Anatomy of a Russian Seperatist False Flag - On February 18th the Telegram channel of the press service of the People's Militia of the Donetsk People's Republic published the following video, claiming to show a sabotage operation targeting chlorine tanks t.me/nm_dnr/6192
They claimed that Polish speaking saboteurs "planned to blow up a tank with chlorine on the territory of a sewage treatment plant near the city of Gorlovka” and the video was recovered from the saboteurs' bodies. t.me/nm_dnr/6191
However, the online community started to quickly identify a number of issues with the evidence presented. @oldLentach examined the metadata from the video, and discovered a media creation data of Feb 8th, and a Feb 4th project folder date.
Also in the metadata was a filename, "M72A5 LAW and AIPLAS live fire.mp4" under the “Pantry” section of the metadata. This part of the metadata contains details of other files that make up the published file, such as other sources of audio and video.
That means the video file had additional audio or video added to it. Adobe provides details of their Pantry/Ingredient system and what it means with regards to metadata here: wwwimages.adobe.com/content/dam/ac…
A quick search on YouTube reveals just one video with exactly the same name as the file in the metadata of the “Polish saboteur” video, from a military firing range in Finland, featuring a number of bangs and explosions.
As @AugustGraham first pointed out, the specific audio waveforms of certain explosions from 1:51 of the “M72A5 LAW and AIPLAS live fire” YouTube video were a very close match to those in the “Polish saboteur” video
He also noted that the sound of one of the explosions in the “Polish saboteur” video appears to cut out, just at the point in the original source video where the watching soldiers audibly react to the explosion
Further analysis of the audio in both videos by @mistercw showed many more similarities, confirming that the “Polish saboteur” video had audio of explosions from another source pasted into it.
If you wish to check this data for yourself and add your own comments on what you find you can view the metadata on metadata2go.com and download the original video here: t.me/nm_dnr/6192
There's still things to discover in the metadata, for example it appears this part of the metadata shows which part of the file was pasted into the final video, and is consistent with the time of the explosion used in the first video.
In conclusion, in an attempt to create a casus belli for the Russian invasion separatists published false allegations, using a fake video, of “Polish saboteurs” attacking chemical storage to create a major chemical incident, claims that were then propagated in Russian media.
The confirmation this was an attempted false flag was established through the combined efforts of an informal community connected through social media, which currently seems to be one of the strongest counters against Russian disinformation around Ukraine.
This is in part thanks to the growth of an open source community around the conflict in Ukraine in 2014, catalysed by the downing of Malaysia Airlines Flight 17, and sustained thanks to Russia's ongoing involvement in the conflict in Eastern Ukraine.
In my mind it's the growth and development of these communities in different regions, or focused on different topics, that can create an effective and rapid response to disinformation.
We've confirmed @john_marquee's geolocation (47.2739, 38.3309) which places this video inside separatist territory right on the border with Russia. This appears to be yet another fabricated videos for another false flag. Seeing a pattern yet?
I believe this footage became available about an hour ago, and we've already debunked it in less time than it took to make it.
It also looks like building supposedly destroyed by Ukrainian saboteurs was geolocated very close to where that fake video was filmed. I suspect that's not a coincidence.
Does any serious person take Russia's attempts to justify their invasion of Ukraine seriously? It's like they're phoning it in. One really obvious attempt to create a pretext for invading after another.
Their report to the UN was nearly entirely sourced from RT Russia articles. It's a like a fig leaf made of glass.
It had a real "doing all your coursework on the last day of term" vibe to it.
How dumb the spread of disinformation can be; some Twitter rando photoshops a picture from yesterday's nursery shelling, quickly admits it was a photoshop, and now people are sharing it like it's legit. Half expect it to appear in a Russian MoD press conference by this evening.
For those interested, the source of the background image is a video showing the outside of the nursery that was attacked.
Even after I made that tweet people are still sending me it as if it's some amazing trump card. Just demonstrates how easily disinformation gets out there and how hard it is to stop it once it does when there's an audience willing to lap it up
It would be nice if @Maxar and other satellite imagery companies sharing their imagery from Ukraine publicly could also make that imagery and imagery showing larger areas available on Google Earth. It's the kind of thing that's incredibly helpful for researchers.
When we were investigating cross border artillery strikes from Russia into Ukraine in 2014 that sort of imagery was extremely useful, but there was months between it being taken and then appearing on Google Earth.
Had that imagery appeared on Google Earth within a few days of the events occurring it could have been possible to prove Russia was firing artillery into Ukraine as it was happening when the internationally community could have responded, not 9 months afterwards,
Reported location of today's nursery shelling in government controlled Eastern Ukraine. If this is the correct building the impact location would be here.
If there is a Russian invasion of Ukraine we can expect it to be very well recorded through open sources, but there's serious questions about how effectively that information is analysed and shared with the public.
The challenge with open source investigation is usually not a lack of evidence, but a lack of capacity to analyse it, and difficulties in turn disseminating that analysis, all of which has to be done in a timely fashion to maximise its usefulness and impact.
We need quality analysis turned around quickly, not reports on what happened a month ago trickling out. The question I have is has anyone built that sort of capacity over the last several years of conflict in Ukraine?