Alright Ladies & Gentlemen, we are going to have a round of "Mud, Blood & Truck Medical Supply Chains" as we look at the casualty implications of the break down of Russian Truck Logistics in Ukraine. 🧵
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First, I'm going to pull some modern warfare casualty ratios from the book UNDERSTANDING WAR.
20 out of 100 troops hit in combat are killed IMMEDIATELY
Modern late 20th-early 21st century war w/tanks artillery and planes has a death to casualty ratio of 1-to-4.
This requires modern trauma care, which is "non-trivial." It requires a supply chain with fresh whole blood & hemostatic dressings. sciencedirect.com/topics/nursing… 3/
The following link and text are a deep dive into Trauma care from the CDC's "Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report" (MMWR)
Injury Prevention, Violence Prevention, and Trauma Care: Building the Scientific Base
Supplements
October 7, 2011 / 60(04);78-85 cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/m… 4/
For the 15 of 100 who are seriously injured, getting to a medical facility in 1 hour is critical to increase survival from a less than 5 of 15 to 12 of 15.
The contested air situation in Ukraine means there are little to no helicopter medical evacuation available. 5/
The corruption of the Russian is such that there are going to be few/no Hemostatic Dressings in the Russian combat medical system, no safe areas & few trucks to evacuate Russian frontline casualties to Belarus or Russia. 6/
This means that Russian casualties in Ukraine are much closer to a 1-to-3 ratio than 1-to-4 most military analysts are using.
That is, less than 5 of the 15 seriously wounded Russians are surviving because they are not getting to modern medical trauma care in time.
7/End
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The ability of Taiwan to operate it's HIMARS is tied directly to it's ability to deny China drone air superiority inside Taiwanese air space.
China can throw 1 million OWA drones to suppress Taiwanese air defenses to take those off shore islands.
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The PLA holding the Pescadores, Green and Orchard islands as launch platforms for HQ-9 SAM's, heavy MLRS rockets and Hornet class truck hunting drones means it can overwatch & reduce Taiwanese beach defenses, all while denying air space to ROCAF fighters.
Russia's air defense has suffered a nearly complete "Lanchester Square Collapse" proximate with the Ukrainian mass deployment of both 150 km range AI truck hunting drones and bridge busting FP-2 OWA drones.
Map H/T United24media 2/3
Any route Russian trucks take to Crimea will result in parking lots near replacement pontoon bridging for both those kinds of drones to exploit.
Elon Musk’s plan for XAI satellite data centers, and all use of space for any purpose, faces inevitable collapse until a solution emerges for the problem of Kessler Syndrome (see Wikipedia). 🧵
This will occur when enough collisions of small orbital debris pieces from old dead satellites hits the steadily increasing number of new satellites until the whole thing spirals into mass collisions.
Kessler Syndrome computes that this will destroy all existing
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...communications, navigation, observation and research satellites in low/medium orbit, and prevent all further satellites launched, for 40+ years, until enough pieces fall out of orbit into the Earth’s atmosphere.
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Do you remember all the 2023 US Navalist accounts o X that screamed at @johnkonrad and I about pointing out the containerized anti-ship OWA drone threat to the US fleet.
Welcome to 2026 Ukrainian anti-ship OWA drone threat, you US Navalist yo-yo's. ⬇️
"Operation Spiderweb with Chinese characteristics" is coming for you all, and we have the receipts.
We need a whole lot of air defense guns everywhere to stop drones that you guys still refuse to fund.
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For fun and reference of guns versus missile air defense, this YouTube test scenario pits 100 Shahed-136 one-way attack drones against the historic US Navy Task Force 38.1 from 1944.
THE UNITED STATES STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
Bombing Accuracy, USAAF Heavy and Medium Bombers in the ETO
MILITARY ANALYSIS DIVISION
First Edition 3 November 1945
Second Edition January 1947
You find both mission failures & gross errors were "excluded data" 2/
And that both increased altitude and the number of combat boxes involved made CEP worse.