Alibaba is now down 67% from the all-time high in October 2020.
After increased competition, declining margins and regulatory pressures, a pullback in price is certainly justified.
But 67% seems excessive…
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Throughout FY21, $BABA increased their Annual Active Consumers +206m, a 19% increase. Alibaba now has 1.28bn consumers globally.
That total number and growth alone makes a 67% share price decline seem insane. But there is some legitimacy to it.
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Alibaba Cloud now services 25 regions globally.
$BABA projected a ~USD$160bn cloud market by 2025. Their current market share in China is ~37%.
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If $BABA lost some of that market share, down to the 30-32% range, they would be generating ~US$50bn in FY25. Which is about a ~4x from LTM cloud revenue.
Even a conservative multiple on the cloud business in FY25 could be worth more than the current EV of $BABA
4/
That type of valuation would mean you get the e-commerce biz with 1.28bn annual active consumers for free.
But of course that may be overly optimistic. Cloud growth at the end of FY21 for $BABA is likely ~30% YoY.
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In Q3, $BABA did beat analyst expectations of non-GAAP EPS growth slightly, but missed revenue expectations.
GAAP EPS was down ~70% YoY, whilst adjusted EPS was down 23% .
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The huge decline in GAAP earnings does seem concerning at first glance, but were impacted by unrealised market losses and impairment charges which together amounted to ~$5bn.
7/
Adjusted EPS is a better number to use in this scenario.
During the time the share prices has declined ~67%, adjusted EPS is down just ~23%.
However increased competition and regulations have led to a much lower multiple for $BABA
8/
$BABA now trades at ~12x adjusted EPS. If we back out cash and short term investments it’s getting closer to ~10x EPS.
Regardless of everything else going on, for a company with 1.28b annual consumers growing at 19%, 10x earnings just seems crazy to me.
9/
Margins have continued to decline, but most of that is expected. Partly because of the faster growing aspects of the businesses (cloud, international e-com etc.) being low margin or unprofitable.
Additionally margin pressure comes from competition, tax increases etc.
10/
Essentially an investment in $BABA is a high quality e-com biz that is slowing growth but still very dominant, at a very cheap valuation.. probably a low IRR.
But the main upside depends on Cloud which could lead to huge growth, multiple re-rate and great IRR.
11/
At some point the valuation has to justify the risks. The regulatory concerns are very real, although often overstated.
Overall, $BABA Q3 earnings weren’t great, but weren’t bad either. Positives & negatives as expected.
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Nick Sleep & Qais Zakaria managed the Nomad Investment Partnership for 12yrs from 2001-2013.
During that time they delivered 921% returns vs. 117% from the MSCI world index.
Their letters to shareholders have become one of the best resources available to investors.
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Nick Sleep has an endless amount of valuable lessons in his letters. I'd suggest any investor who hasn't read the letters to prioritise it.
Nick Sleep has become famous in the investing world for a lot of reasons, but most notable is his early investment in $AMZN and $COST
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Is this thread, I'm going to share Nick Sleep's original thesis on $COST in 2004.
He invested in Costco in 2002, but wrote extensively about the company in 2004. He never sold his shares. Since purchasing, Costco's share price has appreciated ~1400%.
What would you pay (market value) for this company? I’ll reveal the company later in the thread.
- Strong network effects, pricing power & a long runway for growth.
- Powerful IP that could be monetised in many different ways…
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- Loyal user base/fans. High retention rate and improving.
- $1.3 billion in sales, $606 million EBITDA. 47% EBITDA margins in FY21.
- FY21 revenue growth of 42% YoY.
- EBITDA has doubled over the past two years. ~41.5% CAGR….
2/
I’ll continue the thread after this tweet, but comment your guess below.
With limited information provided, I’d suggest any high quality US company with 47% EBITDA margins and a 41.5% CAGR would earn at least a 20x EBITDA multiple, probably much higher.
Rob Vinall’s recent purchase of $CVNA and the huge drawdown of the share price has made me finally look into the business that every growth investor has been raving about for years now.
Carvana’s share price is down ~60% from their all-time high.
2/
Revenues for Carvana have grown at a ~112% CAGR over the past 5 years. Which is a pretty insane number, it’s hard to even comprehend.
The revenue growth is obviously unsustainable, but there is still a long runway for growth for $CVNA
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Currently only 1% of used car sales in the US are e-commerce sales. JP Morgan forecast that number to increase to 12% by 2030.
$CVNA have around 40% market share of e-commerce used car sales. If* they maintain that market share we could see >30% sales CAGR until 2030.
I’m always interested by what other great investors are buying and selling. Not to blindly copy/clone. But to source ideas or even just out of interest.
Here are some of the most interesting investments from the 13F filings from Q4 2021.
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Li Lu increases his position in $FB by 53%.
I’d like to think this happened after the drawdown. But the buy is from Q4 2021. Li Lu payed ~$320 per share. $FB Now trades at $220 per share. Curious to see what his next 13F looks like.
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Greg Alexander increases his stake in $BABA by 20%.
Alibaba has been a stock with a lot of pessimism from the market. But China bulls like Greg and Charlie Munger keep averaging down.
$BFIT is a low-cost provider of ~900 gyms in Europe (500 in France). They are a great case study of Nick Sleeps’ concept of ‘scale economies shared’.
Basic-Fit have a long runway of growth and if we normalise to pre-covid revenues they might be reasonably priced.
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I’ll start with a quick shout out to @vperelman for his podcast with @AndrewRangeley where I first heard the idea.
Additionally @1MainCapital and his commentary on $BFIT in his Q4 letter.
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$BFIT revenues have halved since 2019 (pre-covid) from £515m down to £247m. So important to note that a big assumption in the Basic-Fit thesis is a return to pre-covid numbers. Which I think is a reasonable assumption to make.