can be seen in countries like Sri Lanka, Bhutan, Thailand or Laos: as income rises, TFR falls. But Mongolia is wacky. And it's not JUST the post-Soviet period driving this: it was a nearly vertical gradient in the 1980s!
The other thing to notice is the fishhook-shape apparent in all the 3 post-Soviet countries: Kazakh, Kyrgyz, and Mongolia. They all saw TFR and income fall at the same time, then recover at the same time.
This results in a kind of wacky situation where to first approximation "economic modernization" is associated with "rising fertility" in these countries, though really what's going on is just return-to-normalcy.
Okay but back to Mongolia: before 1990, Mongolia had higher TFR for its income than any of these plausible comparison countries. This has been true once again since about 2005-210 sometime. Mongolia's TFR *is* unusually high for its income levels!
So @RichardHanania is not wrong to flag Mongolia for interest: it really is an oddity! A zero-economic-growth fertility transition, followed up by anomalously high TFR for its income.
Okay, so how do we explain it?

Well, @devarbol helpfully noted this recent paper, which decomposes Mongolian TFR into the "quantum" and "tempo" components. Basically "implied ultimate family size" and "spacing/timing of births."
What the paper shows is a lot of the Mongolian trend is driven by tempo effects. During the 1990s and early 2000s Mongolian women paused childbearing, and since then they've resumed, without necessarily changing the mathematically implied total family size.
But while this is a lot of the story, it's not the whole story: since about 2009 there's a clear turn upwards in implied total family size as well, and from an already quite high baseline given Mongolia's income levels!
One thing always worth checking is, "How many children do women say they WANT to have?"

Here's results from the most recent survey I could ID for each country vs. 2019 TFR. Very high correlation!
But.... correlation may not mean anything! Luckily, we have some change-over-time in fertility preferences as well! Here's what we have for these countries:
Right of the bat, Mongolia is interesting. Mongolian fertility preferences are NOT high compared to historic comparison countries. They BECAME relatively high simply by being stable while preferences changed more in other countries.
We can do better than this. We can plug PPP per capita and fertility preferences into a panel model of these countries. Spoiler: in a panel model of *all* countries with this kind of data and other controls available, preferences are EXTREMELY predictive.
Looking at just these countries, changes in desired TFR are extremely predictive: when preferences change, TFR changes in pretty lockstep. PPP has a much smaller effect.
Of course, PPP and preferences are themselves correlated: higher income is associated with lower fertility preferences!

But where both variables are included, preferences are the dominant explanatory factor.
So, Mongolia has unusually high TFR compared to its income levels. Why? Most likely: because Mongolians tend to have fairly high fertility preferences. It's not common you get countries as well-off as Mongolia with desired family size of >3!
Pronatal policy could be at work as well on various margins. But the key point here is that Mongolian *culture* is more pro-natal.

So then the really interesting question becomes: why are Mongolian fertility preferences so high?
Here it's not clear. But what we can say is that Mongolia's fertility preferences were not *always* unusual. Here's preferences vs. income for these countries.

Compared to income, Mongolia's preferences *were* typical. They've *become* atypical as incomes rise.
So the distinctive trait of the Mongolian "demographic regime" is "fertility preferences which are not declining despite rising economic development." And that is very interesting and unusual! And it's the thing to explain.
"But Lyman, if it's all tempo, why do we care?"

1) Again, it's not all tempo
2) Even aside from the recent recovery, TFRs were high
3) Explaining why Mongolian tempo suddenly rocketed upwards is interesting too!
Finally, one of the better discussions of "deep cultural roots" of Mongolian fertility is here: demographic-research.org/volumes/vol33/…

It's like a greatest hits of weird-historic-demography: 44% of men being celibate monks! Endemic widespread venereal disease! 5-year-breastfeeding-period!

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More from @lymanstoneky

10 Jan
This study of long COVID in Norway has a nice design: PCR tests, long follow-up, large sample, and a plausible mechanism for identifying cases: a huge pre-existing panel survey using frequent mobile-device questionnaires. medrxiv.org/content/10.110…
My only real critique is that while they do have about 80,000 people in the sample, it's Norway, so they only managed to find about 800 COVID cases. lol. problems of low attack rate!
But, among those 800, they found that no single symptom of "long COVID" occurred among more than 22% of infected people. The most common symptoms among COVID+ people were loss of taste/smell and fatigue. Loss of taste was NOT correlated with other cognitive symptoms.
Read 15 tweets
10 Jan
Statistics Canada is doing a pilot study of a mobile-device-based wellbeing-survey and they're recruiting respondents through the Very Scientific method of.... emailing everyone who's ever emailed their technical support desk.
Extremely strong selection there for "disgruntled data analysts" so that's gonna be a WILD pilot study.

I have of course signed up and downloaded the app and am PSYCHED to be a respondent in another survey.
I'm a longitudinal panelist in two surveys, I've gotten ACS AND CPS (!!), and I'm a standing panelist in multiple "big survey company" databases, and because I very reliably take the surveys, my personal traits are wildly overrepresented in studies of Americans.
Read 7 tweets
10 Jan
Luckily, this can be simply "solved" from a statistical approach by just deleting the option "Christian" from the survey.
When you have an option that is confusing respondents, there's a solution! Delete it! Force them to choose between the empirically meaningful options.
Also, the actual best way to survey religion is to ask people, "Think about the place you most often worship. What is its name?" and then to do a follow up, "Do you happen to know what religion this place of worship is associated with?" then give religion options.
Read 10 tweets
10 Jan
I like David French but this is clearly wrong.
There has been progress on racial justice, yes: but most of the progress occurred while religiosity was still very high and fairly stable. As religiosity has declined, progress on racial justice has clearly faltered, and we're now in a place were it's not even clear...
What anybody means by a phrase like "progress on racial justice." Without a shared pre-political moral landscape, statements like that are meaningless, and so unsurprisingly political discourse around them becomes irresolvable.
Read 21 tweets
10 Jan
Quebec COVID update: Back when I projected this wave would just never generate the deaths and hospitalizations the government worried about, I made 3 scenarios for ICU cases. One assumed Case-->ICU ratios returned to historic wave ratios. One assumed they flatlined. One fell.
For January 8, the latest data, my low forecast suggested there would be 208 ICU cases. My mid forecast suggested 333 ICU cases. And the high forecast, the one the government is basically treating as "what is going to happen," was 795.
In reality, on January 8, there were 257 ICU cases: between my low and mid scenarios. So it continues to be the case that Quebec's wave is generating far fewer ICU cases per official positive case than prior waves.
Read 17 tweets
6 Jan
What is the best empirical evidence that therapy actually improves mental health?

I am struggling to find anything credible.
This meta-analysis of 147 studies seems to suggest p-hacking is very common, publication bias is huge, and even with that the typical effect of therapy vs. care-as-usual is clinically insignificant. pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/21770842/
This more recent one specifically on CBT for adult depression suggests that CBT has been wildly overrated by creative research practices. journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.117…
Read 32 tweets

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