We'll look at how this transitional crisis in the Kremlin plays into why there are troops on the Ukrainian border, and why such things may keep happening more and more....
5/56
Let's think about what's going on. We've got this guy at top, Putin - we're going to talk about his reign changing & how this is producing the dynamics in Ukraine - but let's spend a moment on the man himself. What worries him? What drives him?
Putin is obsessed with the speed of a nuclear strike. He talks about it . . . on ... and on... and on . . . What does that tell us about him and who is this man?
Putin has a sense of mission. He developed it circa 2014, when Russia annexed Crimea.
To some extent, it seems to him that Putin is Russia. We really are in the territory of tying the destiny of a nation to the will of a single individual.
Putin is not a pathological liar, but he lies all the time.
Unlike Trump, who has dispositional states more than steady beliefs, Putin nows the difference between truth and lies.
But, for him language is political technology.
Putin is over-emotional. He never forgets favours or betrayals and is exercised by them a decades after. He is often indignant, furious, or sentimentally moved.
Putin mistrusts humans - in particular, he always looks for a personal motive, not a social or institutional motive, to explain people's behaviour. He reduces too much human behaviour to power or money.
Putin is very pragmatic and very not pragmatic at once.
His big ideas are rigid, inflexible, sentimental, and conspiratorial. But he is patient, flexible and transactional about means he uses to achieve them.
Putin loves legalistic language and that's not for show.
If you had a tape of him (allegedly) approving the poisoning of Alexei Navalny, you would not hear any criminal language or instructions to kill anybody.
As an 'informational autocracy' the Putin regime doesn't use the information to justify its goals - it doesn't have goals beyond controlling the informational environment. Control over the informational environment is the regime's goal.
What kind of wars does Putin like? Putin likes the kind of war whereby you look at it & you don't know if it's a war or not.
A war that's clearly a war is informationally harder to manage. You can't just declare victory or remove it from the news cycle. #UkraineInvasion
25/56
The regime is not aiming to persuade its citizens its views. The aim of the regime is NOT to convince the population of its ideology, as was the case with the USSR - its aim is to confuse the population, and the benefit of confusion is apathy.
The Soviet regime wanted persuaded, ideologically straightened up, engaged citizens. The Putin regime wants citizens without clear views, citizens who are informationally confused, and consequently apathetic.
Second, the CEO is there illegally (in 2020 Putin organised an illegal constitutional coup). Moreover, the CEO got junior staff in the corporation to find the no 1 candidate for the CEO position, and poison him.
Imagine a ship that is called Putin. And then imagine that the captain of the ship is Putin. And he has the formal powers of the captain, but he no longer is able to exercise many of them.
The people milling around the captain are making many of the decisions the captain would normally make, and the captain acts as a kind of referee int he conflicts arising in these clans around him.
That's because, even though Putin's power is declining and the conflictive clans around him are becoming even more powerful, the symbolic significance of the office of president in Russia remains crucial. #UkraineInvasion
34/56
Putin is the only political institution that is regarded as legitimate by the population. The people who are taking power away from Putin are doing so in a way that maximally preserves the symbolism of a Russia ruled by Putin.
The fourth point about this corporation-mafia-boat structure is not just that Putin is losing power relative to the people around him - it's that the people around Putin are consciously and strategically planning for his departure!
But more likely, it could mean (3) that Putin remains in the role of the presidency with much reduced power or (4) that Putin is shifted into some other role with emaciated powers and responsibilities. To stretch this a bit too far - Putin as the Queen!
But if the Kremlin believes that current principles of security are unacceptable to it, would it abide by new principles of security of they could be negotiated?
No! Because the ideology of the Kremlin is disruption!
Russians support escalation but not war. They are not going to want the economic impact of a full scale war. Moreover, 1/4 Russians either have relatives in the Ukraine or are from the Ukraine!
And what is the regime's thinking about next steps?
They know what what Boris Yeltsin used to call a Zagagulina - a kind of adventure that distracts citizens' attention from their daily worries they are worried about it - won't work.
The second reasons is more important: Putin's sense of mission. He does have a track record of overruling warnings about economic impact form military adventures.
Russia will continue it's policy of interference in Western democracies and it's enterprise of distabilising any county engaged in the sanctions regime against Russia
Political scientist and commentator Ekaterina Schulmann says that collective responsibility is a fascisised concept.
I don’t agree. I think there is a confusion here. Let’s talk about it. 1/5
I agree that there is no such thing as ‘guilt by association’. The self-indulgent thoughtlessness with which ‘guilt by association’ is dished out online is shameful.
But where guilt is inappropriate, someone may still be ethically implicated. 2/5
There is no reason to automatically go from guilt to zero. There is an ocean of ethical space in between: levels of responsibility which fall short of guilt and blame.
This trap of thinking that an idea has to be everything or nothing at all is age old. 3/5
Navalny stood out among the Russian opposition for being a political animal. He was interested in power, agency, change - not merely moral condemnation of the Putin regime.
A thread 1/13
Navalny had a remarkable capacity to feel free, no matter what physical restrictions were put on his liberty. This sense of freedom endowed him with an historically rare kind of courage. 2/13
Navalny was obsessively ambitious. One could be exhausted observing how every step he took was measured in terms of whether it got him closer to his political goals.
His sense of freedom, his courage, and his relentless ambition compelled him to return in 2021. 3/13
A flop for both Carlson and Putin. Or a limited success: a destructively productive concept poorly executed.
I will analyse Putin's part. 1/8
Narratively, the 2 hours had 3 parts. (1) A half hour long history lecture by Putin (2) an hour on how Putin is a victim of the West - which has tricked him over and over and (3) a half hour on how mistreating Russia hurts the West. 2/8
The history lecture was bad - bad by Putin's own standards. He was compulsive about all the dates he had memorised. 892. 988. 1922. He kept pulling out historical dates and clinging to them for dear life. When Carlson tried to move the conversation on, Putin couldn't bear it. 3/8
There is much debate between experts on the prospects of a NATO-Russia conflict a few years from now.
I want to make three points about how we might understand this debate.
1/8
(1) Putting military issues aside, disagreement among experts re a future Rus/NATO conflict is mostly disagreement about how constitutively linked war and regime security are for the Putin regime.
2/8
This doesn't mean how much Putin wants more war, but how far Putin is co-opted into more war in a way he can no longer control.
So: not just a conception that's in the heads of several people, but something that already has institutional percolation.
3/8
Imagine that my house is on fire. I take action! But instead of putting the fire out, or calling the fire-brigade, I lean out of the window and declare my right to freedom from fire'.
Eventually, I do call the fire brigade and try to put the fire out - but . . . 1/5
... I consider these actions secondary to my declaration of 'freedom from fire'.
The next day, you see me and my neighbours marching down the street, holding a placard: 'say no to fire'.
I also put 'say no to fire' in my Twitter bio, and tweet outrage at those who haven't. 2/5
I feel that I have taken action. I made that action collective. I even incorporated 'say no to fire' into my identity.
But I have done nothing to make the kind of building I live in safer from fire. 3/5
My reaction to the recent Spectator interview with the radical geopolitical activist and mock-spiritualist Dugin.
Spoiler alert: criticism of the article is fair.
But first, who is Dugin, and what does he think of Putin, and vice versa?
1/20
For Dugin, Putin has some of the right form but none of the right content. Putin's politics is about Putin, Dugin thinks, but not about what Russia truly needs.
However, Dugin thinks Putin is necessary.
2/20
For Dugin, Putin is not so much a necessary evil, but a pivotal part of a transitional stage that will eventually culminate in what Russia is truly meant to become.