For months of skyrocketing prices we were gaslighted by the "it's underinvestment in fossil fuels, it's the fault of wind energy" narrative while Russia was deliberately undersupplying the EU and leaving Gazprom storage facilities in Europe empty as a preparation for war.
When Fatih Birol pointed at the anomaly of Gazprom's commercial behaviour, loads of media and expert reacted like "leave Russia alone, it's all about your silly climate scenario"
It was certainly possible to debate whether Russia was motivated by technical, commercial or political behaviour (I had tried to do it in this old thread).By abiding by existing contracts, Russia skilfully remained within the realm of plausible deniability
But I guess right now it is extremely difficult not to link the unusual Gazprom's commercial practice of last months - especially the low storage issue - to the events unfolding right now. How?
Tentative answer:Russia calculated that a high bills environment would have limited European leaders' options for retaliation measures implying inflationary effects. The Kremlin weaponised households bills while we were all busy expecting them to weaponise pipelines
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1. In occasion of Putin’s visit to Beijing, a major gas deal was finalized between Russia and China,portrayed as a sign of consolidation of relations between revisionist powers.But energy-wise, there is more than meets the eye. Thread. reuters.com/world/asia-pac…
2.First the deal.Gazprom and CNPC signed a deal to annually supply 10 bcm of Russian gas from the Sakhalin 3 fields to China via a pipeline connecting the domestic Sakhalin-Vladivostok pipeline to the main Power of Siberia trunkline. (source: Gazprom)
3.The deal will take Gazprom supplies to China (about 4 bcm in 2020) to 48 bcm in the second half of the decade, adding to the 38 bcm expected to be shipped through Power of Siberia as of 2025, following a major deal between the two countries in 2014 reuters.com/article/us-chi…
1.IEA’s chief Birol sparked intense debate by accusing Russia of orchestrating the current gas supply crunch in Europe. But why would Russia do that? A (long) thread ft.com/content/668a84…
2.First some background. There are two drivers through which Russia has influenced gas prices in Europe: the levels of storage in Gazprom’s facilities in Europe, and the level of spot sales to European markets
3. Historically low storage levels in Europe are recorded since July. But some facilities are emptier than others. It is the case of Gazprom’s facilities in Germany and Austria, which take down overall EU level
Italy's MFA undersecretary Di Stefano announces IT government intends to double TAP capacity to 20 bcm, also considering supplies from Turkmenistan "in the future"
Mentions 2 important caveats
- market tests (so far, not so good)
- Azerbaijan additional supplies (who knows?)
Interestingly, the undersecretary(M5S) does not mention EastMed/Poseidon. M5S sided with local protests against TAP in the past, and may have reservations to support a project that implies another pipeline landing on the same territory. Something an expansion of TAP doesn't need.
Any sudden rush to additional pipelines in Italy faces however some risks. First, imagine Russia changes policy at some point in the near future, and decides to flood EU markets (provided it has capacity to do so) taking prices abruptly down