Some thoughts about why the Kremlin could miscalculate so catastrophically on basically everything: the steadfastness of the UA leadership, the resolve to resist in UA society, UA military capabilities, and their own capability to figth this war.
I see three factors:🧵1/11
1. There is a blatant lack of knowledge and understanding in RU about political and societal developments in neighbouring countries. They used to be part of the Soviet Union until 1991. After independence RU was first too poor to fund proper research on basically anything. 2/11
In the 2000s, attention shifted to other topics, notably China/Asia. I remember the director of a big research institute telling my once that their attempt to create a department about Russia’s immediate neighbourhood was met with indifference if not ridicule. 3/11
After the annexation of Crimea, links with Ukraine were severed on many levels. The RU research community lost contact almost entirely, people stopped traveling to UA, doing research there. They got their information from the internet, secondary sources, and sometimes 4/11
meeting with Ukrainian colleagues in international conferences – and that was that. Most were unable to get real insights into the profound changes Ukrainian society went through over the past 10 years. 2. Lack of knowledge and understanding reinforced neo-imperialist 5/11
thinking about Ukraine (and other states and societies in RU’s neighbourhood). Because the foreign policy elite in Moscow not longer interacted with their UA counterparts, their belief that UA lacked agency of its own and was but a docile instrument in the hands of the West 6/11
to undermine RU influence and very existence became more and more entrenched – and disconnected from realities in Ukraine. One could also say that neo-imperialist arrogance blindfolded Russia’s decision makers up to Vladimir Putin and completely misdirected RU policy. 7/11
3. The power vertical, and Vladimir Putin’s resistance to accept advice blocked out the few people who still had an understanding of what was going on in Ukraine. Over time and with domestic tensions rising after the annexation of Crimea, 8/11
the situation of those who could have told a different story became more and more precarious. This development now culminates in another harsh wave of censorship and repressions we see unfold against independent media and civil society actors who criticise RU’s war. 9/11
The combination of incompetence, ideological blindness and authoritarianism led Putin and his supporters to believe that this war was possible (even legitimate?) and winnable in a short time. But they don't pay the price. 10/11
It is the UA people, UA soldiers, RU soldiers and RU society who are paying this horrific price with their lives and their livelihoods. I truly hope that the perpetrators will be held accountable for this catastrophe. 11/End #RussiaInvadesUkraine #WestandbyUkraine
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Now I understand why he wrote that article about Ukraine last summer: to have something to base this speech on... today's Ukraine is entirely a product of Russian policy... and off he goes.
"We will show Ukraine what real decommunisation is" sounds like a very serious threat to dismember the country.
Meanwhile in Moscow: Russian NSC is discussing situation in DLNR, Ukraine. Live translation via @ru_rbc This doesn’t bode well… reader.rbc.ru/share/8R8C9EsH…
Kozak explaining (at Putin‘s request) how Ukraine is not implementing but undermining Minsk Agreements.
Both agree that it is outrageous to think Russia interferes with UKraine's domestic affairs. Insist that Ukraine and Western partners chose to ignore all proposals made by DLNR. Ignore that Ukrainian steps should be agreed with DNLR.
Leaving Moscow after 5 d of intense conversations. Early in the week most people were hopeful about signs of deescalation. Moderates thought Kremlin was calming down. Hawks believed RU would get what it wants merely by mil posturing. This changed in past 2 days.
People who know about economy are extremely worried about consequences of sanctions. But they do not have the Kremlin‘s ear. Haven’t had it for a long time. Liberals fear war AND domestic consequences in Ru: more autocracy, more repression.
Since Friday night everybody should have unterstood the situation is dead serious. What is happening now clearly is a well-staged provocation from the Russian\DLNR side. 23 February is the „National Day of the Defender of the Fatherland“. We‘ll see where we are then.
1/15 Looking at the outcome of the 🇷🇺 discussion at the EU Summit I have many questions. Why did 🇩🇪 and 🇫🇷 suggest an EU27 + Russia format when this was clearly not going to fly? Why the urgency?
2/15 Why is there so little reference in the Conclusions to the @JosepBorrellF report? Did the 🇩🇪 🇫🇷 initiative distract the chiefs? Did they not consider the EUHR’s suggestions worth discussing? Would the result have been different without the🇩🇪🇫🇷 push?
3/15 Is the idea of high-level meetings with🇷🇺 heretical? The old summit model had exhausted itself long before it was suspended, as @kadriliik rightly says. They were devoid of substance and increasingly at odds with the harsh reality of a deteriorating relationship.