Saudi Arabia got released some footage of "Iranian missiles in Yemen in 2017" that turned out to be "Saddam's missiles in Iraq from 2003" that someone stole from a documentary, #SevereClear A short thread on a wild story by @garymbaum in @THR.
The Saudis showed a satellite image of a port in Yemen where the claimed, followed by "secret" video showing the missiles. @miis_ford translated the slides.
The problem, as many online observers pointed out, is that the video of the missiles is taken from a documentary about the invasion of Iraq called "Severe Clear." The Saudis showed a brief excerpt three times; the full clip that I added shows the full clip with US soldiers.
This was really lazy, or contemptuous, on the part of the Saudis. First, you can just reverse image search a still and Google will tell you it is from the movie.
Second, the missiles are "Al Samud II" short-range ballistic missiles. The briefer doesn't really give you a good look, but the missiles in the video they show have the same access panels as the Al Samud II.
The gyroscope plate is also the same. You don't really need Sherlock Holmes here to do this identification. Iraq used a small number of these missiles in the 2003 Gulf War. I would be shocked if no one recognized their old friend.
Third, an analyst could have tried to gelocate the video at the port. The arrow in the slide points at one building that simply isn't a match at all. (below). Most of the other buildings are trashed; none are a good match for the roof, windows, etc.
All of which is to say, this video would have been easy to verify if someone had many any effort at all. My students in the @MIIS#OSINT course can do, and routinely do, much better. This was either very lazy or deeply contemptuous of public opinion.
So many typos.
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I am coming around to the idea that Israel's stocks of Arrow-2 and -3 interceptors are either depleted from April or are being saved for more sensitive targets. A little thread on cost effectiveness at the margins.
The US fired 12 interceptors during this engagement from the destroyers Bulkeley and Cole. Assuming they were SM-3 interceptors, that represents the production run for an entire year, at a cost of about $400 million total. (Each interceptor is about $30 million.)
Arrow-2 and -3 production rates are classified, but Arrow-3 is more expensive than SM-3 at about $50 million per interceptor. You can see lots of Israeli officials talking about the need to reduce the cost of interceptors and increase production rates. defensedaily.com/israeli-arrow-…
I think the three big takeaways are: 1. That's likely Kangson. It *is* an enrichment plant. 2. The centrifuges are more advanced than the ones Hecker described in 2010. 3. KCNA did not to show the plant staff or the control room. Someone read about STUXNET.
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As @ColinZwirko reported, the @JamesMartinCNS OSINT team concluded last night that this facility was most likely the presumed uranium enrichment plant at Kangson. I spent the morning quadruple-checking. I think they're right. nknews.org/pro/north-kore…
Here is the team's reasoning. North Korea released 5 images -- 4 inside the "big" hall and 1 inside the annex that @ColinZwirko first noticed under construction in March of this year. nknews.org/pro/north-kore…
Our friends at @planet have a really nice series of images of the "Typhon" missile launchers that the US has temporarily deployed in the Philippines. A couple of observations.
The Mid-Range Capability (MRC) or "Typhon" (named after a Greek giant just to please @tomkarako) is a @USArmy missile system capable of launching the ~500 km-range SM-6 and the ~2000 km-range Tomahawk missiles. There is a nice CRS report on the system. crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF…
@tomkarako @USArmy The deployment of the system to the Philippines is temporary and coincides with a series of US-RP military exercises. US officials, however, have avoided specifying how long "temporary" will be. usarpac.army.mil/Our-Story/Our-…
Russia conducted an exercise in which it practiced starting a nuclear war. A short thread. iz.ru/1699925/2024-0…
We get to see a convoy of Iskander vehicles -- a very rare security vehicle, some transloaders, some containerized missiles (ballistic and cruise) and some support vehicles.
We also get to see what seems to be a warhead convoy, although we don't have great reference imagery. Still, we see a different, also very rare security vehicle and some mundane looking trucks, which isn't much but its what we'd expect for the 12 GUMO.
After the US transmogrified Qasem Soleimani into his final form as a a parade float, Iran conducted a big missile strike against a US airbase in Iraq. Miraculously, no one else died.Did a whole pod ep on it.
Some implications for this morning. Season 2, Episode 5: The Worst Case Scenario (Almost) middlebury.edu/deal-podcast
Iran was prepared for a significant escalatory response by the US -- so much so that a jumpy Tor SAM crew shot down a civilian airliner (PS752) taking off from Tehran International Airport, killing all 176 people on board. cnn.com/2023/04/17/mid…
The US minimized the impact of the strike -- correctly stating that no one was killed in strike and incorrectly claiming that no significant injuries (Traumatic brain injuries are not "headaches".) However, by not responding, the situation was allowed to deescalate. washingtonpost.com/national-secur…
A quick summary on Iran's drones, cruise missiles and ballistic missiles that can reach Israel. Reminder, Iran is about 2000 km from Israel.
“Drones” usually means the Shahed-family of loitering munitions, like the -131/136 models that Iran exports to Russia. They are long-range, but only carry about 20 kg of explosives. (Not that I would want 20 kg of explosive dropped on my office, mind you.) dia.mil/Portals/110/Do…
IDF officials have said the attack “also includes cruise missiles and not just drones." While there isn’t a clear dividing line between the two, that likely means Iran is also firing what I'd call land-attack cruise missiles which can have a 1000 kg payload.