Advanced performance analysis is fine but nothing beats common sense. Below are some common sense ways of analyzing strategy and fund performance.
1. Annualized return
The strategy must offer an acceptable annualized return subject to constraints. Very low annualized return is undesirable but also high annualized return that comes at high risk is also undesirable and even more so.
Note that even if annualized return is low, the strategy may be acceptable due to the leveragability it offers. Often is better to leverage 2X a strategy with a smooth equity than use one w/o leverage but with volatile equity.
2. Drawdown profile
Many funds and strategy developers state the maximum drawdown but that offers a measure of historical max drop from ATH. The historical drawdown profile is more important b/c it offers an extended view of performance rather than just a snapshot.
3. Recovery time
Recovery time from drawdown is an important metric and feature. If it takes a few years to recover from 20% drawdown, then the strategy or fund may cause uncle point to traders and investors.
For example, $ARKK has been in a drawdown for about a year since the all-time highs.
Note that $ARKK compound annual return peaked at 40.5% but maximum drawdown is currently at 54%. Some make the naïve claim that despite the high drawdown the annualized return of the ETF since inception is still 20.5%. See #6 below for the reasons this is a naïve claim.
The drawdown profile of $ARKK shows that about 10% of the time the drawdown has been larger than 33%; this is a high risk drawdown profile that can cause uncle point depending on risk aversion profile.
4. Leveragability
Why is leveragability important? It is because if the drawdown profile remains acceptable under leverage, then the probability of a large loss in the future is lower.
Leveragability does not mean that necessarily the strategy or fund performance will be leveraged but that it can accommodate a larger-than-expected drawdown without causing uncle point or even ruin.
5. Performance ratios
Some performance ratios used for strategy and fund performance evaluation can be misleading. One of them is the Sharpe ratio. For example, Sharpe of 1 can mean 10% excess return divided by 10% volatility or even 30% excess return divided by 30% volatility.
MAR (annualized return divided by maximum drawdown) of 1 can mean 10% annualized return divided by 10% max DD or 30% annualized return divided by 30% max DD. It is always important to evaluate the significance of dimensionless ratios in the context of actual performance.
6. Time irreversibility
Some strategy developers and fund managers point to past performance in an effort to justify current underperformance. This is of no consolation to those who started using a strategy or invested in a fund just before the drawdown.
No one can travel back in time to realize the benefits of past performance. This is why #2, drawdown profile, is important.
“We are down 25% year-to-date but last year we made 60%.”
The above is a frightening statement and those who make it forget to account for the investors or traders who invested in a fund or traded a strategy just before the drawdown.
“But CTAs made in excess of 20% in the 90s!” Someone once told me.
Sorry, this is 2022. Investing is not about history, is about the future.
To summarize, advanced statistical analysis of performance and fancy ratios are nice for filling marketing brochures and blog pages but common sense evaluation is probably the most robust way practitioners have used all along and will continue to use.
In strategy development, false positives (Type-I) can cause losses but false negatives (Type-II) can cause missed profits. This problem cannot be solved quantitatively at a high level. The answer is experience and no algo has that (except if it's a sophisticated expert system.)
A false positive is when you select a strategy that was the result of data snooping or over-optimization but the Sharpe, t-stat or p-value looked good. These may fail immediately but in some cases can remain profitable for many years due to luck of persisting market regimes.
A false negative is a missed discovery because among other things someone used a procedure for adjusting Sharpe, p-values of t-stats that ruled out the strategy as one generating returns from distribution with zero mean. Again, a regime change could make the strategy profitable.
Short thread. I see some charlatans and especially one of most notorious, which I won't name, arguing for high probability of rebound tomorrow in stocks. I posted a backtest yesterday with results from shorting at close of Friday if larger than 2% drop.
These backtests have small samples and particular one shows, as expected, there is higher frequency of rebounds on Mondays after a large drop on Fridays, of around 60%. Now, frequency in historical data hardly translates to probability and also even then, 60% probability is low.
If you're aren't going to repeat this trade for several decades, then you may experience a large drawdown until the expectation converges, if ever. These charlatans don't understand probability doesn't translate to expectation for the next move.
Thread. We consider the question. Why regulators in USA are not acting to eradicate the cryptocurrency and NFT pandemic? In other countries they have already taken action.
The answer is as always complicated because everything in Western World has become so complicated there may be no answers to even basic questions: Complexity has increased beyond bounds.
When complexity is extreme, the only possible answers are extreme. This is primarily due to "curse of dimensionality." See slides 24 - 33 of my Dec 2018 M4 presentation in NYC. priceactionlab.com/Blog/2018/12/m…
Let's talk about going short after another permabear fund announced shut down.
But before that, I'll talk briefly about going to the casino. It's related in a way.
I don't like casinos because I don't like to be around so many losers. The energy is bad. Casino players essentially go short the casino with tiny odds to win.
Last time I visited one was many years ago. I made windfall profits with a martingale system playing the roulette.
I cashed the ships and tried to get out. A few waitresses blocked my way offering free drinks and a man in black suit offered me a room at the hotel. I had to find an exclude to leave as the pressure to stay was mounting. Why? Because they knew if I stay long enough, I'd lose.
1/ Overall it's interesting but there is a problem. The thread compares an additive process to a multiplicative one. Similar to those comparing number of deaths from ladder falling to those from virus infections. You simply can't compare these two processes.
2/ Save the fact that it's irrelevant to trading/investing. The payoffs are random variables and both additive or multiplicative can result to ruin/uncle point despite the positive "expectation" if there isn't enough capital to cover losses from drawdown.
3/ The Kelly criterion results in way excessive risk and although there is no "ruin" theoretically there can be "uncle point". Thus, although a nice theoretical exercise, this has little relation to investing, trading and risk management.
"Why do you sell software and strategies if they are making money?"
They usually imply there is something fishy.
Well, these people usually don't understand trading and risk management.
I recall recently someone asked @chanep this question during a webinar where he was talking about his ML software. His answer was good: Because I need to raise capital to trade.
So let's take this from start. There are three components: operation, capital and risk management.
Operation: I'm not raising OPM. I trade my own money. I don't like risking OPM. Retail traders cannot allocate all their money to trading. There are expenses they must cover every month.
The typical capital of retail trader ranges from maybe $50K to $1M. Not enough money.