Alright Ladies & Gentlemen, we are going to have a round of "Mud, Blood & Truck Medical Supply Chains" as we look at the casualty implications of the break down of Russian Truck Logistics in Ukraine. 🧵
1/
First, I'm going to pull some modern warfare casualty ratios from the book UNDERSTANDING WAR.
20 out of 100 troops hit in combat are killed IMMEDIATELY
Modern late 20th-early 21st century war w/tanks artillery and planes has a death to casualty ratio of 1-to-4.
This requires modern trauma care, which is "non-trivial." It requires a supply chain with fresh whole blood & hemostatic dressings. sciencedirect.com/topics/nursing… 3/
The following link and text are a deep dive into Trauma care from the CDC's "Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report" (MMWR)
Injury Prevention, Violence Prevention, and Trauma Care: Building the Scientific Base
Supplements
October 7, 2011 / 60(04);78-85 cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/m… 4/
For the 15 of 100 who are seriously injured, getting to a medical facility in 1 hour is critical to increase survival from a less than 5 of 15 to 12 of 15.
The contested air situation in Ukraine means there are little to no helicopter medical evacuation available. 5/
The corruption of the Russian is such that there are going to be few/no Hemostatic Dressings in the Russian combat medical system, no safe areas & few trucks to evacuate Russian frontline casualties to Belarus or Russia. 6/
This means that Russian casualties in Ukraine are much closer to a 1-to-3 ratio than 1-to-4 most military analysts are using.
That is, less than 5 of the 15 seriously wounded Russians are surviving because they are not getting to modern medical trauma care in time.
7/End
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THE UNITED STATES STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
Bombing Accuracy, USAAF Heavy and Medium Bombers in the ETO
MILITARY ANALYSIS DIVISION
First Edition 3 November 1945
Second Edition January 1947
You find both mission failures & gross errors were "excluded data" 2/
And that both increased altitude and the number of combat boxes involved made CEP worse.
>>This is essentially a complete tactical bomber cell in a box, sized for a small mobile drone team operating at brigade level or below. It is not a strategic deep-strike weapon, and it is not pretending to be one.
I've spent the last few hours reposting my 2022 to date take down's of Alex Vershinin's "Truck beer math" (from the Nov. 2021 War on the Rocks article "Feeding the Bear") which I used to review this Tochnyi article⬇️
TLDR: Tochnyi screwed up & used Vershinin's disproven work. 1/
Specifically this bit stating Russian trucks did three trips a day because they spent one hour loading and one hour unloading trucks.
That is, like Alex Vershinin, they assumed mechanized logistics loading times with pallets & forklifts⬇️
2/
This is Alex Vershinin's truck "Beer Math" for comparison.
It assumes 45 miles vice 50 km, but both show the same mirror imaging of Western mechanized logistics on Red/Russian Army non-mechanized logistics.