Thread by @AndrewPRLevi

There’s a three-way tension at the heart of any No. 10 operation, between:

(a) good, strategic governance;

(b) day-to-day, urgent govt needs;

(c) electoral cycle/ shorter-term political imperatives.

A good PM masters it.

A terrible one means …

… huge trouble.

A 🧵/1.

Johnson or no Johnson, the three-way tug-of-war, which affects the whole of government, but is by far most acute in No. 10, militates against effective leadership in the interests of the whole country, while at the same time being fundamental to it in a democracy. /2.

Without sound, strategic governance, chronic - or even acute, catastrophic - failure of the entire country is inevitable.

Day-to-day urgent requirements are both distraction & necessity. Even with the best long-term governance, many & varied crises occur & must be managed. /3.

And, of course, the party politics (aka factional interest power politics) inherent to our political system, is an acute concern for any PM & cabinet. Equally obviously, its requirements are often potentially seriously at odds with non-party-political governance priorities. /4.

So who, in a No. 10 structure, represents each of the three priorities? And how can they be optimally balanced & integrated with each other?

Traditionally, good, strategic governance was represented by the most senior (& career) civil servant: the cabinet secretary. /5.

Day-to-day government priorities, albeit with a strong eye toward the cabinet secretary, were looked after by the PM’s principal private secretary (PPS): a very senior (career) civil servant. /6.

Work on party political/ electoral considerations was headed by a very senior special advisor (SpAd), a political appointee & a temporary, not a career, civil servant. The title & precise role have varied substantially over the years. /7.

To the extent the cabinet secretary was highly capable & trusted by the PM, & the PM carried authority with the cabinet & party, the powerful tensions could be managed.

The PPS would skilfully handle daily business & the PM-cabinet secretary relationship. /8.

The chief SpAd would formally be overseen by the cabinet secretary. But, all knew the primary relationship would be with the PM (personally responsible for the SpAd’s good conduct).

And the cabinet secretary couldn’t, in any case, be involved in party-political matters. /9.

Meaning the cabinet secretary wouldn’t really be in overall charge.

Fine: experienced professionals of high integrity could operate as a capable triumvirate, with the cabinet secretary first among equals on “permanent governance” & the chief SpAd on party/ electoral issues. /10.

Still, there are clear limitations.

Who decides what falls into which category, what takes priority & when?

Answer: the PM.

Again, fine, as far as it goes.

But loading the PM with day-to-day management & dispute resolution isn’t a recipe for good governance. /11.

That’s especially true in an ever more complex, faster moving, ever more technologically interconnected world.

And the structure outlined doesn’t directly answer who should manage the immediate No. 10 team.

When No. 10 was below 100 staff the PPS could do it. /12.

Now it’s several hundred, that’s harder.

In 1997 Tony Blair tried to resolve both No. 10 management & the permanent/ political question of who’s in overall charge by appointing a SpAd as chief of staff, with (unlike SpAds before) the power to instruct career civil servants. /13.

That tended to sideline the cabinet secretary, arguably creating a weakness in the permanent governance structures of the country.

Over the years, variations have been tried. /14.

For example, adding a top civil servant (a permanent secretary) to run No. 10, answering to the cabinet secretary, not the (SpAd) chief of staff.

Sensible, maybe. But there’s no obviously perfect solution.

In fact, it’s pretty obvious there isn’t one. /15.

That’s far from the same as saying anything goes, because it all makes no difference anyway.

Quite the opposite in fact.

An here we come to the disaster caused by @BorisJohnson, @Dominic2306, Munira Mirza & others. /16.

Given the vast importance to the country, & to some extent the world, of No. 10 &, by extension, the UK government as a whole, working to the highest standard, the following are essential:

- the best structures & procedures possible, accepted & respected by all concerned /17.

- all staff, no exceptions, of the highest quality & integrity

- excellent, honest communications, internally & to the outside world

For that to work the way it needs to, there’s one more essential ingredient: a PM fully up to the job.

Capability. Character. Credibility. /18.

It would serve little purpose here to rehearse in any detail the by now widely understood failings of the current office-holder on each of those counts. /19.

Let’s just say that in his personal & professional conduct, & in so many of his appointments in No. 10 & the government more widely, he has displayed chaotic, cynical, crassly incompetent behaviours. /20.

That’s massively problematic for the country.

But if we narrow our focus back to No. 10, which the PM claims he’s “fixing” with a “planned shake-up”, we can easily understand the nightmare which has been unfolding there since he came to office. /21.

A leadership disaster which has led directly to grotesque, fatal policy failures. And again looking at the specific issue of 10 Downing Street, to the need to put a derailed No. 10 back on the tracks. /22.

Yet the denials by the PM about what’s really happening - an unplanned organisational & moral collapse at the heart of government, with no worked-through or credible solution in place to resolve it - just serves to highlight what the real problem is, & what must happen next. /23.

It isn’t just that, Truman-style, the buck stops with the head of the executive branch of government.

That’s (of course) true for any PM who’s fundamentally up to the job, but who might nonetheless make mistakes. Humans do. /24.

It’s that everything - everything - in the UK system depends on the PM’s high capability, integrity & authority. Nothing works without that.

Some things might seem to.

Like a handsome oak, rotting inside. Before a gust brings it crashing down.

They’re mirages. /25.

A PM who quotes from the Lion King - as he has reportedly been doing in No. 10 today - as a substitute for actual leadership & ability is far worse than a joke.

He’s a real & present danger. To the UK’s constitution. And to national security, prosperity & well-being. /26.

And so, given the nature of the UK system, is the political party which chose him as leader.

The departure (& soon) of the current PM is a necessary condition for extracting the UK from the existential danger of the mire into which it’s sunk.

Yet entirely insufficient. /27. End

P.S. A few additional points on the cabinet secretary. It’s a job which has its origins in a dangerously chaotic period of govt during WW1. So it’s very much about coordinated, orderly, effective govt. /PS1.

As the job title suggests, it in part involves preparing & recording cabinet govt. The PM chairs the cabinet, so it’s directly serving & reporting to the PM, who in practice can hire (or fire) any cabinet secretary they wish. As Boris Johnson has, indeed, done. /PS2.

Physically, the Cabinet Secretary’s office is in 70 Whitehall, not 10 Downing St, although there’s an internal, connecting door for the cabinet secretary’s use. There’s no reason why the cabinet secretary couldn’t manage No. 10 that way. /PS3.

And, as mentioned in the 🧵, that’s effectively the way things used to be, in the sense that the No. 10 principal private secretary, while working directly for the PM, was line managed by the cabinet secretary. /PS4.

(“Yes Prime Minister” fans will remember some of the tensions which could ensue! Also with the PM’s chief SpAd. That was all long before the days of the Blair-era chief of staff). /PS5.

The real reasons it’s hard for the cabinet secretary to manage No. 10 directly, day-to-day, are (i) workload, (ii) the PM might not want that. /PS6.

I suggested that a triumvirate of cabinet secretary, principal private secretary & chief SpAd has been able to operate, with more or less “first among equals” roles for the cabinet secretary (on strategic “permanent government” matters); … /PS7.

… principal private secretary (on day-to-day matters & running No. 10) & chief SpAd (on party political/ electoral matters). /PS8.

In practice, the cabinet secretary usually has greater leverage over the principal private secretary than vice versa. Although much depends, in the end, on the respective relationships with the PM. /PS9. End