We put together a team of macro-, micro- and energy economists to think about the question: what would be the effects on the German economy of a stop of energy imports from Russia?
In short: moderate, especially in combination with the right policy response.
Summary:
- no single study finds deviation of yearly GDP from baseline larger than 5.3%
- no single study finds recession with GDP drop larger than 2.5%
Our review builds heavily on the careful and highly recommended survey by @SVR_Wirtschaft
Of course, any model-based quantitative assessment is necessarily subject to a large degree of uncertainty, both with respect to parameter values and functional form assumptions and in the form of uncertainty about model choice and assumptions (“model uncertainty”).
We nevertheless think that the combined body of work suggests that:
- a recession with year-to-year GDP drop of >5% seems highly unlikely
- a recession with GDP drop of 10 or 15% or even Great Depression-type scenario is completely implausible
As we said many times, these numbers -- GDP deductions of 3% or 5%, or a recession with a 2% GDP drop -- are substantial.
But they do not amount to an economic catastrophe.
In case this wasn't clear and to put it a bit more bluntly: the "completely implausible" scenarios include
- "the loss of millions of jobs" (@Bundeskanzler Scholz)
Excellent thread with intuitive explanations why people claiming energy sanctions won't affect Putin's ability to wage war in Ukraine either haven't thought things through or are arguing in bad faith.
An example by @M_C_Klein: "Russia has lost access to many imports" and therefore "the oil boycott will hurt ordinary Europeans at least as much as it impairs Putin’s war effort. It should be understood mainly as a moral gesture rooted in self-denial"
Where does this "production multiplier" of 5 come from?
From an important paper on supply chain disruptions after Fukushima by Vasco Carvalho, Makoto Nirei, Yukiko Saito & Alireza Tahbaz-Salehi @QJEHarvard which indeed finds substantial amplification.
We asked Alireza Tahbaz-Salehi & Vasco Carvalho what they thought of the @tom_krebs_ calculation. Here is what they said:
"We ourselves would not use that Japan- and earthquake-specific number as a starting point for a quantitative assessment of energy disruptions in Europe."
"[Ein Ölembargo] ist überfällig und nötig. [...] Die geplante schrittweise Einführung bis zum Jahresende ist aber nicht ambitioniert genug. Wenn man die Einnahmequellen für Putins Kriegsmaschinerie effektiv treffen will, muss das Embargo wesentlich schneller greifen."
"Obwohl das Ölembargo auch den Maschinen- und Anlagenbau indirekt weiter belasten wird, sieht der VDMA angesichts des aggressiven und menschenverachtenden Verhaltens Russlands in der Ukraine keine Alternative zu einer weiteren Verschärfung der Sanktionen."
@fromTGA mentions our paper "It would cost a lot, maybe 2-3% of GDP, but it’s doable"
@W_Schmidt_ then says a few things we would like to react to.
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Some of these statements are either misleading or plainly wrong.
More importantly though @W_Schmidt_ simply dismisses a whole body of work that concludes: economic costs of an embargo would be substantial (eg jobs would be lost) but not catastrophic.
First, in its literal interpretation, the sentence "there is no German chemical industry" is demonstrably false.
Anyone can see for themselves by simply reading our paper and I'm sure @tom_krebs_ was aware of this.
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Now if you read @tom_krebs_ article in more detail, that's not actually what he means.
Instead his criticism is that we use a common elasticity of substitution for household consumption ("turn down heating") and different sectors in industry ("cracking furnaces").