So let's take a deep breath and recap some of where we are and some of the different points I have been hitting. 1. I think you still have to call the Russians the proverbial favorites as they have a lot more they can easily do in Ukraine. Don't mistake me here 1/n
I want the Ukranians to win but Russia has a lot of cards left to play in Ukraine and a much higher appetite to absorb and inflict savage losses. That said: this is going to be a real fight all around. True prayers be upon Ukraine that they survive this fight. 2/n
2. So far the Biden administration gets very mixed grade. They have made some real mistakes and been very slow to react. For instance, Biden being public with intel and sharing intel with Beijing is a high risk move. Given that Biden did nothing to backstop Ukraine 3/n
With additional hardware, and Putin got to see US analysis and leaks, this was clearly seen as a bluff with no cards. Would this have turned out differently if Biden played hardball earlier? Honestly, who knows. What we can say is that Putin has this funny habit of 4/n
ONLY invading the Ukraine when Biden is in the White House. Biden team does get key points because when they have actually decided to do something, they took significant steps. The Russia central bank freeze and additional arms to Ukraine are strong steps and needed 5/n
They got docked because of the delay. Even if it didn't prevent the invasion, Ukraine is definitely now playing from behind. 3. Germany and the EU get major points. They deserve a lot of criticism for their past decade of unicorns and cotton candy foreign policy but for now 6/n
I'm not going to stress that given their about face including strong financial sanctions and arms movement to Ukraine. What is absolutely key however is whether this represents a six month crash diet or whether this represents a fundamental rethink of Germany and EU 7/n
foreign policy, looking right at you Iran and China. Maybe I am too cynical but I would still assign a 50/50 chance this isn't applied to other countries and or that we don't see the follow through from this weekend. On a brief side note, for all the criticism of Trump 8/n
Germany and the EU basically fulfilled Trump's wish list for security and economic policy in a weekend. As much of a vindication of Trump foreign policy this weekend was, you have to call it the final failure of Merkel foreign policy. This is the repudiation of Merkel 9/n
4. I want to make one quick extension to Taiwan. Despite what the Acela Corridor Galaxy Brains are saying, the lesson being learned in PLA halls is that they need to ensure taking Taiwan fast. Fait accompli. I guarantee this is what the US military fears. Sending arms 10/n
To Taiwan48 hours after China has moved in raises risks exponentially given its island status. Why am I saying this? You CANNOT CANNOT CANNOT make the same mistake with Taiwan that were made with Ukraine. You have to be there early and with size. The last piece of good news? 11/n
Even though it has gotten virtually no attention, China a month ago changed the language around Taiwan to solve the Taiwan situation for a new era. Xi has made it pretty clear he is ushering China into a new era. This isn't 5-10 years away. It would be an absolute farce 12/n
To make the previous assumptions like Xi doesn't want to risk it. Really the dude runs concentration camps and nobody seems to really care. He takes Taiwan what do you think Mercedes or Goldman will do? Nothing. It's only going to get better. Happy Monday
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ICYMI, here is my latest paper with my new think tank New Kite Data Labs. In this paper, we cover the case of a Chinese military civil fusion firm who has exfiltrating data from high value networks like US military and European universities. Are major findings are: 1/n
1. Chinese enterprise, likely acting on behalf of a major state owned enterprise designated by the US government as tied to the People’s Liberation Army, is engaged in data collection from sensitive high value information networks of the US military and other non-US targets 2/n
2. The data and the associated source code provides evidence of methodical exfiltration from a variety of high value networks ranging from known but top-secret US military projects to non-US university and government linked targets. 3/n
So in professional news I am happy to announce that @that_data_chap and I have started the the think tank newkitedata.com. Our first report is on Chinese military civil fusion about the case of a private Chinese company using AI processing to manage data 1/n
Exfiltration from top secret US military projects, companies, and non-US institutions including government linked entities and universities. We are also proud to announce the China Data Project where will be releasing a series of reports in the coming weeks and months 2/n
About China and other data collection activities by authoritarian states. We will be working with other trusted researchers and institutions prioritizing researchers from Taiwan, Hong Kong, East Turkestan, and Tibet who feel the weight of authoritarian policies 3/n
I see this idea being bandied about that roughly goes if sanctions don't prevent Putin from going into Ukraine then what's the point? This is attempting to draw a staight line from X sanction to Y action. There are multiple problems with the line of thinking. Let's unpack 1/n
1. Sanctions can be used simply to make something more difficult or cut of customers. As a simple example, why should the United States consumer being funding Russian petro-state when it can produce that same gas domestically. Yes, Russia can sell that gas elsewhere 2/
But why should the US be funding in this case Russia when they are so stridently anti US and or attacking? 2. Can be used to stimulate shifts away from one producer to another. China has opened up its markets to Russia but sanctions can stimulate growth from other producers 3/n
Look at almost any event and if you play back the decisions or little events that led up to that, what we see as the "BIG EVENT" ultimately became almost inevitable by all the previous events or decisions that took place to cause the "BIG EVENT". Let's revisit why we are here 1/n
1. Disconnect between word and deeds. The reality is there is a vast difference between the two and enemies looking for any weakness to exploit know that the major democratic powers are little more than hashtag powers 2/n
2. Engagement needs to be shot between the eyes. Russia, China, Iran and others know engagement is a one way bet. Let people make some money because they will never do anything because they fear the consequences. What have universities really accomplished in Russia/China?
Take a brief trip with me about about how we frame foreign policy leading up to major events. As I tell my kids, you should never arrive in a test or a game and think OMG what do I do? You've practiced. You've studied. You're ready. The process and work has prepared you. 1/n
So how do we apply that thinking to foreign policy? A. Is foreign policy consistent in direction, statement, and execution? Put another way: do words match actions and do so consistently? Let's start with Trump: the PR on Trump foreign policy was relatively inconsistent 2/n
BUT actions and directionality were very consistent. On Iran, China, and Russia, he took a pretty hawkish line and did so very consistently over the course of his administration. Let's turn to Biden who saw many flaws with the Trump approach and has done almost exact opposite 3/n
I don't normally use the language I am about to use but in this case it is completely accurate. The White House recently released their Indo-Pacific Strategy and in it they made the following statement: 1/n whitehouse.gov/wp-content/upl…
Let me state in no uncertain terms: this is an absolute lie and the White House knows this is an absolute lie. This is why in spending bills O-RAN is being removed from every spending bill around. The White House is actively pushing an industry coalition that will 2/n
a) Give Chinese and Russian intelligence access to the source code of a USG backed telecom systems b) license USG and American firm technology to Chinese firms c) give technology to ENTITY list and PLA owned firms according to executive agency lists 3/n