If there is a Russian invasion of Ukraine we can expect it to be very well recorded through open sources, but there's serious questions about how effectively that information is analysed and shared with the public.
The challenge with open source investigation is usually not a lack of evidence, but a lack of capacity to analyse it, and difficulties in turn disseminating that analysis, all of which has to be done in a timely fashion to maximise its usefulness and impact.
We need quality analysis turned around quickly, not reports on what happened a month ago trickling out. The question I have is has anyone built that sort of capacity over the last several years of conflict in Ukraine?
Keep in mind the Russian authorises have a well documented track record of denying that well documented conflict incidents occurred, even to the extent of presenting their own faked evidence to deny it, and there's no reason to believe things would be different this time round.
This thread details some of the ways they use satellite and aeriel imagery in disinformation, categorised by the 4 Ms, modify, misdate, mislocate and misrepresent
Keep in mind The Russian Ministry of Defence was caught using a screenshot from a computer game as "irrefutable evidence" the US was helping ISIS. There's no low they won't go to when it comes to disinformation. bellingcat.com/news/mena/2017…
And don't be mistaken into thinking Russian authorities have some intricate grand plan for disinformation campaigns, the strategy is more about throwing as much mud as possible and seeing what sticks, even when it contradicts other disinformation they've put.
Russian officials are also not beyond presenting ideas they've copied from the Internet in official statements, like Sergei Lavrov claiming videos from the August 21st 2013 Sarin attacks in Damascus were uploaded the day before the attack, based on claims made in obscure blogs.
With MH17 the Russian MoD presented evidence that supported an allegation sourced from Russian forums that a key piece of video evidence was filmed in a different location, which was easily debunked bellingcat.com/news/uk-and-eu…
Russian authorities rely on the initial reporting of their allegations in Western media, which rarely fact checks them in the moment or afterwards, to disseminate their claims to Western audiences. If you repeat a lie on Monday & fact check it on Friday the damage is already done
Keep in mind there's effectively no political cost domestically for these lies. Russian independent media is under constant attack by the government, and major outlets have mainly fallen in line.
Organisations like @CITeam_en and @the_ins_ru do their best to reveal the truth to Russian audiences despite those pressures, but it's a drop in the ocean of endless deception.
That's not to say we should automatically trust Western sources, but Russian authories have a strong *provable* track record of consistently producing fakes and blatantly lying over the last decade that would be incredibly idiotic to ignore in the context of Ukraine.
In this example we have ordinary people collecting evidence, but is anyone organising and analysing that information to inform the public in a consistent fashion? Seems like that would be valuable given the lessons of 2014
Without that consistent approach these things remain interesting stories rather than the extremely useful source of information about an unfolding conflict they could be. This @bellingcat piece demonstrates the types of information that can be gathered: bellingcat.com/resources/how-…
And just for a taste of how low the bar is when it comes to disinformation from the Russian authorities, here's a Russian embassy effectively accusing the US of preparing a false flag
Unlike 2014 we won't have to evidence Russia's involvement in Ukraine, because this time they aren't hiding their involvement, so I expect the focus of analysis will be on conflict incidents where there's civilian harm.
I expect those incidents will be well documented by local civilians and journalists. Given past experience I also expect the Russian authorities' response will be denials or allegations it's a "provocation" by the Ukrainians.
Speaking of which, here's Bellingcat alumni @BenDoBrown discussing the very thing we need to see a lot more of if there's a conflict
I've been reviewing the videos of the US raid in Syria that killed the new head of ISIS and there's some details that are emerging about the aftermath that might lend some credence to the US claims about a bomb being detonated.
I've only identified one video that shows corpses at the scene, and that was filmed at night. If you've seen the video with a grey splodge in the middle you'll know the one I mean (and if you have a splodgeless version please send it over).
Three corpses are visible. They're positioned on the ground opposite the side of the house that exploded, around the area marked on the map below.
A new OPCW Fact-Finding Mission report on chemical weapon use in Syria. It's interesting to look at the analysis they're doing on the chlorine cylinders used, I expect we'll see similar analysis in the final report on the Douma chemical attack.
The OPCW FFM concludes that there's "reasonable grounds to believe that the chlorine cylinder was used as a weapon. The cylinder ruptured as a result of mechanical force and released a toxic irritant substance that affects the respiratory system and mucous membranes."
During the Summer of 2014 the Russian military performed over 100 cross border artillery attacks from Russia into Ukraine to support Russian proxy forces fighting inside Ukraine, which we identified in this investigation bellingcat.com/news/uk-and-eu…
By measuring the shape of impact craters on satellite imagery on Google Earth it was possible to establish which direction incoming fire that created the craters came from.
Although we published our report 2 years after the attacks took place the techniques used could be applied to satellite imagery as soon as it becomes available, sometimes as little as 24 hours after the attack.
Russia has declared Bellingcat, an organisation with no presence inside Russia, a foreign agent under Russian law. Given the ridiculous and potentially dangerous nature of such an act by the Russian state we'll be challenging the designation in Russian courts and the ECHR.
This is part of the Russian state's attempt to shut down free speech and any reporting that puts the government in a negative light, and has impacted many Russian organisations that we'll also be working to support.
It is now almost certain Bellingcat's Russian language site (ru.bellingcat.com) will be blocked inside Russia, but will we continue to publish stories about Russia, in Russian, irregardless of what labels the Russian state puts on us and our work.
This appears to be pro-Kurdish protestors, almost certainly in relation to attempts to get Turkey investigated for alleged chemical weapon us against Kurdish forces.
I've contacted the KCK to ask to see the evidence they've collected, considering they're claiming 300+ attacks over the last several months what I received wasn't very compelling, especially when there's accusations of Sulphur Mustard and Tabun use.
Given the number of alleged attacks and the fact chemical weapons generally leave fairly intact munition casings the images that were shared with me were not compelling, some captured unused riot control grenades and a munition that was marked as containing an explosive fill.