Alright Ladies & Gentlemen, we are going to have a round of "Mud, Blood & Truck Medical Supply Chains" as we look at the casualty implications of the break down of Russian Truck Logistics in Ukraine. 🧵
1/
First, I'm going to pull some modern warfare casualty ratios from the book UNDERSTANDING WAR.
20 out of 100 troops hit in combat are killed IMMEDIATELY
Modern late 20th-early 21st century war w/tanks artillery and planes has a death to casualty ratio of 1-to-4.
This requires modern trauma care, which is "non-trivial." It requires a supply chain with fresh whole blood & hemostatic dressings. sciencedirect.com/topics/nursing… 3/
The following link and text are a deep dive into Trauma care from the CDC's "Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report" (MMWR)
Injury Prevention, Violence Prevention, and Trauma Care: Building the Scientific Base
Supplements
October 7, 2011 / 60(04);78-85 cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/m… 4/
For the 15 of 100 who are seriously injured, getting to a medical facility in 1 hour is critical to increase survival from a less than 5 of 15 to 12 of 15.
The contested air situation in Ukraine means there are little to no helicopter medical evacuation available. 5/
The corruption of the Russian is such that there are going to be few/no Hemostatic Dressings in the Russian combat medical system, no safe areas & few trucks to evacuate Russian frontline casualties to Belarus or Russia. 6/
This means that Russian casualties in Ukraine are much closer to a 1-to-3 ratio than 1-to-4 most military analysts are using.
That is, less than 5 of the 15 seriously wounded Russians are surviving because they are not getting to modern medical trauma care in time.
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There is so much to object to here that I'm going to restate some basic design observations on the FP-5 to clarify how the Russian reflexive control data fed AI slop that is polluting public discussions of the FP-5.
1. The FP-5 Flamingo is about four times the launch weight of a BGM-109 Tomahawk (i.e. ~13,200 lb), and 2-3 times the range (i.e. ~1,620 nmi) while carrying twice the warhead mass (i.e. ~2,000 lb).
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2. The FP-5 design concept is modelled on the USAF MGM-13 Mace GLCM as Fire Point told Ukrainian military analysts - but designed with modern technology to be extremely cheap to make (claimed 1/6 the cost of a Tomahawk - likely not counting the engine cost).
The first thing that needs to be pointed out is that in 2026 Ukraine has not only replicated, but likely exceeded, the 2018 capabilities of the USAF's Stand-off Munitions Activity Center (SMAC) at at Barksdale AFB.
Electronic warfare is always a "saving throw" with an expiration date for the defense.
Plus no one in the world, since 1989, has invested in enough mobile guns for robust AA-combined arms to screw up the simple arithmetic of a saturation drone/missile attacks.
2/
Russia burned out Ukraine's considerable stocks of 5V55 SAMs (~3,300 rounds), 9M83 SAMs (~1,000) and 9M38 SAMs (~800) by repeat saturation attacks.
Ukraine returns the favor. This is not that difficult to grasp.
Saturation attacks were central to legacy Soviet doctrine.
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We have just seen over Moscow today - with Ukrainian drones - the Russo-Ukrainian War's version of the RAF’s first 1,000-bomber raid of World War II, codenamed Operation Millennium, which took place on the night of May 30–31, 1942.
Operation Millennium, marked the first tactical deployment of the RAF "bomber stream".
That is, the tactic of flying a dense, tightly timed formation along a narrow corridor to overwhelm German radar networks and anti-aircraft defenses of the Kammhuber line. 2/3
When I look at the design of the air defense rings around Moscow.🧐⬇️
I can't help but think Ukraine used a 2026 "Drone Stream' to saturate one sector of these ring defenses like the RAF did to the Kammhuber line.
The Soviets built their industrial plants to minimize transportation impact on its railway system, and later, it's trucking.
This 2013 time stamped Jon Parshall presentation on WW2 US vs German Vs Soviet tank industries underlines this Soviet reality
2/
In the 1950's and 1960's the CIA and Strategic Air Command (SAC) Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) targeting planners discovered this quirk of the Soviet centralized economy.
Via a question to @grok of Cities of 500K(+) in OWA Drone range:
"Distances are approximate great-circle (straight-line/air) from Havana or central Cuba; actual drone paths could vary due to routing, wind, altitude, & launch site (e.g., closer to Florida from western Cuba) 2/
All listed cities are well under 2,700 km.Florida and Southeast (easiest reach)
Miami, FL (~370 km / 230 miles) — Well within range.
Jacksonville, FL (~1,000–1,100 km) — Within range.
Tampa/St. Petersburg area (metro >500k in cities/urban) — ~400–500 km.