Following on from @ww2tv with @ReassessHistory episode British steel in Normandy I wanted to drop a few stats. These are from allied reports reviewing armoured warfare some stats cover all theatres of war.
This study is based on a sample of 12,140 allied tank. American, British, Canadian and French tanks. I will bring it in to British as it progresses. And more so, the Normandy campaign
Note it was recorded that due to incompleteness of Allied records, separate tank casualties for ‘gunfire’ was not broken down into categories of tank/anti tank/artillery.
As some would expect gunfire was the highest over all percentage of tank casualties in all theatres at 54%.
Land mines 20% in all theatres
Mechanical, terrain, non enemy weapons immobilised 13% of this sample. Its stated that the British and US were only concerned with weapons damage so under reported. Canadians recorded 25%-40% deemed to be more accurate
Hollow charge weapons made up 7.5%, the Panzerfaust type weapons went on to peak in spring ’45 with 25-35% of all tank casualties in NW Europe.
Miscellaneous weapons or combinations accounted for 5.5%, notably enemy air attacks knocked out a negligible share of this small percentage.
A study of the average range at which tanks were knocked out by gunfire indicated 785 yards (717metres/0.7Km). Hollow charges averaged 50 yards. This is in theatres.
Sites of gun fire hits immobilising tanks were 31% turret, 52% hull and 17% suspension systems.
Site of hollow charge hits immobilising tanks were 44% turret, 48% hull and 8% suspension systems
Causes of burned out tanks once hit were attributed to 65% gunfire, 61% hollow charges and 21% mines.
Limited data on allied tank crews showed an average of 2-2.5 crew members became casualties. This includes killed, wounded, missing.
Took further break that down, tank commanders suffered the highest rates of 57%, followed by gunners/wireless ops 51%, co drivers 48% and drivers 47%.
Staggeringly these figures in another report show that 40% of these casualties occurred outside the tank. 11-30% of total losses attributed to crew trying to escape from the tank.
Tomorrow, I will bring this report in to take a look at the Normandy campaign and to see if any conclusions can be drawn from the data. It may also highly differnet approaches to deployment of tanks between allied nations.
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
Dearest Family,
You must consider my writing is for the benefit of you all. The opportune time for writing is sparse to say the least.
Tonight I am in my foxhole which has a log roof. The log roof primarily serves as protection for artillery
but also with it one may have a light. Candles are the fashionable things here in the ETO. I'm getting along just fine, no gripes or complaints of course, living in a foxhole isn't the nicest place in the world. But that ole civilian saying applies, "This is war."
Just don't worry about me I'm getting along swell. My biggest worry and trouble over here is the men in my platoon. Believe me, I have the best damned platoon in the world but still men have to be fed, clothed and sheltered and that is my problem.
Following on from last weeks look at the 12 SS Panzer Divisions defensive positions around Galmanche and the impact on the British 59th Inf Div during Op Charnwood, today I wanted to look at the ridge leading up to Lebisey that the British 3rd Inf Div would attack...
This photo is the D60 looking south, the road leads into Caen and would be a main axis of advance for the British on the 8 July '44. Behind me, 1km away is the village of Bieville. The British frontline had formed around this area since the 6 June. We will come back to here later
Here's the overview map of where we are just north of Caen. The landscape has changed a lot with urban and industrial sprawl since 1944. The map on the right is from 1950-65. Source- remonterletemps
Back to Operation Charnwood, this time to look at the defensive positions standing in the way of the 59th Staffordshire Division. In particular the well planned, placed and sighted positions at Galmanche. This position could be classed as a classic hedgehog defence.
Within days of the landings, the Germans looked to bolster their units and defence around Caen. The 12. SS-Panzerdivision "Hitlerjugend" began to move into the villages north of Caen from the 7 June '44. Map- Panzerdivision Hitlerjugend Volume II, Stephen Cazenave
They would hold these positions for nearly four weeks before the British and Canadians launched Op Charnwood on the 8 July '44. Map- The 12th SS Volume one, Hubert Meyer
Yesterday I mentioned the Naval Operational Orders for the invasion of Normandy, it did not post some of my snippets I extracted on the detail of the planning, a few things that stood out to me contained within were..
Many of you will have seen this detail, but here is the breakdown of each beach area and task force including the beach area names and grid co ordinates. Not ground breaking information but very important to makes sure you head for the correct area.
It wasn't just as simple as sailing over, the convoys were prescribed exact details of formations down to yardage and even angles.
11. La Breche, Queen Red/White sector of Sword Beach.
To be hit at H-30 to H-15 (or H-10).
RAF heavy day bombing, Priority 1.
12. East of La Breche, WN18
To be hit at H-45 by one fleet destroyer.
Remarks- At Call of FOsB when landed.
12. East of La Breche, WN18 also known as Casino.
To be hit at H-45 by one fleet destroyer.
Once the men of the 1 Special Service Brigade were ashore, Commander Kieffer and his Fusiliers Marins Commandos of No.10 (IA) Commando would assault this position.
So after the @WeHaveWaysPod on Gold Beach, a question relating to the Sanatorium came up. It got me thinking so I decided to look at the targets designated to Force D, Sword to see exactly what was in the plan for the most eastern landing beach.
Video- IWM ADM 1258
With the use of the 27th Armoured Brigade HQ Diary '44, I had documents of the proposed targets and timings on Force D and how the pre bombardment would go. Its worth remembering Force S could also have their own plan on targets and timings. There is also evidently an overlap.
So which vessels formed Force D and what were there main armaments?
HMS Danae and Dragon both with five 6-inch guns and a 4-inch gun.