Thread by @StilichoReads

A thread with a few vignettes of modern warfare from Armies of Sand by Kenneth M. Pollack:

Iraqi generalship was actually pretty good during the 1st Gulf War, and the Republican Guard, at least, was cohesive enough to fight to the death. Their main problem was that their soldiers and junior officers were incredibly incompetent.

The Iranian military was weakened by purges and the effects of the 1973 Revolution, but managed to use a combination of fanatical militia and their remaining mechanized troops to push back the Iraqi invasion. This was aided by poor Iraqi performance.

Cuba intervened extensively in African conflicts during the Cold War. They performed very well, establishing air superiority over the SADF and repeatedly outmaneuvering and defeating them.

The DPRK was very tactically skilled and aggressive during the Korean War, but suffered due to poor logistics and an inability to defend against American airpower.

Chadian forces refused tanks, artillery, and APCs that the west offered them to help defeat Libya, instead relying on swarms of aggressive and mobile technicals. They crushed the more well equipped Libyan army.

The Egyptian General Staff realized that their soldiers were incapable of using independent initiative, so they meticulously planned their 1973 offensive against Israel down to the squad level. This was successful, but broke down once they had to react to Israeli counterattacks.

Hezbollah light infantry fought like a conventional army and were one of, if not the toughest opponent faced by Israel. Many of the Hezbollah fighters in the early Syrian Civil War were veterans of the 2006 war with Israel, and they were far more effective than the SAA.

Hezbollah built cohesion in their units be deliberately recruiting groups of friends and relatives, and by relying heavily on a small group of elite fighters. However, losses and expanded needs in the Syrian Civil War forced them to lower their standards.

The PLA during the Korean War was mad up mostly of light infantry, but their tactics were far more sophisticated than "human waves." They relied on infiltration, flanking, and aggressive attacks into close quarters to defeat more well equipped UN troops.

The focus of this book is accounting for why Arab armies have been so consistently bad. Although one can debate its conclusions, it's the best exploration of how politics, culture, and economic development influence battlefield effectiveness I've read, and I highly recommend it.

*1979 🤦