The US did not intervene during Russia's wars with Georgia in 2008 nor Ukraine in 2014. Why would Afghanistan change their view of the situation since the other two cases are far more relevant?
Russia's escalation with Ukraine is driven by a number of things, mostly related to internal Ukrainian politics, Russian-Ukrainian relations, and NATO-Ukrainian cooperation. The US withdrawal from Afghanistan is almost completely irrelevant.
If anything, the US withdrawal from Afghanistan forced Russia to reinforce units in Central Asia, which can't easily be used against Ukraine, creating a new security problem for Moscow. Russian foreign policy decisions generally cannot be explained with a US-centric approach.
Again, the current buildup near Ukraine is a continuation of the spring buildup (much of the equipment neve left the border), which began before the US withdrew from Afghanistan or even announced that it was going to. It doesn't explain Russia's current behavior.
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Wishful thinking. Putin has overseen:
-2nd Chechen War
-2008 Russo-Georgian War
-Invasion of Ukraine 2014-
-Intervention in Syria 2015-
Russia sustained thousands of KIAs in those conflicts. If Putin decides to escalate, he'll be prepared to sustain hundreds of casualties or more
Putin's record isn't perfect, but he has more experience using military force than any other leader in the world. Is there much evidence that Russian casualties sustained in these conflicts significantly hurt his domestic approval? We shouldn't underestimate him.
Again, if your only conception of how Russia will use force is a large-scale occupation, you're likely exaggerating how many casualties Russia will face.
A channel run by Belarusian rail workers says that 33 military echelons have arrived in Belarus from Russia with an average of 50 cars per train over the past 7 days compared to 29 over an entire month for the Zapad 2021 exercise. They claim 200 echelons are scheduled to arrive.
They claim that 200 echelons is an unprecedented figure. The Tik Tok videos indicate the 33 echelon figure could be accurate. If there are another ~170 trains scheduled to arrive, that could transport a substantial force. 2/ t.me/belzhd_live/12…
If the 200 echelon figure is accurate, that indicates that Russia is planning on sending nearly 10 times the amount of military equipment deployed during the Zapad 2021 exercise. It would also indicate that we're only seeing the beginning of deployments to Belarus. 3/
In 2021, the Russian MoD received 5k pieces of new or modernized equipment including:
-900 armored vehicles
-3 submarines
-4 surface ships, 10 cutters, 17 support boats;
-151 aircraft (77 planes, 29 helicopters, 45 UAVs)
-Pantsir-S, S-350, S-400
-3 Bastion systems
-4 Tu-95MS
Shoigu said the Army and Navy have 71.2% modern equipment, the Strategic Nuclear Forces is 89.1%, and the serviceability of military equipment is 95%. He said the 1st Avangard HGV regiment is fully equipped, and a MiG-31K regiment with Kinzhals has been formed. 2/
2022 thread on Russian exercises with foreign countries. The Pacific Fleet’s Varyag missile cruiser, Admiral Tributs large anti-submarine ship, and Boris Butoma tanker arrived at the Iranian port city of Chabahar for an exercise with Iran and China. t.me/ChDambiev/12916
The Varyag, Admiral Tributs, and Boris Butoma departed Vladivostok at the end of December. 2/
Russia conducted a joint naval exercise with Iran in the Gulf of Oman and northern Indian Ocean with the Baltic Fleet's Stoikiy Project 20380 corvette last February. 3/
Russia's current activities are a continuation of the buildup it conducted in the spring. Units from Siberia were deployed then and never left. Not only was that before the US withdrawal from Afghanistan, it occurred before Biden announced the withdrawal. wsj.com/articles/how-t…
If you're going to try to explain why Russia is escalating, you need to address why they decided to conduct a buildup in March and what has happened since. This editorial seems to argue it is all about weakness from Washington, a common and poor foreign policy analysis cliché. 2/
Russian interventions in Ukraine and Syria were primarily driven by events in both countries. Russia was reactive. The POTUS wasn't that relevant, though they did learn from the Bush admin in 2008 that the US wouldn't stop them with force (strange WSJ didn't see that as weakness)
Ryabkov is being quite explicit. Russia believes further negotiations with Kyiv are pointless and neither France nor Germany forced Kyiv to make concessions as part of the Normandy format.
So either 1) the US makes Kyiv concede or 2) Russia uses force to compel Kyiv to concede.
I've heard plenty of people argue that NATO should declare an end to further expansion, but that would not resolve the current crisis and the risk of war would remain. Russia wants a solution to the Donbas on its terms (with only a little wiggle room for compromise).
I think many people are debating inducements to Russia that are peripheral to the main issue. If the US is not willing to coerce Ukraine to accept limitations on its sovereignty, then a Russian military escalation will remain likely. There aren't any easy offramps here.