2\ Each process in Windows is represented by an "EPROCESS" structure.
These EPROCESS blocks are joined in a doubly linked list structure. The flink (forward link) tells you the next process running and blink (backwards link) tells you the previous process.
3\ When you see a list of processes on a live system, often times this is gathered by walking this doubly-linked structure of EPROCESS blocks.
Of course malware can unlink a process in this doubly linked list to hide from detection :P
4\ Now inside each of EPROCESS blocks is a pointer to a PEB (Process environment block). This is an object that stores information about a process like:
> What command started this process ;)
> The directory the process lives in
> handles, heaps etc
The capabilities of the leaked Chinese APT contractor "iOS Spyware" are accessing:
- basic mobile phone data
- GPS location
- Contacts
- Photos / multimedia files
- Recording sounds
If this sounds familiar, it should. These are settings accessible...Accessible ANY application requesting these permissions on a phone :)
This means, the delivery for the "spyware" would likely (my guess) be in the form of an application that the user installs on their device and must approve these permissions. If you've ever done mobile forensics, this is almost one of the first things you would check.
3\ The implantable devices are very similar in concept to the Hak5 devices.
This is not a new attack vector and NOT novel.
However, this should serve as a push for businesses to consider their threat models and playbooks for this kind of event.
Specifically the vendor's devices are disguised as:
- A power strip
- A power adapter
The way they work (as per the document) is: 1. Cracks WiFi password, sets up socks proxy 3. Cracks routing device 4. Self destruction to clear all system data
From an ops standpoint this targets a weak point of most businesses as most orgs do not have the best logging set up for their peripheral devices. It's why a lot nation states target edge devices for initial access (EDR blindspot / logging blindspot and difficulty of analysis for blue teamers).
However, once they pivot onto a vulnerable device or onto the network... the work of the detection team stays the same, it may just be difficult (in the absence of logs) to piece together what occurred.
2\ EWS and other legacy auth is commonly abused by APT groups (when enabled).
Check MSExchange Management.evtx log for EWS abuse.
Look for cmdlets like (more cmdlets in blog)
> New-MailboxExportRequest
> Remove-MailboxExportRequest
> Search-Mailbox
> Set-Mailbox
3\ Hunt IIS logs in Exchange for:
> Exploitation of unpatched vuln
> Webshell/owa backdoors being used
> Exfil
I've noted across engagements this happens in chunks via several extensions 7Z, TAR, RAR, PST, OST, CAB, ZIP). APTs will use several diff file types on one engagement