If I'm reading it right—and I'm not sure I am, as it's confusing as hell—tonight's order in Trump v. Thompson isn't just a win for the Jan. 6 committee in this case, but has big potential implications that should have Trump and his supporters worried.
The Court writes that, "[b]ecause the [D.C. Circuit] concluded that [Trump]’s claims would have failed even if he were the incumbent, his status as a former President...made no difference" and its discussion of that issue is dicta.
But the rest of the D.C. Cir. opinion controls.
What exactly is left is hard to parse, as a lot of the D.C. Circuit's opinion intermingles issues that seem to hinge on Trump's status. But the key language in the section pointed to by the Court (pp. 40-46) appears to be this:
I think this suggests that at least eight justices agree that the "historic commitment to the rule of law" and other equities were so threatened by the events of Jan. 6th that they outweigh Trump's claims of executive privilege—and would do so *even if he were still president*.
Notably, this doesn't hinge on Biden's policy judgment, as deferring there would implicate the incumbent versus former president issues being avoided.
Instead, this is the Court's own judgment, which would appear to prevail even if an incumbent president argued otherwise.
What it suggests, however, is that future presidents probably can't rely on executive privilege to protect information relating to potentially major unlawful conduct, like interfering with the transition of power.
By today's standards, that's not an insignificant caveat.
I'm admittedly surprised, as I would have guessed that a ruling on the substantive scope of executive privilege raised far bigger constitutional questions than a former president's ability to assert privilege, and would thus be avoided in favor of the latter.
Obviously, I had that flipped.
Some justices, like Kavanaugh, are clearly worried about about preventing former presidents from invoking executive privilege in some future cases and found it easier to agree on how the specific equities implicated by Jan. 6th should be weighed.
All told, this seems to bode quite badly for Trump associates making their own arguments relating to executive privilege or the committee's lacking authority—and potentially other arguments they might bring out.
After all, eight justices—including all three Trump appointees—seem to be suggesting that Jan. 6th was enough of a threat to the rule of law to warrant the sorts of responses we haven't seen since Watergate, even over presidential objections.
For Trump et al., that's bad news.
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Nor would this move necessarily mean recognizing the Taliban. The U.S. maintained a diplomatic presence in Afghanistan from 1979 until 1989, even though it did not recognize any party as the legitimate government.
People associate diplomatic relations with some sort of moral approbation, but that's not the case.
States sometimes sever diplomatic relations, but that's usually saved for circumstances where diplomacy is seen as no longer paying dividends, not just a sign of distaste.
My unsolicited two cents: the White House has been too focused on defending the policy logic of withdrawal and not focused enough on empathizing with and accepting responsibility for the human consequences—or laying out a way to minimize them moving forward.
There are strong counterterrorism and strategic cases for withdrawal, which the admin has made ably for months.
But even those who agree with them are now focused on the political and humanitarian consequences of how it was executed, which clearly exceed what was anticipated.
There are too many admin soundbites of overly optimistic projections about post-withdrawal Afghanistan to ignore. Nor does the U.S. appear to have effectively planned for this contingency.
The only thing you can credibly do is own those mistakes and examine why you made them.
Some observations on the Biden administration's response to recent attacks in Erbil and Baghdad, including last night's airstrike in Syria—all of which reflect a much needed return to a more considered and sustainable Iraq policy. ...
Threats from Iran-backed militias are a deadly reality for U.S. personnel in Iraq, and will be for the foreseeable future.
But how the United States deals with these threats has major ramifications for the bilateral relationship, and other U.S. interests there.
The Biden administration is clearly making it a priority to maintain and restore the conditions allowing for the U.S. and Coalition military presence in Iraq.
That's a good thing legally and politically, and a necessary corrective from the Trump administration's policies.
And the regime for designating Specially Designated Terrorist Groups (SDGTs) relies on IEEPA, which can only be used against threats that originate “in whole or in substantial part outside the United States.”
In Syria, the U.S. has previously claimed that the AUMF authorizes it to take defensive action on Kurdish allies’ behalf, specifically against the Assad regime and its partners.